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Soul of a Man 
 
Won't somebody tell me, answer if you can! 
Want somebody tell me, what is the soul of a man 
I'm going to ask the question, answer if you can 
 
If anybody here can tell me, what is the soul of a man? 
I've traveled in different countries, I've traveled foreign lands 
I've found nobody to tell me, what is the soul of a man 
 
I saw a crowd stand talking, I came up right on time 
Were hearing the doctor and the lawyer, say a man ain't nothing but his mind 
I read the bible often, I tries to read it right 
 
As far as I can understand, a man is more than his mind 
When Christ stood in the temple, the people stood amazed 
Was showing the doctors and the lawyers, how to raise a body from the grave 
 
 
“Blind” Willie Johnson (1897-1945) 
 
  
Abstract 
 
Thesis analyses the reception of Augustine of Hippo's (354-430) ontological discourse on 
the soul in late antiquity and the early middle ages, more specifically in the sixth and the ninth 
centuries. Since Augustine never wrote a De anima, nor always presented his readers with definite 
answers to questions, there was room for later authors to interpret and improvise. This thesis 
focuses on 4 texts: Cassiodorus Senator's De anima, Eugippius of Lucculanum's massive florilegium 
the Excerpta ex operibus Sancti Augustini, both from the sixth century, Gottschalk of Orbais' letter 
Quaestiones de anima, and John Scottus Eriugena's apologetic De divina praedestinatione liber, both 
from the ninth century. This thesis establishes that, apart from Cassiodorus, the author's main 
interest in Augustine's ideas on the ontology of the soul rests on the way it impinges on their 
contemporary predestination debates. Cassiodorus consciously wanted to produce a Christian De 
anima in a classical vein. Especially the question of the origin of the soul takes the interest of 
Eugippius and Gottschalk. This is an important question for predestination debates, since it is 
supposed to explain technically how original sin came to be universal. Augustine never found a 
satisfactory answer to this thorny question. Eriugena's genius lies in building an original ontology 
of the soul on Augustine's own foundations which sidesteps this problem of the origin of the 
soul entirely. 
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 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Who would not want to know the secret of life?1 The secret of life, of what makes 
something a moving, self-propagating, perhaps sentient and maybe even rational being, has been 
long delved into. Since the twentieth century and Watson and Crick’s discovery of DNA in 1953, 
the discipline of biochemistry has solved a number of significant problems. Yet many important 
questions have not been answered, and it is questionable wether biochemistry, or neuroscience 
for that matter, will ever solve them. Why is there life in the first place? What is the meaning of 
life? What is the mind? If it thinks these questions have relevance at all, the natural sciences in its 
paradigm will have much difficulty answering these questions. But there are different ways of 
thinking or paradigms which have their forte not so much in the ‘technical’ aspects of life, as the 
natural sciences have, but in answering the questions pertaining to the meaning of life. Why do 
we have life and what should we do with it? And what is our life? The paradigm which has been 
dominant in the West since late antiquity, and still is very influential today, is the Christian 
paradigm. This paradigm ascribes life to the soul and it has ideas why we have one, what we (or 
it) should do and why, and where it is going. However, the soul is not a Christian invention, nor 
are Christians the only ones to think in terms of ‘soul’. And even though the humanities and 
philosophy have tried to supplant the notion with concepts such as ‘mind’, ‘identity’, and ‘self’, 
the soul seems to enjoy a renewed popularity.  
 
But this thesis is not about to make a case for the soul or to judge its validity as a concept 
or the Christian paradigm we have it from. This thesis purports to describe a  small part of the 
long intellectual tradition which has shaped our ideas concerning the soul and as such is part of 
the discipline of history of ideas and reception studies. Finding out not only how concepts 
change over time, but also how people look upon and use their (intellectual) past, are questions 
pertaining to this field. This may be followed up by questioning what constitutes authority and 
how people try to learn from authority, and how to use it to bolster their own position. 
Reception history will show how our ancestors formed a tradition by reiterating but also (subtly) 
changing part of their intellectual heritage. Some of the biggest fruits from this enterprise come 
 
1 Augustine in the lib. arb. 1.25.12 agrees that an act of the will precedes the quest for knowledge.  
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in eventually realizing how it was the interplay between an already given intellectual tradition and 
an author’s own contemporary concerns which shaped his interests and use of his past, and how 
this changed this same tradition (gradually or not). Occupying our own position later in history, 
this earlier process in turn partly shapes our own concerns. Heidegger, so important for the field 
of intellectual history and perception studies, gave a sort of programmatic statement for the 
questions raised above in Sein und Zeit, at least that is how I understand him:  
 
‘Das Dasein ist in seiner jeweiligen Weise zu sein und sonach auch mit 
dem ihm zugehörigen Seinsverständnis in eine überkommene Daseinsauslegung 
hinein- und in ihr aufgewachsen. Aus dieser her versteht es sich zunächst und in 
gewissem Umkreis ständig. Dieses Verständnis erschließt die Möglichkeiten seines 
Seins und regelt sie. Seine eigene Vergangenheit - und das besagt immer die seiner 
‘Generation’ - folgt dem Dasein nicht nach, sondern geht ihm je schon vorweg.  
 
Diese elementare Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins kann diesem selbst 
verborgen bleiben. Sie kann aber auch in gewisser Weise entdeckt werden und 
eigene Pflege erfahren. Dasein kann Tradition entdecken, bewahren und ihr 
ausdrücklich nachgehen. Die Entdeckung von Tradition und die Erschließung 
dessen, was sie ‘übergibt’ and wie sie übergibt, kann als eigenständige Aufgabe 
ergriffen werden.’2 
 
The point of entry in this thesis shall be Augustine of Hippo (354-430). For the 
intellectual history of the West, Augustine serves as a pivotal point between Antiquity and the 
Middle Ages. Having received a classical education himself and undergone a conversion to the 
Christian religion, Augustine would determine the face of the classical heritage into the Christian 
Middle Ages to no small extent. Certainly not an isolated figure, other important representatives 
of his age include in the West Ambrose and Jerome, who did their part in the transformation. 
But through his long writing career, there was hardly a topic that Augustine did not write about. 
Already famous during his lifetime, his stature would change in a few centuries hence from the 
first and foremost peer to an almost unassailable authority. This was helped by the fact that 
Augustine went through a long intellectual development, changing his opinions on, for example, 
free will, so that many people with different intellectual outlooks could read Augustine, be 
 
2 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (11th, unchanged ed., Tübingen 1967), 2.6, 20. 
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formed in different ways, and find in Augustine what they needed. This thesis will look at the 
way a few authors read, understood, and used Augustine for their own purposes. As such, it has 
been written in the context of the Leverhulme-funded project After Augustine, which took place 
at the University of St Andrews under the leadership of prof. dr. Karla Pollmann. Other awards 
to support this thesis have been given by the Prins Bernhard Cultuurfornds, the Ketel 1 
Studiefonds, the Hendrik Muller Vaderlandsch fonds, and the Radboud Wetenschappelijk fonds. 
As the first chapter on Augustine will explain, the soul has been a major topic of 
investigation for Augustine. In fact, realizing that God and the soul both have immaterial 
substances instead of materialistic substances (as was the default position in the fourth century) 
was an important step in Augustine’s conversion. The writings of Augustine concerning the soul 
can roughly be divided into two different discourses. There is an ontological discourse, in which 
Augustine writes about questions such as ‘What is the soul?’, ‘What is the primary function of 
the soul?’, ‘What is the soul made of?’, ‘Is the soul divine?‘, and ‘Is the soul changeable?’. These 
questions were answered in many of his early dialogues, such as the an. quant. (387-388), but also 
during some of his mature works, most notably book 7 of  his great exegetical enterprise Gn. litt. 
(published ca. 416). Then there is a dynamical discourse on the soul, which focuses on questions 
about the capacities and powers of the soul. Augustine stated that there is a trinitarian structure 
in the soul, consisting of remembering, knowing and willing, which makes up for these powers. 
The most important work in which Augustine expounded this theory is the trin. (written roughly 
between 400-420). These two discourses hardly come together in Augustine’s oeuvre, and in 
order to make for a more coherent field of research, I have chosen to focus on Augustine’s 
ontological discourse of the soul, not on his dynamical discourse. The authors in this thesis who 
have been studied with an eye to their reception of Augustine provided  enough material for 
that. The exception to this is Eriugena (chapter 5), but his specific text was chosen somewhat 
later.  
 
This brings us to the criteria of choice for the authors other than Augustine which are to 
be researched in this thesis. As I had gained some knowledge and insight in how the Carolingian 
era is a(nother) very formative period in the intellectual history of the West through my study of 
Fredegisus of Tours’ De substantia nihili et tenebrarum,3 it seemed clear that the authors had to be 
selected from the ninth century. In this century, the foundations have been laid for the tradition 
of medieval scholasticism and a living, unbroken tradition of philosophy has been established in 
 
3 out of which so far have come ‘Wat te doen met ‘niets’ en ‘duister’?’, Millennium, tijdschrift voor middeleeuwse studies 
20.2 (2006), 95-114 (with an English abstract). 
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the West.4 However, in order to gain more of a feeling for the way in which ninth century 
authors would not encounter just Augustine, but also Augustine as read through the lens of a by 
then already existing tradition of reception of Augustine, some sixth century ‘stepping stones‘ 
were taken into account. Most prominently, Eugippius‘ massive Excerpta ex operibus Sancti 
Augustini came to be considered for this reason (chapter 2). Eventually the investigations into the 
sixth century authors merited an equal part in the whole thesis. And rightly so, for this period is 
important for its transformations of classical traditions into medieval ones. Even though this 
thesis has not pointed this out explicitly, the differences in motivations and selection criteria 
between Cassiodorus (chapter 3) and Eugippius (chapter 2) might bring this out.  
Another criterion of choice has been the existence of critical editions. I have chosen in 
this research to cut to the core of the reception of Augustine’s ontological discourse on the soul, 
and in order to establish fairly quickly how much of Augustine is present in a text in an 
identifiable way, the availability of a good critical edition is a necessary condition. Hrabanus 
Maurus‘ De anima, for example, in this way came to fall from the ‘shortlist’ of eligible texts, even 
though it seems that at least some Augustine made its way into this treatise. Another author 
whose texts eventually did not came to be included is Alcuin, even though he has been 
thoroughly formed by Augustine and Augustine seems to seep through in all of his writings, e.g. 
his De animae ratione liber ad Eulaliam virginem. This may be something to be done in the future. An 
exception to this rule is Claudianus Mamertus’ De statu animae which received a critical edition in 
1885 by Engelbrecht. But the sheer size combined with a relative scarcity of secondary literature 
made me sidestep this text. It could be another future project, and this thesis has intentionally 
not been designed to offer an exhaustive treatment of these two centuries. 
This also means that this thesis is also almost devoid of considerations concerning the 
manuscript tradition of the texts which did end up being included. Eugippius’ Excerpta are the 
exception, since Pius Knöll’s critical edition of 1885 has some problems with the manuscript 
tradition which may impact on the findings on Eugippius. These problems have been addressed 
in appendix 3.3 (‘Comparison of editions of Eugippius‘ Excerpta in the PL and Knöll’).  
The texts which have been chosen as sources are the sixth century’s Excerpta ex operibus 
Sancti Augustini by Eugippius of Lucullanum (chapter 2) and the De anima by Cassiodorus Senator 
(chapter 3), and the ninth century’s Quaestiones de anima by Gottschalk of Orbais (chapter 4) and 
the De divina praedestinatione liber by John Scottus Eriugena (chapter 5). This last work did not 
initially figure in the texts under consideration, since it does not boast a lot of reception of 
 
4 John Marenbon (1981), 4. 
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Augustine’s specifically ontological discourse on the soul. There are, however, a few overriding 
reasons to consider the work none the less. Over the course of the research of both Eugippius’ 
and Gottschalk’s text, it became clear that the predestination debates of the fifth, sixth and ninth 
centuries had their impact on the reception of Augustine’s ideas on the ontology of the soul in 
their texts. It is interesting then to see how the soul is treated ontologically in a work which does 
not start out from the perspective of the soul, but from the predestination debates. Eriugena’s 
text is magnificently suited for this, as he wrote much on the soul in this work, and he directly 
reacted against Gottschalk’s ideas on predestination (which probably in turn had their influence 
on his ideas of the ontology of the soul, as chapter 4 will elucidate), although not on the text 
under consideration in this thesis. Moreover, in the predestination debates of the ninth century 
specifically the mastery of Augustine as an authority was one of the points at stake. Gottschalk’s, 
but especially Eriugena’s longer text is bristling with Augustine, even if they both draw their very 
own and opposite conclusions from Augustine. This merited the inclusion of Eriugena in this 
text in this thesis. Moreover it would be a shame to ignore this monumental thinker of the ninth 
century entirely.5 
The texts have also been chosen with an eye to the genre to which they belong.  
Eugippius compiled a florilegium, Cassiodorus wrote a classical De anima, Gottschalk a letter and 
Eriugena an apology against Gottschalk. The form which the respective writings took was a 
factor in the material included. Eugippius’ work consists of copy pasting texts written by others, 
and apart from a prefatory letter, he is only indirectly present. His first and very visible editorial 
choice consists of limiting his compiling to Augustine’s texts. The genre of the De anima 
determined what kind of questions and topics Cassiodorus had to treat to conform to the 
expectations of his readership, such as the substance, quality, quantity and the seat of the soul in 
the human body. Eriugena’s polemic was determined by opposing Gottschalk’s opinions and 
arguments, and using as much Augustine in the process as he was capable of. Gottschalk’s own 
text is a letter, and therefore has not that many requirements as to its contents. However, the 
contents seem to show that it was composed as the kernel of a De anima. But even if the letter 
could be expanded into a De anima, the real and relevant topic was Gottschalk’s solution to the 
problem of the origin of the soul. It would be interesting to see if the requirements of the genres 
have their influence on the reception of Augustine by the respective authors as well. However, 
 
5 Eriugena’s Liber de egressu et regressu animae ad deum (PL 122) seemed too fragmentary, and the content of Augustine 
to questionable to receive a chapter of its own, and it would amount to hubris to casually include Eriugena’s 
magisterial De divisione naturae in a mere chapter.  
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this influence has been treated rather implicitly in this thesis, given that I eventually have been 
able to give only one text per genre the scrutiny it deserved. 
 
The texts have been researched through ‘close reading’. Understanding what the author 
meant with his text and with his borrowings from Augustine (in the form of quotations, 
paraphrases or otherwise), comparing these borrowings with Augustine’s own text and context, 
then identifying similarities and differences, and finally using these similarities and differences to 
explain and elucidate the author’s intellectual commitments and choices, seemed for me the only 
way of going about this thesis. This thesis aims therefore not only to be part of ‘reception 
history’, but also of the history of ideas. This method leads to a rather detailed view of the texts 
which have been researched. A chapter typically has a first paragraph on the structure of the text 
itself, followed by paragraph with an overview of the use of Augustine in the text, before a more 
abstract conceptual analysis takes place. There are many historians of ideas who deliver 
commendable work, but I would like to point out three articles which have served as a model for 
my enterprises in this thesis. These are Brian Stock’s magnificent ‘In search of Eriugena’s 
Augustine’, Goulven Madec’s ‘L’Augustinisme de Jean Scot dans le De Praedestinatione’ and 
Charles Brittain’s ‘No place for a Platonist soul in 5th Century Provence? The case of Claudianus 
Mamertus’.6 The downside of this intensive method of reading is that I have not been able to 
research many more texts. The reader is therefore warned not to expect a large overview of a 
historical intellectual development through many texts, or an exhaustive treatment of the 
reception of Augustine’s ideas on the soul in the two designated centuries. 
 
This does not mean, however, that this thesis consists only of a collection of loose 
chapters. The red line and main finding in this thesis is that there is a definite connection in the 
minds of my authors (excluding Cassiodorus) between the ontology of the soul and 
predestination. This may be obvious from an abstract Christian theological perspective. It stands 
to reason that God, as the creator of the soul may determine its later course. But through the 
predestination debates it took a more technical form. That has to do with the dogma of the 
universality of original sin. This idea that humanity in its entirety shares in Adam’s original sin (to 
which the title of this thesis refers) became orthodox in the predestination debates in the fifth 
century. It serves as the foundation for Augustine’s theodicy and subsequently for his idea that 
God dispenses grace gratuitously. But the question then becomes how this process of sharing 
 
6 the first two are listed in the bibliography, the last one is published in Ralph Mathisen and Danuta Shanzer (eds.), 
Society and Culture in Late Antique Gaul. Revisiting the sources (Aldershot etc. 2001), 237-60. 
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technically takes place, and what -if any- the consequences are of original sin and the Fall for the 
ontology of the soul. 
The question of how humanity shares in Adam’s sin has been framed, under Augustine’s 
lead, under the heading ‘the origin of the soul’. The problem of the origin of the soul (i.e. how 
the soul came into being and -perhaps even more important- how it came to occupy the human 
body) had traditionally formed part of any (complete) classical theory on the soul. It had already 
been connected with a Fall of the soul by e.g. Plotinus and Origen. Even though Augustine came 
to reject both their ideas on the origin and the Fall of the soul, and even if the problem of the 
origin of the soul also is a general intellectual topos, Augustine would always connect it with the 
way in which original sin was universalized. Consequently the authors which were concerned 
with predestination followed suit. But Augustine thought long and hard on the topic, yet never 
came to a satisfactory answer. This gave room for later interpretation and ‘improvisation’. 
Eugippius tried to keep the peace between parties by stressing Augustine’s agnosticism on the 
topic, but implicitly proposing his own solution to the problem. Gottschalk chose a solution 
proposed by Augustine which was very congenial with the rest of his ideas on predestination. 
However it was only one of the possible solutions Augustine proposed, so that Gottschalk had 
to proverbially twist Augustine’s arm to get his support. And Augustine would not have withheld 
his consent for nothing, for Gottschalk’s solution was far from perfect. Eriugena, in reaction to 
Gottschalk’s ideas on predestination, came with a very original solution to the problem. He 
broke through the problem by considering it on his own terms and not on the terms that 
Augustine had set in his writings. And the admirable aspect of it is that he did it all on the basis 
of Augustine’s own ideas.  
 
The authors in this thesis therefore have different interests in Augustine’s ontological 
discourse on the soul. Cassiodorus tried to take it all in, but did not care so much about 
predestination in his De anima. In opposition to this Eugippius and Gottschalk actually did not 
care all that much for Augustine’s ontological questions on the soul, in as far as they did not 
impinge on the predestination debates in their respective ages. Eriugena in his div. praed. finally 
did take a keen interest in the ontology of the soul, even if starting from the perspective of the 
predestination debates, but his genius lay in sidestepping Augustine’s ontological discourse on 
the soul altogether.   
In this way my hope is that this thesis shows different examples of the reception of 
Augustine’s ontological discourse on the soul, how this ontological discourse has a relevance in 
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the predestination debates, and finally how the authors of the texts are formed by and recreate 
the intellectual tradition they stand in. 
 Part One: Augustine 
 
Chapter 1. Augustine’s ontological 
discourse on the soul 
 
 
 
 
With the field of anthropology, one comes to one of the core of Augustine’s thought. To 
characterize in a nutshell, one is frequently referred to a few lines of the Soliloquia, one of 
Augustine’s early dialogues (386/387).7 In this dialogue between Augustine and Reason, 
Augustine states that his interests are God and the soul: 
 
Augustine:  ‘So, I have prayed to God 
Reason: What then do you want to know? 
A:  All these things which I have prayed for. 
R:  Sum them up briefly. 
A:  I want to know God and the soul. 
R:  Nothing more? 
A:  Nothing at all’.8 
(trans. Gerard Watson) 
 
 Arguably this can be considered a programmatic statement for the rest of Augustine’s 
intellectual career. Whether it be in the works he produced in the great debates against the 
Manichees, Donatists and Pelagians, in other major texts such as the conf., the trin. and the civ., or 
the textbooks on the arts such as the mus., the human being and his relation to God were always 
prime topics of Augustine’s attention.9 However, Augustine’s ontological discourse on the soul 
 
7 e.g. Gerard O’Daly starts his book Augustine’s philosophy of mind (London 1987) invoking the following few lines 
from sol 1.2.7, 1 and it is no shame to follow him in this.  
8 sol. 1.2.7: A. ecce oravi deum. R. quid ergo scire vis? A. haec ipsa omnia quae oravi. R. breviter ea conlige. A. deum et animam scire 
cupio. R. nihilne plus? A. nihil omnino. 
9 The debate with the Manicheans evolved around the (in)corporality of God and the soul, with the Donatists 
around the possible human influence on the sacraments and with the Pelagianists around the measure of 
dependence on God’s grace of the human will to do good. The conf. can (at least partly) be described as the road of 
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was mainly developed in his early career, from the Cassiciacum dialogues onwards, through his 
reading of (neo)platonic materials, and in his debates with the Manicheans. He came to realise 
that substance did not necessarily need to be corporeal, and that divine substance was indeed 
incorporeal and immutable and that the rest of the cosmos depended on it.10 These views would 
congeal and last his entire career, with one exception. The problem of the origin of the soul 
would continue to haunt Augustine, and, even though he never solved the problem, he still made 
important contributions to the problem in book 10 of the Gn. litt., which was written as late as 
416. This last problem also was to provide an explicit link, by way of the universality of original 
sin, between his philosophical ontological discourse on the soul, and the more theological 
problem of grace versus free will in the debate against the Pelagians. But before we come to that, 
the ontology of the soul will be built from the ground up. 
 
 
1.1 The function of the soul 
 
1.1.1 Participation in species and being 
 
The tie that binds the soul to God can best be described by the concept of participatio. 
‘Participation’ is the term with which Plato described the relation between forms and 
particulars.11 Augustine espoused this concept, yet also converted it by placing the forms as Ideas 
in God’s mind.12 The impact of placing the Ideas in God’s intellect is that the goal of the concept 
is no longer only to describe the relation between exemplar and instance, or between the stable 
model and the universe as Plato would have it in the Timaeus,13 but is broadened to describe the 
relation between creator and creature. Since every particular participates in some form or 
another, every particular is modeled on the Ideas in God’s mind. For Augustine this means that 
 
one specific individual to God, the trin. seeks insight in the holy trinity via trinitarian structures in the human soul 
and the civ. treats the history and eschatology of the human race, the mus. at least makes remarks on the workings 
and unity of human perception.  
10 conf. 7.10.16; conf. 7.20.26. cf. John Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian philosophy’ in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus 
(Cambridge 1996), 403. The default position in fourth century natural philosophy, to which the Manicheans also 
adhered, was that being entailed matter. Other insights Augustine reached were that the divine cannot be mutable, 
and that evil is a privation and not a substance. These insights were augmented with a method of intellectual 
movement which turns inwards from the perceptions of changing bodies, to the rational soul that judges these 
perceptions and measures them against eternal truths, and upward from these truths to the divine which is the cause 
of these eternal truths and the soul’s insight in them, which Augustine acquired through is neoplatonic reading. cf. 
conf. 7.17.23. 
11 For a description and problematization of the concept, e.g. Gosling, (1973), 187-193.  
12 div. qu. 46.2.  
13 E.g. Timaeus, 28a-29a. 
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it is not just the human soul which participates in God, but that the whole of creation is related 
to God. Yet at the same time the human soul has a participation in God which is special, due to 
the creation of the human being in God’s image and likeness in Gen. 1.26. There are thus two 
ways in which the human being participates in God: in the ways that are common to every 
created being and in a way that is privy to the human soul. In this paragraph the primary focus is 
on the normal relation of the (human) soul to God. Augustine would describe the special tie of 
the human soul to God through its trinitarian structure of memory, will and understanding. This 
special tie, however, is not the focus of this thesis.  
The general way in which both the soul and the rest of creation participate in God is of 
two types. First, as afore mentioned, creatures participate in forms in God’s mind, and with the 
participation in the forms, the creatures participate in God. An example would be the form 
‘likeness’. Every creature participates in this form, since it resembles creatures of the same sort 
and contains within itself elements that resemble each other (e.g. particles of earth).14 Very 
important, for a reason soon to follow, are the forms which define a creature as what it is, such 
as stone, human or horse. Since not all the creatures are of the same sort, only some creatures 
participate in a specific form in order to be a stone, human being or a horse. Augustine names 
these forms through which objects become what they are the forma, species or rationes.15 Thus all 
stones participate in the species ‘stoneness’ and all horses in the species ‘horseness’. So the species 
gives the answer to the question what a specific thing is.16 The second way in which any creature 
participates in God is by the very fact of its existence. Augustine used a neologism to express the 
fact that in his view every creature is utterly dependant on God, as he is the only real being. God 
alone has esse, the creatures he bestows existence upon must participate in that esse, so that they 
have their ‘essentia’ (essence).17 
 
14 Gn. litt. inp., 16.59. 
15 div. qu. 46.2. On the ‘terrible mobility’ of Augustine’s technical terms species and forma in the vera rel. cf. Pegon, BA 
8 (1982), 487.  
16 div. qu. 46.2.  
17 In the civ. 12.2 Augustine explicitly indicated his use of this neologism. ‘He gave being to the things which he 
created from nothing, but not the highest being, as He himself is; and to some He gave more being, to others less, 
and thus He ordered the natures of things with grades of being (for as ‘knowledge’ is named from what knowing is, 
so from that which is being, ‘essence’ is called, yet with a new name, which the old authors of the Latin tongue did 
not use, but which has already been used in our times, so that our language should not lack, what the Greeks call 
οὐσία; this word is thus expressed with that word, so that ‘essence’ can be said).’ Rebus, quas ex nihilo creavit, esse dedit, 
sed non summe esse, sicut est ipse; et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus, atque ita naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit (sicut enim ab 
eo, quod est sapere, vocatur sapientia, sic ab eo, quod est esse, vocatur essentia, novo quidem nomine, quo usi veteres non sunt Latini 
sermonis auctores, sed iam nostris temporibus usitato, ne deesset etiam linguae nostrae, quod Graeci appellant οὐσίαν; hoc enim 
verbum a verbo expressum est, ut diceretur essentia). For an earlier use of the term in Augustine e.g. imm. an. 11.18. The 
Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford 1982) reports that the term essentia is ascribed by Seneca to Cicero (ep. 58.6), but by 
Quintilian to Plautus (Inst. 2.14.2; 3.6.23) or to the rhetorician Verginius Flavus (Inst. 8.3.33), 621. Thus the term did 
already exist among the latini. Tertullian may have used the term twice (De oratione cap. 3 [PL 1, 1155d]; De carne 
Christi cap. 2 [PL 2, 755a]) but both are variant readings and may therefore well be later interpolations. Marius 
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The reason why the form of the species is so important is because there exists a very close 
bond between the participation in a certain species and the participation in esse. For it is the species 
which determines in what measure an object is able to participate in esse. In Augustine’s universe, 
being is not a ‘binary’ or discrete state, in which an object either exists, or does not exist (as 
would be the case in an Aristotelian universe). It is rather the case that an object can have a 
‘measure’ (gradus) of being, say between 0 and 1, if 0 is defined as absence of being and 1 as the 
esse which God has.18 It is the esse inquantum est (‘being insofar as it is’) which Augustine speaks 
about in the vera rel., indicating that there are differentiations in being.19 The things are created in 
a proper order of being, a hierarchy ranging from the highest spiritual being of the ‘heaven of 
heavens’ who participates most in esse to the stuff from which everything else is formed. This is 
the base ‘prime matter’, the almost nothing, which barely exists precisely because it lacks species. 
What the thing is determines where it is located in this hierarchy of being. In another 
formulation: the species is closely related to the degree of esse, the essentia of an object. Yet this 
thesis is not concerned with any created being, but especially with the human being. Therefore 
the focus will narrow itself from created beings to living beings, and from living beings to the 
human being.  
 
 
1.1.2 Transmission of the species 
 
When we regard living beings in this context of species and essentia, the soul becomes 
most relevant. For it is the soul which transmits the species to the living being.20 When reading 
an early work such as the imm. an., it becomes clear that the young Augustine thought the soul 
itself to be a being too. The reason is that the soul does not only conveys the species to the body, 
so that it can be the living thing it is, but that –at least the human rational- the soul itself is in 
possession of a species too.21 The human being is thus a composite of soul and body, the first 
having given the latter life and form. As mentioned earlier, Augustine came to the insight that in 
 
Victorinus uses the term (De generatione divini verbi, ad Candidum arianum 9 [PL 8, 1024b] and 28 [1034a]; Adversus 
Arium 3.7 [PL 8,1104a] and 4.6 [1117a]). In Ad Candidum arianum 28 he gives this description: ‘In this way do we 
ascribe substance, existence, and other such terms to God, and on the one hand we say οὐσίαν of His essence, on 
the other hand there is ‘created substance’ to what is in Him, and [what is] to His being.’ Isto etiam modo substantiam, 
existentiam, et caetera hujusmodi apponimus Deo, et ejus essentiae οὐσίαν aliter dicimus, aliter se habente substantia creata ad quod 
inest sibi, et ad suum etiam esse. 
18 civ. 12.2, cf. previous note. 
19 vera rel. 7.13; also imm. an. 15.24.  
20 imm. an. 15.24. 
21 ibid. 
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order to exist, an object need not necessarily be corporeal. Corporeal being is certainly a mode of 
being, but in this creation another mode of being is possible as well. This mode of being is 
spiritual being.22 Augustine is thus a substance dualist, stating that there are two modes of being: 
corporeal and spiritual. We will see shortly that Augustine believed the soul –at least the rational 
soul- to be such a spiritual being. However, there is only a substance dualism in Creation. When 
it comes to esse per se, there is only one type of being on which the rest of the beings are utterly 
dependant: divine nature. The divine nature thus unifies in itself the plurality of substances in 
Creation. And from the divine being each being receives its proper measure of being, mediated 
through the species. The soul is of primary importance for Augustine, since the soul is what 
makes the living thing what it is by transmitting the species. In other words, without the soul the 
living being would be unable to participate and have an essentia.  
 
 
1.2 Structure of the soul 
 
1.2.1 Three assumptions on the soul 
 
When developing his views on the soul, Augustine starts out from three assumptions.23 
The first assumption is that the soul is that what gives life of the body.24 The soul gives life 
through its participation in the form ‘Life’. The implication of this assumption is that the soul 
itself cannot die, since it is life itself.25 Augustine frequently uses the verbs vivificare and animare in 
order to express this fundamental function of the being of the soul.26 The second assumption is 
that the soul provides the living body with proper movement, or action (there may be movement 
of the body through the causal agency of another body, as the collision of one billiard ball with 
another causes the movement of the latter, but this does not constitute action).27 Everything that 
lives, moves. Thus also the growth of plants and trees and their drawing of saps is considered to 
 
22 Gn. litt. 1.1.2-3. These paragraphs are quite obscure though, because of the many questions Augustine poses. This 
is an effect of his conviction, stated earlier in the Gn. litt. inp. 1.1, that when investigating Scripture on the nature of 
creation one should go about asking instead of claiming. Yet it seems clear that his preferred interpretation of the 
word ‘heaven’ in Genesis 1.1 is that it is a spiritual creation, whether unfinished or not. cf. Agaesse’s and Solignac’s 
notes in BA 48, 586-8. 
23 In researching this paragraph, I have made extensive use of the useful references that Gerard O’Daly gives in the 
lemma ‘Anima, Animus’ in the AL, 315-340.  
24 E.g. Gn. litt. 7.18.24. 
25 imm. an. 9.16. 
26 vivificare: e.g. Gn. litt. 7.18.24; div. qu. 54; animare: e.g. imm. an. 15.24; agon. 22. 
27 imm. an. 3.3. 
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be vegetative internus motus (internal motion).28 The third assumption which Augustine entertains 
is that ‘like is known by like’. Corporeal objects can only interact with other corporeal objects, 
incorporeal objects, such as the intelligibles and the rational soul, can only interact with other 
incorporeal objects.29 This assumption of course directly calls into question how the human soul 
is able to govern the body. Augustine never found a satisfactory answer to this perennial 
problem of substance dualism.  
 
 
1.2.2 Vegetative and animal soul 
 
With these three assumptions in mind, we can now start to get an overview of his ideas 
on the soul. Augustine held that there are three types of soul; the vegetative soul, the irrational or 
animal soul and the rational soul. These three types of soul are ordered hierarchically.30 The 
vegetative soul is inferior to the animal and the rational soul, and is therefore rather called ‘life’ 
than soul.31 As stated earlier its action is the internus motus of growth. One step higher on the 
ladder of life stands the animal, or ‘irrational’ soul. This soul provides the body with the vita 
sentiens, the power of sense perception.32 Next to sensation also appetitus (desire) and memoria are 
found in the animal soul.33 The irrational soul has an interesting mixture of corporeal and 
incorporeal elements. In book seven of the Gn. litt. 5.7-21.31 Augustine argues that the rational 
soul in no way is made out of material. One of the arguments is that the rational soul 
contemplates incorporeal objects, such as truth or God.34 Since the assumption that ‘like goes by 
like’ holds, this means that the rational soul is incorporeal. Vice versa, this entails that irrational 
soul should be in some way corporeal, since sense perception deals with bodily objects. 
However, it is hard to catch Augustine on positively affirming this point. Possibly the refined 
particles of fire which, according to the medical knowledge Augustine used, run through the 
 
28 Although I am inclined to think that Augustine would not apply the term actio to this vegetative movement, since 
the imm. an., from which the term stems, is specifically about the human soul. cf. Gn. litt. 17.16.22. 
29 e.g. sol. 1.3.8, imm. an. 10.17. 
30 civ. 7.23. 
31 Gn. litt. inp. 5.24.  
32 Gn. litt. 7.16.22; Gn. litt. inp. 5.24. 
33 civ. 5.11. Although memory and desire are not exclusively in the irrational soul. If will, understanding and memory 
are one, as Augustine states in the trin. then memory cannot only be found in the irrational soul. Appetitus is found in 
every part of the soul. div. qu. 35.2; Cf. Gerard O’Daly, ‘Appetitus’ in AL, 421. According to O’Daly ‘Anima, 
animus’, 323 Augustine was aware of the Platonist division of the soul in three parts: sensual life, love (including 
pleasure and pain), and anger or ‘spiritedness’. Yet O’Daly also remarks that Augustine did not use this division 
often, and certainly in the works of the younger Augustine, I have so far not come across this division. Therefore I 
consider it warranted to leave it out of the account of the irrational soul.  
34 Gn. litt. 7.14.20. 
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‘pipes’ (fistulae) to establish perception in the animal soul can be seen as a remnant of the 
pneumatic theory of soul.35 Yet the animal soul also houses memory, as birds for example are 
able to find their nests again after having flown off.36 Animals are thus able to retain images in 
their memory of places where they have been or found foodstuffs. These images are incorporeal, 
following the argument that forming the image of a stone in one’s memory does not involve 
turning one’s mind into rock. From this it follows by the assumption that ‘like goes by like’, that 
the animal soul must also in some way be incorporeal. Moreover, the argument for the 
incorporeality of the soul from the fact that it cannot be divided in parts presumably works for 
the irrational soul as well. Since the irrational soul is eventually of much less interest for 
Augustine than the rational soul, Augustine does not care to elaborate his statements on this 
topic. It is clear, however, that the irrational soul does possess the power of judgement. It 
belongs to the vita sentiens to judge white from black and hot from cold, and presumably danger 
from safety.37 The irrational soul gives the body a spontaneus motus, translated by Edmund Hill 
into English as ‘deliberate movement’.38 This translation rings true, as long as it is understood 
that the deliberation is the judgment whether or not food is edible, circumstances are dangerous 
and mates are sexually attractive. The deliberations which take place over intelligibles are 
reserved to the rational soul. In my opinion it is this distinction that underlies conf. 10.6.10, where 
Augustine explicitly denies the power of judgment to animals. Yet, it is in the context of the 
reviewing of forms and the search for their Creator, so that it should not be construed as a denial 
of judgement per se.  
 
 
1.2.3 Rational soul 
  
With the rational soul we come to that which gives the human being a status apart from 
the other created living bodies, vegetative or animal. Because of the possession of the rational 
soul the human being has an extra way of contact with the divine. It can gain self-knowledge, 
realize that as a creature it is dependent on God and recover the Truth it holds in itself. The 
human being therefore holds a middle position in Creation: it stands on top in the hierarchy of 
 
35 Gn. litt. 7.13.20. Augustine of course proceeds in the next paragraph to discount the possibility of being particles 
of the soul of even the most refined kind of fire that is used by the senses (the rays of fire which proceed from the 
eyes in order to establish vision). Yet Augustine is here specifically treating the rational soul, for the possibility of 
‘the soul’ being merely animal or irrational soul is discounted in 7.6.10-7.8.11. 
36 Gn. litt. 7.21.29. 
37 Gn. litt. inp. 5.24.  
38 Gn. litt. 7.16.22; Edmund Hill’s translation (2002), 334. 
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bodily life (because of its rational soul), but on the bottom of spiritual life (because of the body). 
When Augustine treats the soul, it is this part of the soul which receives the bulk of attention 
and about which he develops his original ideas. Augustine uses the words anima, animus and mens 
to refer to the rational soul.39 The rational soul has a few special characteristics, which need to be 
treated in turn.  
 
 
1.3 Properties of the rational soul 
 
1.3.1 Incorporeal 
 
The first major point about the rational soul is that it is immaterial; because of its 
importance this has come up already several times. A long treatment of this point is given in the 
gen. litt. book 7. Augustine argues, against the Manichees and other materialists, that the idea of a 
spiritual corporeal matter is erroneous. If the rational soul would have been made from some 
spiritual material, this material would have been leading a blessed life (and an undeserved one 
too for no action would have merited this life) prior to its incorporation in the human body, 
since this spiritual material would have lived (this was the definition of soul) and lived totally 
rationally. After all, the sensual life of corporeal creation would then not be in a position to 
hamper the understanding. But then the consequence would be that the formation of the human 
soul out of this material would mean a deterioration for this material, since it would fall from its 
blessed life into an inferior human life. This would mean to claim that God, when shaping the 
human soul, actually turned something into a worse condition than it was before, which would 
violate God’s goodness. At best, the human soul could be a ‘discharge’ or ‘emanation’ (defluxio) 
from this material, which would then itself stay unchanged and unincorporated in the body.40 
Augustine dismisses this option without argument, yet it is easily understandable that this option 
would seriously degrade the human soul, stating that it is not really rational soul at all. In Gn. litt. 
7.28.43 Augustine will therefore say that the soul is thus not from God’s substance, but created 
from nothing.41  
Other arguments against the corporeality of the soul are that the soul has no extension 
and is indivisible. The idea that the soul has no extension is argued by the idea that the soul 
 
39 O’Daly (1986), 315-316. 
40 Gn. litt. 7.8.11-7.9.11. Cf. O’Daly, col. 319. Cf. Agaësse and Solignac, notes complementaires in the BA 48, 699-700.   
41 cf. O’Daly (1978), 17. 
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transmits the species to the body. The soul is the agent in forming the body, and as cause must 
therefore be something better, higher and more real than the effect.42 It is thus not forced to 
keep itself to the presupposed extension of bodily existence, even though on this earth it is 
bound to the physical human body. At the same time, however, it is necessary that the soul exists 
‘somewhere’ or ‘in a place’ since only that what does not exist, is nowhere.43 This location cannot 
be expressed spatially. Hereby Augustine broadens the Aristotelian category of space (‘an object 
exists in a place’) with the Neoplatonic idea of a hierarchy in hypostaseis (‘soul is better than 
body’). The third argument for the incorporeality of the soul is that the soul has a simultaneous 
awareness of all the body parts. This falsifies the idea that the soul is divisible, since the soul 
would then need ‘messengers’ to inform the other more remote parts of the soul of what 
happened elsewhere.44   
A final argument for the soul’s incorporeality in the sol. rests on the principle that like is 
known by like. The soul can contain immaterial truths, for example logical tautologies, and 
intelligibles like geometrical forms which cannot be realized in physical bodies in their pure 
shapes.45 The soul can therefore not be a body. Granted that the argument is rather devised to 
prove the immortality of the soul, the fact that soul contains incorporeal things implicates the 
soul to be incorporeal as well.  
 
 
1.3.2 Immortal 
 
This last argument for the incorporeality of the soul brings the next property of the soul: 
its immortality. Truths are in the soul as in a subject thus the demise of the subject, in this case 
soul, would mean the demise of the truth. However, the truths themselves never perish (if the 
world ceases to exist, it will be true that ‘the world ceased to exist’). Therefore soul must exist 
forever. The soul is life, so the ever existing soul is the immortal soul.46 The important step in 
this argument is that truth is in the soul ‘as in a subject’. As safeguard against the perishing of 
truth only God is necessary, since the truth of the ideas is in his mind. In order to extend that 
 
42 imm. an. 15.24. 
43 sol. 2.17.31. 
44 imm. an. 16.25. One wonders again how this works for the animal soul, which deals with the sensual perceptions 
of bodies. Does it have a strict divide between its messengers of particles of light and itself? How would it then 
interact with these messengers? 
45 sol. 2.18.32. Cf. Gn. litt. 7.21.27. Plato states that bodies in the world of becoming are only ‘…imitations of those 
things that always are…’. Tim. 50c, trans. Donald Zeyl.  
46 sol. 1.15.29; 2.2.2;2.13.24. 
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safeguard to the human soul, Augustine needs to argue that truth is in the human soul too. He 
does this by stating that there is truth in the arts or disciplinae, especially in the discipline of 
‘disputing’, involving discursive reasoning.47 The human soul in general is in possession of these 
arts, and the arts cannot meaningfully be separated from the understanding of them in the 
human soul. Augustine’s idea is thus that if a human soul would be mortal, the discipline in that 
soul would perish. But that is impossible, given that there is truth in the disciplines.48 Yet, one 
might claim that this would only make some human souls immortal, granted that some, or even 
many, people have never understood a truth in the first place. Augustine thus needs to state that 
there is actual truth in every single rational soul, not only potentially, but that most (or even all?) 
people lack accurate self-knowledge of those truths. He first entertains the idea of the Platonic 
reminiscence of truth, but later espouses the idea that truths are impressed on the soul in its 
creation. Yet for Augustine it is above doubt that if there is knowledge of truth, the soul must be 
immortal, and thus exist eternally. Augustine thus employs a triad from knowledge of truth, life 
and existence in order to argue for the immortality of the soul.49 In the Cambridge Companion, 
Teske states that after the early dialogues, Augustine mainly refers to the immortality of the soul 
in the context of the resurrection of the body.50 
 
 
1.3.3 The soul divine? 
 
If the soul is incorporeal, immortal and contains stable truth, one could claim that the 
soul itself must share its essence with God, since all these characteristics of the ontology of the 
soul are marks of divinity too. The rational soul was considered divine in most of Hellenic 
philosophy (whether material as with the Stoics or immaterial as with the Platonists). According 
to Teske, Augustine seemed to entertain the idea of the divinity of the soul very early on in his 
career, in the late eighties of the fourth century.51 Teske expresses himself cautiously since his 
evidence only consists of two adjectives in one of the first of Augustine’s extant works. It is in 
the Acad., written in 386, that Augustine calls the mind (animus) ‘divine’ in 1.1 and ‘reason’, which 
is the action of the human soul, the ‘divine part of the soul’ in 1.11.52 The first mention of the 
 
47 sol. 2.11.21.  
48 sol. 2.11.20. 
49 sol. 2.1.1. 
50 Teske (2001), 122 gives as example en. Ps. 88,2,5. 
51 ibid., 117-118.  
52 Acad., 1.4.11: based on Mary Garvey’s translation ‘For we lived in great peace of mind, preserving the soul from 
every corporeal stain and very far removed from passionate desires, devoting ourselves, in so far as a human being 
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divine mind is the less conspicuous of the two, and in any case it needs to be noted that 
Augustine does object to his use of the adjective divinus, although he quotes this very same 
sentence in the retr.53 The second mention catches the eye somewhat more, since reason is 
explicitly identified not just with any part of the soul, but specifically the ‘divine’ part. This 
sentence, however, does not return in the retr. at all. Yet from the retr. it is clear that he did reread 
his Acad. quite thoroughly, since he quotes extensively from the text itself. Reading the Acad. 
later on in his career, Augustine apparently took no offense at these two adjectives, or at least did 
not perceive the need to defend himself against people who might think he described the soul as 
divine. Teske’s caution is therefore warranted, since the mature Augustine would certainly 
disagree with the divinity of the rational soul.  
Striking is therefore Phillip Cary’s fairly recent enthusiastic insistence on Augustine’s 
belief in the divinity of the soul during the Cassiciacum period, going back on Robert 
O’Connell.54 In his readable and sweeping description of the invention of the inner space in the 
self by Augustine, he has a project of ‘locating God within the soul’, which led him to this firm 
belief.55 In my opinion, for the young Augustine to believe in the divinity of the human soul, he 
has to accept two assumptions: 1) the idea that reason is divine and 2) the identification of 
reason with the soul. The first claim is established through Augustine’s ‘exploration of the 
identity of [the character] Reason in Soliloquies’ which ‘is an attempt to work out a concept of 
divine presence in the soul…’.56 It is in the reflexive research of reason into its own nature in the 
sol. where the main force of Cary’s interesting argument lies. The first assumption is guaranteed 
 
can, to the workings of reason, that is, living in accordance with that divine part of the soul, which suits a happy life, 
according to our definition yesterday.’ viximus enim magna mentis tranquillitate ab omni corporis labe animum vindicantes et a 
cupiditatium facibus longissime remoti, dantes, quantum homini licet, operam rationi, hoc est secundum divinam illam partem animi 
viventes, quam beatam esse vitam hesterna inter nos definitione convenit.  
In the Augustine through the ages encyclopedia Teske also uses a statement from the ord. 2.17.46 There 
Augustine says: ‘For they believe that the suffering here weighs down the soul, because they do not want to 
distinguish at all between its substance and the substance of God.’ Namque animam poenas hic pendere fatentur, cum inter 
eius et dei substantiam nihil velint omnino distare. Teske identifies this belief here as Neoplatonic, and it therefore seems to 
serve as an underpinning of Teske’s explanation in the lemma. I am not convinced, however. This paragraph from 
the ord. treats questions about God and the existence of evil. At that point in the text the discussion turns on the 
question whether evil can harm God, and whether this evil nature could have been the cause of the world. The 
quotation above is given as an explanation by Augustine why these people would believe such a thing. For me this 
sooner signals a position the Manichees would take, since they believe that God is susceptible to corruption by evil 
and explain thereby the bad volitions in the soul, which is –at least partly- made up from exactly the same substance 
as God. I do not believe a Neoplatonist would think God is corruptible, and even though Plotinus believes 
individual souls might suffer in this life, the hypostasis ‘Soul’ is incorruptible. I will therefore not use this quotation 
in my text.  
53 retr. 1.1.2. 
54 Cary (2000), e.g. xi; 86-7. 
55 Cary (2000), 114; xi. 
56 Cary (2000), 87. 
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by the fact that dialectics (‘its [reason’s] very own tricks and trades’57) ensures the truth of all 
learning, thereby being stable, divine Truth itself.  
But the second assumption is doubtful. What disconcerts me is that reason in these 
dialogues is not identified as the mind itself, but with a ‘movement’ (motio mentis/interioris) of it or 
with a ‘power’ (vis) or ‘vision’ (aspectus).58 It makes no sense for Augustine to describe reason in 
such a way, if he thought that reason was identical with the mind. In imm. an. 10 Augustine 
summed up the separate meanings that ‘reason’ (ratio) has for him: reason is a) the ‘capacity of 
seeing’ of the mind (aspectus), b) the very contemplation of the truth (ipsa veri contemplatio) or c) the 
truth itself (ipsum verum). According to the separation of these meanings, Augustine is prepared to 
make a distinction between reason as the action of the mind (aspectus and contemplatio), and the 
fruits of reason (ipsum verum). There is thus a distinction between reason as movement, and 
reason as stable and divine truth. In my view Augustine wanted to make this distinction in order 
to differentiate the actions of reason of individual souls and the fully-fledged truth itself, say 
between reason in the individual soul and objective Reason. For if Reason were wholly realized 
in every individual, Augustine would not be able to explain how souls can change from ignorant 
to wise (imm. an. 7). Yet in order to show that for the young Augustine the human soul is divine, 
it has to be shown not that he identified the rational soul with the action of reason, but with 
objective reason.  
In the imm. an. 2 and 11 Augustine does not choose whether (objective) reason is in the 
soul, or is the soul itself: what matters for the argument, as Cary notes, is that reason and soul are 
not two different substances. They are inseparable, so that the immutability of reason rubs off 
on the soul, and ensures its immortality.59 But in imm. an. 10 Augustine explicitly raises this very 
question: ‘In regard to the third sense [ratio as ipsum verum], the big question arises whether that 
true reality which the soul sees without the instrument of the body exists of itself and is not in 
the soul, or whether it can exist without the soul.’60 (trans. Gerard Watson) Thus Augustine is 
exactly unsure about this and I see no reason to doubt him–even though he will later say that it is 
of the same substance as the soul. And Cary himself analyses very well why: if the truth exists 
outside the soul, then the project of arguing for the immortality of the soul is put in danger. But 
if truth is in the soul, then the existence of truth would depend on the existence of the soul, 
 
57 ord. 2.13.38. 
58 ord. 2.11.30, 2.48; sol. 1.6.13.  
59 Cary (2000), 107. 
60 imm. an. 6.10: de tertio magna quaestio est, utrum verum illud, quod sine instrumento corporis animus intuetur, sit per seipsum et 
non sit in animo aut possitne esse sine animo. 
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thereby making the better or prior (truth) dependant on the inferior or posterior (soul).61 
Although Augustine thus needed to ensure that there was a tie between objective Reason and the 
soul, he apparently did not want to make this tie too strong. This means he just was not clear on 
whether the soul is objective Reason or not, notwithstanding that Reason may unconsciously be 
present in the soul.62 My conclusion is therefore that Augustine was not sure whether the soul 
was divine or not.63 I suspect that Augustine always kept in mind that the power of reason is but 
one of the powers and one of the parts of the soul, next to the vegetative and the animal soul. 
There still is a life of the senses in which the soul of the human being is involved, even if the 
young Augustine thought one had to turn oneself from it towards reason. And the life of the 
senses, although it may not be the human part of the soul, is still part of the soul of the human 
being. The further understanding of the whole interplay between emotions, desires, will and 
reason was something for Augustine’s future. 
 
1.3.4 Mutability of the soul 
 
Not long after the Cassiciacum period –as Cary points out-, from the mor. and the an. 
quant. onwards (387-389), Augustine would exactly reject the divinity of the soul and posit its 
creation by God.64 This fits in with the anti-Manichean polemic, since the Manicheans claim that 
God and the soul are of the same substance.65 Augustine rejects this, pointing out that, although 
the soul is not mutable in space, it is mutable over time.66 The soul is after all mutable since it is 
now stupid, then wise.67 Yet this mutability of the soul is not only intellectual, but at the same 
time moral.68 The change of the soul has a definite direction for Augustine: it improves or 
deteriorates, it turns itself towards the life of reason or towards the life of the senses. The soul 
thereby undergoes a change over time, with which it takes a middle position between the divine, 
which is immutable per se, and corporeal nature, which is mutable in place and time.69 
In explaining how the soul is mutable, Augustine needed to steer clear from positing a 
change that affected the soul too much, since the soul has a definite position in the order of 
 
61 Cary (2000), 102; 106. 
62 imm. an. 4.6, cf. Cary (2000), 100. 
63 Although it always remains the question what Augustine has read of Plotinus, it is worth noting that according to 
Plotinus an individual soul both resides with his pure part in the intelligible realm and has the intelligibles present in 
itself for contemplation. Kalligas (1997), 223-225.  
64 Cary (2000), 111. 
65 e.g. c. Fort., 11; cf. O’ Daly (1978), 32. 
66 div. qu. 19. 
67 e.g. div. qu. 54. 
68 cf. O’Daly (1978), 32. 
69 ep. 18.2; cf div. qu. 19. 
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creation from which it cannot verge. But at the same time Augustine was of the opinion that the 
change that the soul undergoes is of crucial importance for the human being. In his early period, 
especially the imm. an., Augustine tried to clarify the mutability of the soul using a model of 
Plotinian origin.70 This model of change is given by Augustine in e.g. 7.12 and 8.13 of the imm. 
an. when he discusses the dangers for the immortality of the soul. If reason ensures the 
immortality of the soul, does this not mean that turning from reason towards the senses 
undermines this immortality? Augustine tells us that the soul which turns to reason and wisdom 
exists more fully, while the soul that turns from reason and truth to foolishness does so at its 
own cost of a lessened being (esse minus). Through the defect of turning from reason, the soul 
tends towards nothingness since all defect ‘tends towards nothingness’ (tendit ad nihilum). This 
lessening of the being has to be understood as becoming ‘more deformed’ (deformius), thus a 
lessening of the species of the being, and thereby the soul becomes ‘uglier’ (foedius). However this 
privation of form can never be said to be so great that the soul totally ceases to exist. Augustine 
finds it hard to explain why, but compares this lessening with the cutting in half of a body. As a 
body can be cut into half infinitely, yet never reach nothing, so the soul will never cease to exist 
totally.  
In the ontological description of the soul according to Augustine so far, the bond of the 
human soul with God has been mentioned often already, but mostly in terms of participation in 
species. But Scripture reveals a different, and perhaps more historical way in which God created 
the human being and the human soul in Gen. 1.26-7 and Gen. 2.7. This enables questions about 
the technicalities of creation of the soul, in other words, about the ‘origin of the soul’. 
 
 
1.4 The origin of the soul  
 
The last question which needs to be addressed when regarding the soul from an 
ontological perspective, is the origin of the soul. On the face of it, this may seem a mere 
technical question. For Augustine’s anthropology, most important is after all that the human 
being is composed of two different entities: an immaterial immortal soul and a material mortal 
body. This difference between soul and body means that the soul has to be joined to the body in 
some way and in turn this implies that one can question where the soul is coming from, if it is 
 
70 In the imm. an. Augustine also tried out the Aristotelian model of change, which ascribes the change to accidental 
or substantial properties, resulting in respectively a change with persistence of the subject and a change without 
persistence of the subject. Augustine would not adhere to this explanation, cf. the appendices 1.  
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not essentially bound to the body. One has to try to answer this question if one wants to have an 
exhaustive theory of soul, but –without further information- it does not seem to have much 
importance for the conduct of the soul once in the body. As Augustine himself would affirm, as 
long as there is no confusion about our knowledge about the Creator, unclarity about a creature 
is less important.71  
However, Augustine deemed it necessary to return to this question often, during most of 
his career, from the Gn. adv. Man. (finished 388) up unto the retr. (426/427). There are several 
reasons for this. Augustine has not found Scripture or prior exegesis to give a conclusive answer 
to the question of the origin of the soul. Precisely this inconclusiveness of scripture allows for 
several different philosophical analyses on this question, so that the origin of the soul has served 
as a focal point for Augustine’s polemic against both the Manicheans and the Pelagians.72 The 
fact that this question is relevant for these two major polemics of Augustine’s career, signals that 
this question is far from a mere technicality. If the Manicheans and the Pelagians are involved, it 
means that at least the big questions of the divinity of the soul, the origin of evil -the points of 
contest with the Manicheans- and individual responsibility –a point of contest with the 
Pelagians- are involved. Through this last debate, the question of the origin of souls came to 
have practical implications for a question such as child or adult baptism.73 Moreover, the theories 
of the soul by Origen and Tertullian were still in the air and needed to be combated. These 
‘complications’ all ask for a more intricate treatment than at first sight may seem necessary. In 
secondary scholarship, this question thus has received much attention, leading to heated debates, 
the last one most notably between O’Connell and Gerard O’Daly. But before diving into the 
different analyses of the question, it is illuminating first to take a look at the relevance of the 
question in the anti-Manichean polemic.  
 
 
1.4.1 The origin of the soul in the anti-Manichean polemic: original sin and 
theodicy 
 
The first two works in which Augustine speaks about the origin of the soul are the Gn. 
adv. Man. and the lib. arb., finished in 395. These two works are written in the anti-Manichean 
polemic. The goal of the first work was to provide an allegorical exegesis of Genesis against the 
 
71 lib. arb. 3.21.59. 
72 lib. arb. 3.21.59. O’Daly (1983), 184. 
73 e.g. Gn. litt. 10.11.18-16.29. 
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derogatory literal exegesis that the Manicheans provided, who denounced the Old Testament. 
One of the Manichean ideas that Augustine attacked in this exegesis was that the soul is of divine 
origin, thus of a divine nature. The main anti-Manichean import of the lib. arb. was to show that 
evil does not originate in God but in the human being, more specifically in the will. I will first 
treat these two works in order to see what treatment of the origin of the soul by the young 
Augustine emerges, in order to compare it with his later treatment of the question. In the Gn. 
adv. Man., when it comes to the creation of the soul, Augustine interprets the two creation 
accounts of the human being in Gen. 1:26 and Gen. 2:7. As O’Daly has observed, Augustine 
interprets Gen. 2:7 as a further explanation of Gen. 1:26. In Gen. 1:26 the idea is that the image of 
God in which the human being is created is a spiritual image and has nothing to do with human 
body and limbs.74 In his exegesis of Gen. 2:7 Augustine expands on this, stating that God’s 
breathing of the spirit does not entail that the soul is divine. That would mean that God’s nature 
is mutable, which is a blasphemy.75 It is thus in this anti-Manichean context that the origin of the 
soul is relevant in the Gen. adv. Man. Another point which is relevant here (which will soon 
become clear) is that Augustine treats the two verses as describing the same moment in creation, 
so that there is no differentiation between the creation of the human soul and the creation of 
Adam.76 Gen. 1:26 and Gen 2.7 run parallel in Augustine’s mind here.  
In the lib. arb. Augustine’s occupation becomes clear with Evodius’ first question: ‘Please 
tell me: isn’t God the cause of evil?’77 The work is dedicated to showing that God is in no way 
the author of the evil we experience in this world. Augustine’s alternative explanation is that 
there is not one cause of all evil, but that every instance evil is caused by the human will, thus 
that every evil starts in the soul.78 The trouble is that ‘We believe that everything that exists 
comes from the one God, and yet we believe that God is not the cause of sins. What is troubling 
is that if you admit that sins come from the souls that God created, and those souls come from 
God, pretty soon you’ll be tracing those sins back to God.’79 Augustine is thus concerned that 
God is absolved from any responsibility for sin, even though he foreknows the sins and could 
 
74 Gn. adv. Man. 2.1.7 O’Daly (1983), 185. 
75 Gn. adv. Man. 2.8.11. 
76 Gn. adv. Man. 2.7.9. ut non alicuius novi operis inchoatio, sed superius breviter insinuati diligentior retractatio isto sermone 
explicetur. O’Daly (1983), 185 
77 trans. Thomas Williams, lib. arb. 1.1.1 E: dic mihi, quaeso te, utrum deus non sit auctor mali. 
78 lib. arb. 1.1.1; 1.11.21. This is also in accordance with the change that we have noticed between the virtus of the 
soul, that what moves the soul, i.e. from external causation through the ratio to the ‘internal’ causation of the will.  
79 lib. arb. 1.2.4. trans. Thomas Williams. Credimus autem ex uno deo esse omnia quae sunt et tamen non esse peccatorum auctorem 
deum. movet autem animum si peccata ex his animabus sunt quas deus creavit, illae autem animae ex deo, quomodo non paruo 
intervallo peccata referantur in deum. 
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have created the soul without free will.80 Yet this leads of course to the following question. If all 
the trouble starts in the will, then how can it be understood that there is evil in the first place? 
For everybody wants to have a good and happy life, so how could anyone come to want evil?81 
This happens according to Augustine whenever we judge some good to be intrinsically desirable, 
which is mutable and temporal and which we therefore fear to lose. In other words: evil starts 
when we value and want something more than we should (cupiditas/libido).82 But no one wants to 
experience evil, so how do we get to have this defective will?  
The answer comes in 3.18.51-52, along with a quotation from Psalms 25.7 (‘Remember 
not the sins of my youth and of my ignorance’) and the famous quotation from Romans 7.18-19 
(‘I do not do the good that I will; but the evil that I hate, that I do.’) These bible verses show the 
two problems with which our soul is confronted when wanting the good: ignorantia (ignorance) 
and difficultas (difficulty). The human being often experiences ignorance about the consequences 
or the moral values of his actions, or when he has knowledge about the morally desirable action, 
lacks the willpower to see these actions through.83 Thereby the human being succumbs to the 
cupiditas (desire) for goods which are lower, or at best equal to himself in the hierarchy of 
creation, whereas he should aim for the highest good, God, who of is the font of all creation. 
Thus the human comes to have an inproba voluntas (perverted will).84 
Following on this is of course the question how then the human being came to be in 
such a state of ignorance and difficulty. It is Adam’s original sin which brought us in this 
position, placing us under the laws of death of the devil (himself a ‘victim’ of the first sin of the 
will on a cosmic scale, through pride).85 Our whole experience of evil therefore is tied up with 
the original sin, since without it we would have dominance over our will and not give in to the 
desire for lower goods. O’Connell thus rightly observes that Augustine’s theodicy in this line of 
argument works through upholding Gods justice.86 The more we are confronted in our human 
condition with evil, the more we ourselves are to blame through original sin. The evil in our lives 
is thus the fulfillment of God’s justice. The human race after the original sin lives in a penal 
 
80 Evodius raises the problem of contingency of sin and prescience of God in lib. arb. 3.4.2.  
81 lib. arb. 1.14.30.  
82 lib. arb. 1.4.9; ibid. 1.4.10. 
83 Hereby Augustine thus gives another explanation to the problem of akrasia. We have seen earlier that Augustine 
later in the Conf. would use the problem of the weakness of will -albeit in a different way- to ridicule the 
Manicheans’ idea that we have two wills, indicating that we have two souls.  
84 lib. arb. 3.17.48. 
85 lib. arb. 3.10.31. O’Connell would point to the persev. for an explicit statement that we live in a penal state. But it 
seems to me that the locus in the text given here already settles the matter.  
86 O’Connell (1987), 27-28. 
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state.87 This explication of Augustine’s anti-Manichean theodicy still serves to show the relevance 
of the question of the origin of the soul. The reason for this is the emergence of the importance 
of the original sin, which serves as the pivotal point in the explanation. Without original sin, no 
theodicy.  
 
 
1.4.2 The universality of original sin in the young Augustine 
 
The question is then how the original sin of Adam is universalized over the entire human 
race. Does the creation of Adam’s soul and his Fall have to be treated metaphorically, as an 
archetype for humanity in total, or should they be treated historically? And if so, how is it then 
technically possible for original sin to affect us all? It is specifically on this last question that later 
authors which are treated in this thesis would latch onto. The juxtaposition of the Gn. adv. Man 
and the lib. arb. with which we are engaged at the moment, leads to an answer the young 
Augustine would give. For –recapitulating- the fact that it was Adam and Eve who sinned, sets 
us up for the following: 
‘Here we come across the slanderous question that is so often asked by those who are 
ready to blame their sins on anything but themselves: “If it was Adam and Eve who sinned, what 
did we poor wretches do?”’.88 This question reveals an unclarity in Augustine’s thinking about 
the Fall up to that point.89 For it is through this question that an important distinction will be 
made, which Augustine hitherto in the lib. arb. does not treat. For the importance of the original 
sin shows that the question to the origin of the soul can be analyzed into two separate questions. 
What is the origin of the first soul, thus of the soul of Adam? And what is the origin of the 
consecutive souls? For it is our relationship with Adam that explains in which way we share in 
Adam’s sin. What it eventually boils down to, thus the real relevance in the question of the origin 
of the soul is encompassed in this question: What do we have to do with Adam?  
 
87 lib. arb. 3.18.51. cf. O’Connell (1987), 27. 
88 lib. arb. 3.19.53. (trans. Thomas Williams) Here we come across the slanderous question that is so often asked by 
those who are ready to blame their sins on anything but themselves: “If it was Adam and Eve who sinned, what did 
we poor wretches do? How do we deserve to be born in the blindness of ignorance and the torture of difficulty? 
Why do we first err in ignorance of what we ought to do, and then, when the precepts of justice begin to be open to 
us and we will to do them, we are powerless, held back by some sort of necessity of carnal desire?”  
Hic occurrit illa quaestio quam inter se murmurantes homines rodere consuerunt qui quodlibet aliud in peccando quam se accusare parati 
sunt. dicunt enim: si Adam et Eua peccaverunt, quid nos miseri fecimus, ut cum ignorantiae caecitate et difficultatis cruciatibus 
nasceremur et primo erraremus nescientes quid nobis esset faciendum, deinde ubi nobis inciperent aperiri praecepta iustitiae, vellemus ea 
facere et retinente carnalis concupiscentiae nescio qua necessitate non valeremus? 
89 According to O’Connell, this question and the four options of the origin of the soul in the lib. arb. are even a later 
insertion. O’Connell (1987), 140-141. 
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To interpret the relevance of the origin of the soul in such a way is to take up a position 
in the debate between O’Connell and O’Daly. There is a clash between the O’Connell’s 
‘maximalist’ and O’Daly’s ‘minimalist’ interpretation of the relevance of the question of the 
origin of the soul. For O’Connell this question serves as the key towards understanding 
Augustine, and the differences between the younger and the older Augustine. The way that 
Augustine has perceived preferences for specific views on the origin of the soul, which alter over 
time, gives O’Connell the key for unlocking the whole of Augustine’s anthropology. For O’Daly 
this question is ‘just’ a technical question about the origin of the soul in a very specific exegetical 
and polemical context. With seeing the relevance of the question in terms of the other question, 
I position myself at least initially on the side of O’Connell. For me it seems the treatment of the 
four options of the lib. arb. 3 need to be seen in the whole context of the lib. arb. to see the 
relevance of this question, and then it is hard to evade significant elements of O’Connells 
argument, which I shall later indicate.  
In any case, it is this question that prompts Augustine to come with his famous four 
options of the origin of the soul. These four options Augustine gives are actually different 
answers to a more technical question about the origin of the soul. This more technical question 
is how the soul comes to be embodied. The soul can be inherited from the parents: traducianism 
(1), the soul can be created at some moment after the conception: creationism (2), the soul pre-
existed before the body and was sent to the body by God (3) and the soul pre-existed before the 
body but sinned, and consequently fell into the body (4).90 Augustine does not pick an option, 
since in the lib. arb. his concern is to show –with mixed success- that none of the options detract 
from the justice of God. And, taken in the overall scheme of the argument, the treatment of the 
question of the origin of the soul with these four options is to defuse a counter argument (‘god is 
unjust since we do not deserve to live in a penal state since we are not to blame for the primal 
sin’). The overriding argument of the lib. arb. –the context in which the four options in this work 
have to be seen- is that if we live in a condition of ignorance and difficulty, we ourselves are to 
blame for it.  
 Comparing the two treatments of origin of the soul in the Gn. adv. man. and the lib. arb., 
the following line of thinking emerges. There is not a real difference between Adam and us. Gen. 
1:26, the creation of the human being in general in God’s image and Gen. 2:7, the breathing of 
the spirit of life into the first man are different expressions for the same act of creation. These 
two text loci in Genesis do not represent different historical moments. Adam stands as a paradigm 
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for the human being, from which the other human beings cannot easily be distinguished. 
Although Augustine would probably resist the idea that every human is identical with Adam, I 
think it is possible to regard Adam as the type, from which the other human beings are the 
tokens. Thus Augustine, at least up to the last part of the last book of the lib. arb. sees no 
problem in directing the blame of the first sin directly unto all human beings. Adam’s first sin is 
our first sin. This conforms with his exegesis of the Fall in the Gn. adv. man 2.14.21-15.22 In 
explaining the Fall and the interactions of Adam and Eve leading up to the Fall, Augustine 
elucidates the dynamics of all human sin, also after the Fall, that takes place. Every human sin 
involves an outside suggestion (the serpent), an aroused desire (Eve, or the animal part of the 
soul) and assent (Adam, the rational part of soul). Adam and Eve’s relationship is thus not 
interpreted as inter-human interaction, but as an intra-human psychological dynamic of sin, with 
the motivation eventually being to sort things out for yourself independent of your Creator. At 
least up to 395, the year of completion of the lib. arb., the technical question of the embodiment 
of the soul did not loom large upon Augustine’s mind. For him it was important to show that all 
humans souls in general were not of divine origin and that they all had defected from their 
perfect beginning. In this view original sin was equally committed and therefore equally 
distributed over all human souls.  
 
 
1.4.3 The universality of original sin in the mature Augustine 
 
This view of the human soul was to change radically however. In the Gn. litt. (404-416) 
Augustine would denounce all three elements of the above account: Gen. 1:26 and 2.7 do not 
describe the same moment in creation (1); Adam’s soul is not the paradigm for our souls (2); 
Even though we live in a penal state, this is not because our souls are in some fallen condition 
(3). To start with the first element. The six days of creation that Gen. 1 describes are 
simultaneously, since the days in which God created the world are taken to be in the spiritual 
light created on the first day. They are not part of our history. Gen. 2 on the other hand describes 
events one after the other in a more mundane way. The planting of paradise with trees, the 
placing of Adam in paradise, Adam’s naming of the animals and the formation of Eve from 
Adam’s rib all are temporal.91 They occur one after the other in our history. This entails that the 
breathing of life into man in Gen. 2:7 also is an event in history, and not in the simultaneous 
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creation. The fact that these two creation accounts are not parallel, leads to an interesting tension 
inside books 6 and 7 of the Gn. litt. For the question then becomes what the relationship is 
between the creation of the human being, man and woman, in Gen. 1:26-7 and the historical 
account of formation of man out of mud, the breathing of life and the shaping of the woman 
from the man in Gen. 2. It is no solution to say that Gen. 1:26 only deals with the human soul and 
Gen. 2:7 in juxtaposition only with the body, since Augustine is of the opinion in the Gn. litt. that 
the sex of the human being is only in the body.92 But already in Gen. 1:27 it is stated that God 
created the human being male and female. Augustine’s solution in book 6 is to explain the 
creation of the human being in Gen. 1:26 potentially, as a seminal reason.93 For Augustine divides 
the process of creation in two parts. There is the creation of the, so to say, ‘framework’, which is 
in full completion from the start of the Creation, such as the stellar spheres. And there is the 
creation of everything which at some time or another is going to take place within this 
framework, such as the different species of plants, animals and indeed in book 6 the human 
species.94 It ‘was already otherwise created in some secret room of nature’ (cum iam esset in secreto 
quodam naturae aliter factus). Yet in book 7 this notion of the creation of the human being as a ratio 
seminalis will come under pressure. Book 7, which deals only with the creation of the human soul, 
the creation of the soul as a ratio seminalis will be denied by Augustine. The problem is that if the 
soul is a ratio seminalis, then there must be a proximate cause for its coming into being. In other 
words, if the soul is not created directly, then there must be something which contains the semen 
prior to the coming into being of the soul. But the idea of such a container of a seminal reason 
for the soul runs into great difficulties. The only valid candidate for such a container would be 
the spiritual creature, the ‘heavens’ of Gen. 1:1. But if that would be the container for the seminal 
reason, it would mean that the angelic nature would be the parent for the human soul, something 
that Augustine cannot imagine.95 The conclusion is thus that the soul cannot be a created as a 
seminal reason in Gen. 1:26 even though the body can be created as such.96 The solution to the 
tension between book 6 and 7, between stating that the human is created as a seminal reason in 
Gen. 1:26, but that the soul is not, is that book 6 deals with the body and book 7 with the soul. 
This might overall be a good solution, but I see two difficulties with this. First of all book 6 
speaks about the human being in general, and only in 6.12.20 switches specifically to the body. 
That is thus after stating that the human being as a whole is created as a seminal reason in Gen. 
 
92 Gn. litt. 6.7.12. 
93 Gn. litt. 6.5.8. 
94 Gn. litt. 6.1.1-2. 
95 Gn. litt. 7.23.34. 
96 O’Daly (1983), 188, comes to a similar conclusion.  
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1:26. Secondly I personally find it hard to imagine that Augustine would think that God created 
the human being in such a fractured way from the beginning: complete soul, but only incipient 
body. I find this hard, since Augustine, as shown above, specifically states that Gen. 1:26 deals 
with the whole human being, body and soul. Yet, strange though this solution may seem, it is the 
best one available.  
The second element in the line of thinking of the Gen. adv. man. and the lib. arb. was that 
there is no fundamental difference between our souls and Adam’s soul. It may be observed that 
book 7 of the Gen. litt. has the same conflation between Adam’s soul and other souls. Augustine 
speaks about the human soul in general in this book, not about the first human soul. A counter 
argument against this is that Augustine treats this specifically in the context of the breathing of 
life into the first soul. This first soul is specifically Adam’s soul. Especially, since it has already 
been shown that Gen. 2:7 and Gen. 1:26 do not refer to the same moment. Gen. 2:7 only treats 
Adam. But above all, the short technical speculations from the lib. arb. about the origin or 
embodiment of the soul or the consecutive souls have grown into a full blown book, i.e. book 
10. Thus, even though the argument of book 7 has an impact on all human souls, this is only 
because with Adam’s soul the ‘technique of creation’ has to be described for the first time. So 
let’s take a short look at book 10. The problem from which Augustine sets out is the origin of 
the first consecutive soul, namely Eve’s. Scripture is silent on the point of Eve’s soul, stating 
only useful information about Eve’s body, being made from the bone from Adam’s bones and 
the flesh of Adam’s flesh.97 The same technical problems of book 7 are rehearsed, but now 
specifically with a view to the consecutive souls, indicating the differentiation between Adam’s 
soul and ours.98 Augustine for example considers whether our souls were constituted as a 
seminal reason and if so, in what vehicle, with the same result.99 Apart from the question to the 
genesis of Eve’s soul, the transmittance of the original sin to the offspring, baptism, and the 
question how Christ’s soul could remain free from sin are important questions.100 Thus it is all 
the while clear that Augustine’s focus is on all the souls but the very first. 
Otherwise it is very interesting to compare the options for the origin of the soul which 
are given in book 10 with the options for the origin of the soul from book 3 of the lib. arb. In 
book 10 the options for the origin of the soul (which would more aptly be called the 
‘embodiment of the soul’ since the relevant question seems to be how the soul came to occupy 
the human body) are that 1) the soul is in some manner pre-existent (as a finished created thing 
 
97 Gn. litt. 10.1.2. 
98 e.g. Gn. litt. 7.3.4-5. 
99 Gn. litt. 10.3.4. 
100 Gn. litt. 10.11.18-21.37. 
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or as a seminal reason) and sent by God to govern the body, 2) creationism and 3) 
traducianism.101 In the course of the book the pros and cons of each specific option are 
discussed at length against statements of Scripture. But there are two options against which 
Augustine specifically turns itself. One is that the soul is embodied since it is already itself a 
material substance. Augustine turns himself specifically against Tertullian’s thinking in this 
respect, discussing these arguments of Tertullian which are nonsensical for Augustine, such as 
that the soul as substance will grow or occupy a larger place along with the growth of the 
body.102 The other option which is denounced is the last option from the lib. arb. which has not 
yet been addressed: the idea that the soul exists before the body, errs and consequently falls into 
the body. Augustine now sees this option in a Origenist context, which becomes clear from his 
description of child death. Origen believed that souls were thrust over and over again into the 
bodies as punishment, but that a virtuous life could free the soul from the cycle of bodily life. 
Augustine, when speaking about infant death, would reject the idea that God ‘saves’ children 
whom He foreknows that they will lead an upright life, by cutting their bodily life (very) short.103 
This would rationalize the mystery of death and force God to act, taking away from his total 
freedom.104 The last element of the line of thought of the Gn. adv. man and the lib. arb., that the 
human soul is a fallen soul, is here rejected. 
But what arguments does Augustine give in the Gn. litt. against the idea that any (Adam’s 
or ours) human soul is a fallen soul? There are two places in the Gn. litt. where Augustine 
provides his arguments against this thought, book 7 -in the case of Adam’s soul- and book 10 -in 
the case of all the other souls-. In this last context (the origin of all the other souls) Augustine, as 
shown above, tries to determine which of the options is preferable in the light of Scripture. It 
thus is Scripture which he uses to argue against the idea that the soul can fall into the body. This 
would especially contradict that very important bible text for Augustine, Romans 9:11.105 In this 
text God is free to choose whom He will from children who have committed neither crime nor 
provided good deeds. Consequently, it is impossible for the soul to act before he leads his earthly 
life for good or bad, and therefore it is impossible for the soul to fall into the body because of a 
 
101 Gn. litt. 10.3.4. 
102 Even though Augustine will always state that the soul is everywhere in the body, and thus also is committed to 
the idea that the soul is somehow local, he would always deny that the Aristotelian category of place can be adduced 
to such an immaterial substance. e.g. imm. an. 25. In this way Tertullian’s idea that the soul will have to stretch out in 
the body as gold or silver is hammered out to provide a larger surface as gold or silver leaf is absurd for Augustine. 
Gn. litt. 10.26.44. 
103 Gn. litt. 10.15.27. 
104 O’Daly (1983), 189. 
105 Gn. litt. 10.7.12. The importance of Romans 9:11 for Augustine can hardly be overestimated. However, this is not 
the place to go deep into a discussion of Augustine’s ‘discovery’ of the text in the Simpl. in 396. 
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sin. The idea here, and above, is thus that God cannot be forced to act on the basis of merit or 
deficit of the human soul. Other than in the previous line of thinking His freedom goes before 
His justice. Later we will see that Augustine will solve this problem of priority of divine freedom 
or divine justice with the idea that God’s justice cannot be understood by the limited human 
being.  
In book 7 of the Gn. litt. Augustine is likewise concerned to guard against the idea that 
Adam’s soul is fallen. Although, since the focus is here solely on Adam, he understandably does 
not come with a discussion to settle the matter between the options of the lib. arb. His concern 
here is the technique of the creation of Adam’s soul. This is set into the context of the exegesis 
of Gen. 2:7 where God breathed life into Adam. Returning to the idea that Gen. 1:26 and 2:7 do 
not describe the same moment in creation, there has to be sought a solution for the double 
creation account, the one in the simultaneous creation of the six days, the other in history. If 
God created some material from which later the soul would be formed, Augustine’s trouble 
could be solved. Moreover, the mutability of the soul suggests such a material.106 He therefore 
searches for a possible spiritual material (materies), or alternatively –as shown above- for a carrier 
of a possible seminal reason. We have already seen that the soul as a seminal reason is 
problematic, and a spiritual material would be a good option, for the reasons given above.107 
Augustine thus has a vested interest in giving such a material. However, the idea of such a 
material leads to a lot of obscurities.108 Augustine finds it most plausible if the material would be 
alive and rational. It is hard to see how dead material can give rise to life and the idea that non 
rational material could change into rational material could have the abject consequence that 
animal souls could change into human rational souls.109 Therefore this material must have 
rational life before it is a soul. But then it must also have a happy life (beata vita). But if it has a 
happy life as material, it loses this life once in the body, since the human being does not have 
such a happy life. God’s breathing of life into man would thus diminish this material, it would be 
a downwards effluence (defluxio), which is nefas to say.110 But the soul also cannot act before it is 
embodied, thus it cannot deserve such a diminution. The idea of a spiritual material thus is very 
problematic. And the reason for this is that Augustine is now opposed to seeing the soul as a 
fallen soul. Herewith all three elements of the line of thinking of the Gn. adv. Man. and the lib. 
arb. have been abandoned in the Gn. litt. and the mature Augustine.  
 
106 Gn. litt. 7.6.9.; cf. O’Daly (1983), 188. 
107 Although in the Gn. litt. the argument actually runs the other way. First the spiritual material is researched and 
prolblematized, then a seminal reason of the soul.  
108 Gn. litt. 7.10.7. 
109 Gn. litt. 7.9.13. 
110 Gn. litt. 7.8.11. 
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Out of the original four options of the origin of the soul of the lib. arb. there are 
therefore only two viable options left, i.e. traducianism and creationism, even if Augustine is not 
officially prepared to entirely drop the option of pre-existence of the soul, as we have seen from 
Gn. litt. book 10. However, with regard to the transmission of original sin these two options both 
have their problems. For if one takes the traducianist position, it is easy to see how the original 
sin is transmitted: given that Adam and Eve are everybody’s ancestors, their original sin taints all 
our souls. But this advantage is offset by difficulties in imagining how the soul of the child is 
present in the parents, as Augustine would explain in ep. 190 to Optatus (418). Is the soul to be 
compared to the flame of candle, which can light another flame without diminishing? But how 
does this work if there are two parents? If one takes the creationist position, this problem is 
solved: it is easy to see that the souls are coming directly from god. But this advantage is offset 
by the difficulty in imagining how the original sin is transmitted from Adam to the rest of 
humanity. No matter how hard Augustine tried to decide between the options or whom he asked 
(Jerome in 415 ep 166), he resigned to an agnostic position time and again, from the lib. arb. In 
395, through the Gn. litt. (401-415), through ep. 166, 190, 202a up to the retr. (427) at the end of 
his life. But this was not a passive resignation: he defended agnosticism in 418 in ep. 202a (15-7) 
when bishop Optatus tried to press him hard for an answer. Augustine was not sure whether this 
knowledge was ever to be obtained by human beings, but he was sure that as long as no 
overriding Scriptural or conceptual reasons were found it was safer to remain agnostic than to 
jump to conclusions. 
 
 
1.4.4 The origin of the soul as the fall of the soul: Augustine's reception of 
Plotinus.111 
 
 The question of the origin of the soul can more aptly be described as the question of the 
embodiment of the soul, i.e. how the immaterial soul came to be intimately connected with our 
material body. This question has received a great deal of attention in scholarly literature, 
although rather under the term 'Fall of the Soul'.  There is debate over whether Augustine ever 
believed that the soul sinned before its embodiment and that the embodiment was its resulting 
punishment. And if so, in which period of his life Augustine took these positions.  
 
111 This paragraph has been based upon Rombs' helpful Saint Augustine and the Fall of the Soul. Beyond O'Connell and His 
Critics (2006).  
Augustine 
 
34 
 The core of this debate evolves around Augustine's reception of some of Plotinus' 
Enneads.112 The question is whether Augustine used not only Plotinus' imagery, such as of the 
human being wandering through the sensible world113, but also his concepts.  
 Plotinus believed that the human soul was fallen. First, because in a very fundamental 
way plurality and individuality meant for Plotinus a digression from the transcendent unity of the 
One. The One is the ultimate reality and from it emanates all other existing beings (hypostases). 
The emanations come from a willingness to share the Good from the perspective of the One. 
But the emanated beings have the task to return to their source and reunite with the One. In as 
far as they have a preference for autonomous existence and an actual autonomous existence, 
they are morally culpable and hence plurality and individuality are reprehensible divisions from 
the One. This already goes for the first hypostasis, which is Nous.  
 But Plotinus considers the human soul itself as fallen for a second reason. The human 
soul is situated at the fringes of the realm of the intelligible, but gives form to the body and 
administers it. The body is situated in the realm of sense, and in this way the human soul has a 
middle position between the intelligible and the sensible. But even if the individual soul has a 
natural proclivity to bring form and intelligibility to matter, the human soul is supposed to 
contemplate the intelligible and look upwards towards the One, which is the source it ultimately 
comes from. But it becomes enmeshed in the world of the senses, and thereby ceases to be 
wholly united to the Soul (Psyche).114 In turning from the intelligible world to inform matter, the 
soul is fragmented into individual souls and distended in time.115 And therefore, even if the One 
shares its goodness freely and the Soul is meant to inform the material world, the mere fact of 
existing outside of the One, and being turned towards the material world, are why Plotinus 
regards the human soul as fallen. Both are effects of the desire to be autonomous, self-sufficient, 
and other than One, which desire is named tolma by Plotinus. Furthermore, the soul is pre-
existent on the body, given that the soul through its fall becomes individuated, and that the soul 
gives form to the material world. 
 Ronnie Rombs took a step forward with his book in 2006 on precisely this debate. His 
analytical innovation is to separate these views of Plotinus into three aspects. For Plotinus' views 
on the fall of the soul cannot only be seen in a moral aspect, but also in an ontological and 
cosmogonic aspect. The ontological aspect of the fall of the soul is where the soul becomes 
 
112 There are different estimates of the number of Enneads used by Augustine at the time of his conversion. The 
differences in estimates are partly due to differences in method: on the basis of ideological or philological parallels 
or a mix of those. For different lists of Enneads and a short history cf. Rombs (2006), 4-6, cf. also n.4 p. 112.  
113 Ennead, 1.6.8; cf. Rombs (2006), 201-8.  
114 Ennead, 4.8.7.  
115 Rombs (2006), 18. 
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individuated, and joined to the corporeal body it administers. The cosmogonic aspect is where 
the individuated soul 'participates as an efficient cause in the process of the coming-to-be of the 
lower world'.116 Rombs's analysis is helpful in getting a grip on Augustine's reception of Plotinus 
and on describing the debate concerning it.  
 Nineteenth century's Quellenforschung recognized Augustine's dependency on Plotinus (and 
Porphyry117), but from the late '60s of the twentieth century, Robert O'Connell started the 
modern debate on Augustine's reception of Plotinus, when he focused not so much on which 
exact Enneads were used by Augustine from a philological perspective, but on whether Plotinus' 
conceptual scheme was taken in.118 He espoused his ideas in three key publications. In the first 
St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man A.D. 386-391 (1968) O'Connell argued that the young 
Augustine indeed defended the fall of a pre-existent and individuated soul into body, through 
which the body gained its form. Thereby Augustine followed Plotinus in all three aspects, moral, 
ontological and cosmogonic, of the fall of the soul. According to O'Connell, Augustine held to a 
circular anthropology, in which the human soul fell into the body in this world and into time and 
anticipated a restoration to its origin after its separation with the body through death. 
 However, O'Connell argued in 1973 that Augustine changed his views and rejected a fall 
of the soul in around 415, due to the import of Romans 9:11. Augustine's insight then was that 
this testimony prohibited the soul to act before its embodiment. Moreover Augustine learnt 
about Origen's ideas on the fall from Paulus Orosius, and he concluded that if the soul could fall 
from beatitude earlier, it might also fall later from Heaven, and that is impossible. But for 
O'Connell this did not mean that Augustine radically broke with Plotinus. In The Origin of the Soul 
in St. Augustine's Later Works (1987) O'Connell argued that in his later writings (Gn. litt., Trin., civ.) 
Augustine would explain the universality of original sin though the idea that the human soul had 
a common life in Adam and a proper life (propria vita) of its own. But this distinction between 
common and proper goods was again taken from Plotinus. According O'Connell, Augustine 
thereby still argued for a pre-existent communal Soul, from which individuated parts fell into the 
body when they turned themselves from God towards individuated and proper bodily life.119 
Augustine thus had in effect become a sort of crypto-Plotinian. 
 These views encountered quite some opposition from scholars such as Mary Clark and 
Frederik van Fleteren.120 Goulven Madec agreed with the many textual parallels between 
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Augustine's and Plotinus' texts, and thereby with Augustine's use of Plotinus, but he questioned 
whether textual parallels were enough to show ideological dependency.121 Gerard O'Daly agreed 
with a fall of the soul in Augustine's texts, but only with a moral fall. For O'Daly there is no 
ontological change involved in a fall of the soul, as the soul retains its middle position between 
the material- and intelligible worlds and remains an incorporeal being. Moreover the intrinsic 
goodness of Christian creation prohibited for O'Daly a fall of the soul into the body.122 Other 
scholars, such as John Rist accepted part of O'Connell's theses, and Roland Teske and Patout 
Burns and Joseph Torchia furthered O'Connells program of research of (the early) Augustine's 
use of and dependency on Plotinus.123 
 Up until the Conf. Augustine seems indeed to have believed in a fall of the soul in the way 
Plotinus did. Like Plotinus, Augustine believed the soul to be in a mid-rank position, between 
the higher intelligible world and the inferior sensible world.124 Moreover, for Augustine the soul 
gives form to the body so that the body can exists in the first place, which mirrors Plotinus' 
cosmogonic function of the soul.125 The soul is the core of the human being, reducing the body 
to an instrument of the soul, which, cast off after death, leaves the soul free to return whence it 
came.126 For the soul had a pre-existence before the body. This is also clear in Augustine's early 
epistemology, before his theory of illumination, which treats knowledge as the remembering of 
truths forgotten since the bodily life of the soul.127 This pre-existent soul thus fell into the body.  
 For Plotinus the fall of the soul was both necessary in order to produce the lower world, 
but also culpable through the soul's desire to be independent from the One. Similar 
considerations seem to have moved Augustine. In the mus. he seems to consider the idea that the 
human soul has been 'knitted' into the fabric of the material world.128 But the fall of the soul for 
the young Augustine was also through Adams' original sin. Augustine analyses three causes of 
sin: concupiscence, curiosity and pride. O'Connell has shown that these are three aspects of 
Plotinus' notion of tolma.129 The soul desires to take a part of the material world as a private 
good, and thereby desires to be 'more' than what it is. Thereby it loses its bond to the One for 
Plotinus, or God for Augustine, thereby itself becoming fragmented and enmeshed in the 
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inferior material world.130 It turns itself from God and towards the body. It therefore has the 
assignment to return itself to God, which can only be completely done when the body is cast off. 
In the meantime for Augustine the soul retains a bond with God. From Plotinus' perspective this 
is explained through his metaphysics of emanation. From the One the individual soul flows forth 
through the successive stages of Reason (Nous) and Soul (Psuche). The young Augustine reflects 
this way of thinking through his acceptance of the World-Soul and his idea that the soul is at the 
same time one and many.131 
 Moreover, Augustine shared these views with Plotinus through his assimilation of 
Plotinus' principle of 'integral omnipresence'.132 This principle is meant to explain the hierarchy 
in reality. Two worlds are posited, the intelligible world and the material world. The intelligibles 
are primary since they produce the sensible world through transmitting form to the material 
beings. For such a material being to exist, the whole form must integrally be accessible from all 
of the parts of the material being. The form therefore must be incorporeal itself and not bound 
by spatial boundaries. But thereby the One for Plotinus, or God,for Augustine, must be present 
in all the material beings, since they are the ultimate source of the intelligibles. This is the 
principle of integral omnipresence. It stands at the heart of the idea of participation: a thing can 
only participate in an incorporeal intelligible and exist because the intelligible, and therefore 
ultimately God, is present in the thing. This principle forms the backdrop for Plotinus' and 
Augustine's ideas of the fall of the soul as a descent into the body, and the description of it as a 
'turning away from God'. For the fall the soul occurs when the soul as an ontologically primary 
being becomes involved in the body it gives form to in a way it should not. A sort of 'inverse 
participation' takes place in which the soul is directed to the body instead of to its own source. 
This is made possible by the soul's presence to the body. In this way Augustine could give an 
explanation of evil that did not require an ontological principle of evil, for evil was nothing more 
than this misdirection of the soul. O'Connell was convinced the Conf. was based upon this 
principle of integral omnipresence.133  
 The highpoint of Augustine's assimilation of Plotinus' ideas on the fall of the soul was 
the Gn. adv. Man. In this exegesis, Augustine interpreted Genesis in such a way to incorporate 
elements from the cosmogonic, ontological and moral functions of Plotinus' fall of the soul. 
Augustine interpreted 'the green of the field before it was upon the earth' (Gen. 2:4) as an 
invisible spiritual creature from which individual souls are distinguished after sin and to which 
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the souls need to return.134 In a parallel effort to interpret Genesis along Plotinian lines, Augustine 
has a preference to think of Adam's body in Paradise in only spiritual terms.135 Adam would fall 
into a corporeal life after his removal from Paradise. Augustine modeled his description of the 
(first) sin and its effects on Plotinus' ideas too. Tolma was the model for the motivation for sin 
when Augustine described how the male or rational part of soul could be persuaded to consent 
to sin through the concupiscence, pride and curiosity of the female appetitive part of soul. The 
soul is thereby loosened from its tie with God, divided through the plurality of carnal desires and 
loses order and integration. These effects align with Plotinus, even if Augustine restricted them 
to psychology.136  
 In the  Conf. Augustine would further restrict his application of Plotinus' ideas on the fall 
to psychology. Augustine refrains from giving the fall any cosmogonic effects. The fall is not 
related to any individuation, and the spiritual creature of the 'heaven of heaven' from book 12 
cannot be assimilated to the invisible spiritual creature of the Gn. adv. Man.'s 'green of the field'. 
For the heaven of heaven in the Conf. is not related to any culpable sin or fall, and therefore 
stands outside the scheme of an emanation or descent of the soul and neither should the soul 
return there.137 Moreover, although the ontological effects of the fall of the soul into corporeal 
life are still present in the Conf., they play much less of a role than they did in his earlier works.138 
Augustine is also now unsure whether there the soul is pre-existent, although he leaves the 
possibility open.139 Augustine's real interest is in explaining how the will is perverted in our 
current penal state. It is here that the explicit reception of Plotinus takes place. Sin is again 
explained with pride, concupiscence, and curiosity, and the effects of sin are multiplicity, 
forgetfulness and an impoverishment through perverse desire and a turning away from God. But 
these effects are described in the life of the soul in the here and now, in corporeal life.140  
 And so there seems to be a movement in Augustine's reception of Plotinus away from 
the cosmogonic and ontological elements of Plotinus ideas on the fall towards a focus on the 
moral and psychological elements of the fall. And this is indeed Rombs' overarching thesis in his 
book. For he will allow for reception of Plotinus in the mature Augustine too, but restrict it to 
the 'psychology of sin', and not to an ontological fall of the soul as O'Connell did. Indeed 
 
134 Gn. adv. Man., 2.4.5; cf. Rombs (2006), 119-20. 
135 ibid., 2.7.8; 2.14.20, with Rombs' (2006) caveat, 128-9.  
136 Rombs (2006), 133. 
137  Conf., 12.9.9; Rombs (2006), 146-7. 
138 Rombs (2006), 140, 143. 
139 Conf., 1.6.9. 
140 Rombs (2006), 148-52. 
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Augustine's reception of Plotinus has never been unmodified141 or static, as Rombs is apt to 
point out.142 And there are good reasons for Augustine to change the manner of his reception of 
Plotinus as he became more 'theological': the Plotinian metaphysics of emanation and return are 
incompatible with the Christian metaphysics of a creation ex nihilo. For Plotinus, diversity, 
individuation, and indeed existence (outside One) are morally culpable. The soul has the task to 
return to the One, with which it never entirely lost contact, in an ontological manner, and this 
return is achieved by shedding the body. Thus individuation is an effect of a negatively valued 
Fall. But the Christian God stands outside of his Creation. The individuals He created are 
intrinsically good. The efficient cause of individuation is not an emanation or descent into a 
lesser reality, but God himself. In a Christian metaphysics sin can only happen after the Creation 
takes place, if God is not to be forced into forming individuals through necessary causes outside 
of Himself. Even if the soul should harken to God in a Christian metaphysics, it cannot return to 
a place it never was or ever will be since it is distinct from God as a creature. The anthropology 
is therefore not circular, but linear: the human being as a created being awaits immortality and 
beatitude. By contrast, in a Christian metaphysics the human being ultimately is not only the 
soul, which is unfortunately bound to a body, but is right from the start a composite of soul and 
an intrinsically good body.  
 The incompatibility of a cosmogony from a creation ex nihilo by God and an emanation-
descent were already apparent even in the Gn. adv. Man. and the Conf., and it lead Augustine to 
eventually the fall of the soul altogether.143 The catalysts in this process were the Pelagians. 
Pelagius and Caelestius arrived in North Africa in 411, and in the debates against them 
Augustine carried out his conviction that original sin, thus Adam's guilt, was universal over the 
human race. He returned to the question of the origin of the soul again, since the answer to this 
question is instrumental to the explanation of the universality of original sin. He reinterpreted 
Rom. 9:11 -which he hitherto had used to defend God's freedom of choice- as a rejection of the 
possibility of action and sin before birth in the pecc. mer. 1.22.31.144 Augustine rejected the fall of 
the soul, and indeed the pre-existence of the soul, so that the only two viable options of the 
original options of the lib. arb. 3.21.59 that remained were creationism and traducianism.145 This 
 
141 e.g. in the Gn. adv. Man. Adam's sin leads to the mortality of his body, and not to an individuation of souls, as it 
did with the invisible creature. 
142 (2006), 113-5. 
143 Gn. adv. Man., 1.2.4; Conf., 12.15.19; cf. Rombs (2006), 147. 
144 Normally the pecc. mer. is dated 412, but O'Connell would rather see it dated as 415. 
145 Gn. litt., 10.11.19, 10.23.39. 
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also meant that there could no longer be a fall of a pre-existent soul into a body, but that the 
human being was created with both a soul and a body.146  
 This development is visible in the Gn. litt. given that its composition history is so long 
(401-415). In book 1 of the Gn. litt. Augustine still posits an intellectual creature, the 'light' from 
Gen. 1:3, with a cosmogonic function.147 But in book 2 the 'light' has become a multiplicity of 
spiritual creatures, the angels.148 Individuation there is a part of Creation, and, moreover, the 
angels do not serve as an instrumental cause in bringing about beings in the material world.149 
Augustine rather uses Wisdom 11:21 to show that God has ordered all individual beings in 
Creation according to their measure, number and weight, with the Word of God as instrumental 
cause. In book 7 Augustine extensively analyzes the hypothesis of a pre-existent soul and rejects 
it, exactly because the soul cannot suffer adverse effects from being coupled with an intrinsically 
good body, and because the soul cannot fall into time as it already is a creature in time-bound 
Creation.150  Sin is only possible in one's own life (propria vita) through Rom. 9:11, and Adam 
therefore had a proper life before his sin, precluding a fall. But Augustine observed that Paul had 
also stated in Rom. 5:12 that 'all die in Adam, in whom all have sinned'.151 And so it was the 
relationship between Adam and the other human beings that provided Augustine with an 
alternate explanation for the universality of original sin and guilt. 
 Augustine did use Plotinus' distinction communis - propria, e.g. in trin. 12.9.14 and s. 165.6. 
For O'Connell this signaled that Augustine was reverting back to a theory of a fall of the soul. 
Before his proper life, the human being had a communal life in Adam. In this way Adam's sin 
could become universal over the human race. A baby would therefore be affected by the penal 
state of the human race, even if it had no chance or agency yet to sin in his proper life. We 
therefore shared an ontological identity with Adam, who thereby became some sort of (as 
Rombs would say) 'transindividual'.152 For O'Connell this goes back to the young Augustine's 
ideas of the soul being one and many at the same time. With Plotinus' metaphysics behind it, it 
would mean that a communal Adam was ontologically prior to individual proper life. 
 But this is not what Augustine had in mind. As Rombs correctly points out, Augustine 
used a different way than a fall of the soul to explain how original sin was proper to every 
individual’s life, and this was not related to Plotinus. In order to explain Rom. 5:12, Augustine 
 
146 e.g. Trin., 13.3.12. 
147 Gn. litt., 1.9.17. 
148 Gn. litt., 2.8.16. 
149 Rombs (2006), 172-3. 
150 Gn. litt., 8.20.39. 
151 Gn. litt., 6.9.14-5. 
152 O'Connell (1987), 300; Rombs (2006), 103. 
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used a more biblical way of reasoning for the universality of original sin. In the pecc. mer. and the 
civ. Augustine explained that it was our relationship of historical origin with Adam which makes 
for a propagation of original sin. There was no ontological and actual presence of an individual 
in Adam prior to his proper life.153 The historical Adam is rather a historical mediator of our 
humanity, carrying the stain of original sin along. Original sin is described in terms of a 
derivation (traxit) from Adam.154  The unity of human beings through Adam's common origin 
that Augustine describes in the civ. is not an ontological unity, but a societas.155 In as far as this 
unity is not only a description of a shared historical origin but also a command from God to 
form a fellowship of mankind, it is dependent on the will of the human being to partake in it.156 
With this description of our relationship with Adam, Augustine had given an alternate 
explanation of the universality of original sin without needing an ontological fall of the soul and 
the Plotinian metaphysics it involved. It took the relevance away from the question of the origin 
of the soul, which hitherto had the burden of explaining in one way or another how original sin 
was universalized.157 The propagation of the soul was thereby disconnected from the 
propagation of original sin so that Augustine could safely retain an agnostic stance on the 
question of the origin of the soul.158 
 Does this mean that Augustine no longer believed in a fall of the soul after the pecc. mer.? 
In trin. 12.9.14 Augustine indeed describes a fall of the soul while using Plotinus'  common - 
proper distinction and Plotinus' imagery. The body is a proper good of the soul and the soul falls 
towards it through a preference for proper goods over common goods. But Augustine's the fall 
of the soul in the trin. did not entail an ontological fall of the soul into the body and time. For in 
this description of sin, the body serves as the instrument through which the soul sins, so that the 
body cannot be an effect of the fall. Moreover, the process of sin is described with regard to the 
psychological process and effects behind it, in much the same terms as the young Augustine 
described the psychological and moral element of the fall of the soul in the Gn. adv. Man.159   
 The reception of Plotinus by Augustine thus is dynamic. The young Augustine accepted 
the cosmogonic, ontological and moral elements of the fall as he learned them from Plotinus. 
Along with it came Plotinus metaphysics of emanation-descent and return. But gradually 
Augustine realized that these metaphysics were incompatible with a Christian creation ex nihilo. 
 
153 pecc. mer., 1.9.9; civ., 13.3. 
154 ep. 98. 
155 civ., 12.22; Rombs (2006), 197. 
156 civ., 12.28; Rombs (2006), 199.  
157 pecc. mer., 1.22.33. 
158 Rombs (2006), 187. 
159 Rombs (2006), 157-60. 
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He therefore rejected the cosmogonic and ontological elements of Plotinus' fall of the soul, 
along with the metaphysics behind the fall of the soul. Through Paul he found an alternate 
explanation of the universality of original sin, so that the question of the origin of the soul (i.e. 
fall of the soul), which had been instrumental in explaining this universality, could safely be left 
unanswered. But Augustine did retain Plotinus' moral and psychological elements of the fall of 
the soul, along with its imagery. 
 
 
1.4.5 Connection with the Pelagian issue 
 
To conclude this chapter a final remark has to be made about the relevance of this issue 
of the origin of the soul. For this seemingly minor technical issue of the origin of the soul 
received, as the rest of this thesis will show, what may seem an undue portion of the attention in 
the centuries after Augustine. The reason for this is that it is tied up with that last major polemic 
in which Augustine was engaged throughout the last decades of his life, the Pelagian issue. This 
polemic revolves around the measures of dependency of the soul on grace and freedom of the 
will. Augustine in his polemic with the Pelagians came to occupy a position of extreme 
dependency of the soul on grace which consequently meant that any volition unaided by grace 
must necessarily be defective. This extreme position not only led to resistance with the Pelagians, 
but also with catholic monks in Hadrumetum and in the south of Gaul. The Pelagian 
controversy, or the issue over ‘grace versus free will’, would rear its head time and again over the 
course of the following centuries, but its history will not be written here.160 What is important to 
keep in mind is that the account of the origin of the soul must for a catholic enable the 
universality of original sin. Earlier in this chapter it has been elaborated upon how this functions 
as the hinge of Augustine’s theodicy. But this universality of original sin also determines the 
relationship between God and the human being after the Fall. For it is the defective nature of 
the human being after the Fall which necessitates its continuing dependency upon grace, over 
and above the dependency a person has on God for his bare fact of existing as a normal part of 
Creation. It is the way in which the account of the origin of the soul thus enables original sin to 
be universalized which will be written over many pages in the coming chapters, the first of which 
will be on Eugippius’ Excerpta ex operibus Sancti Augustini.
 
160 E.g. a good account of (and deconstruction of the established narrative concerning) the reactions of the monks in 
southern Gaul has been written in the first few chapters of Augustine Casiday’s Tradition and Theology in St John 
Cassian (Oxford, New York 2007). 
 Part Two: The sixth century 
 
Chapter 2. Eugippius and the origin of 
the soul in the Excerpta ex operibus 
sancti Augustini. 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
2.1.1 Eugippius’ selection criteria and audience for the Excerpta 
 
Eugippius’ aim with the Excerpta was to provide the reader with one volume (albeit 
massive one, Knöll’s modern edition has 1100 pages) of relevant excerpts taken from 
Augustine’s enormous oeuvre, which would be easier to procure than the different separate 
manuscripts. ‘Certainly, if none of the great men deemed it worthy to do or to have this, at least 
such men for whom the fullness of such a great work is absent perhaps will enjoy these excerpts, 
because one will be able to procure one codex easier then many.’161 Eugippius self-professed 
stance in his collecting is one of humility and passivity: the only thing Eugippius did to the 
 
161 Quorum omnium [vicariorum illius] ego prorsus abiectior ex aliquantis eiusdem beati viri praeclaris operibus perpauca ruminando 
quodam modo lambendoque decerpsi, quae praestantibus amicis integra legeram: nam omnia illius habere vel invenire quis possit? 
‘Epistula ad Probam virginem’ in Eugippius, Excerpta ex operibus S. Augustini (ed. P. Knöll, Vienna 1885), 23.  
‘Of whom [the very lowly herd] I –even more improper- have straightforwardly gathered from a considerable 
number of very famous works of the same blessed man a few things by chewing them over in some way and 
‘licking’ them gently, which things I had read in their entirety with admirable friends: for who could have or find all 
works of this famous man?’ [All translations of the prefatory letter to Proba are mine]. 
 A complete translation and discussion can be found in Gomez (unpubl. 2008), 87-99. 
Certe si nullus magnorum id vel facere vel habere dignetur, saltem illi quibus plenaria tanti desunt operis his fortasse delectabuntur 
excerptis, quia facilius unum codicem quis poterit sibi parare quam multos. ‘Epistula’, 3. 
‘Certainly, if none of the great men deemed it worthy to do or to have this, at least such men for whom the fullness 
of such a great work is absent perhaps will enjoy these excerpts, because one will be able to procure one codex 
easier then many.’  
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excerpts was ‘gently lick’ them into place.162 Indeed Eugippius stayed true to Augustine’s texts 
and only made some changes to fit the excerpts on to each other if necessary. Eugippius himself 
is not present in the Excerpta, apart from the chapter headings he gave to the excerpts. Together 
with the prefatory letter Eugippius wrote to Proba, these amount to the totality of Eugippius’ 
explicit expressions on his material. Much of what will be said in this chapter will therefore have 
to come from inferences from Eugippius’ selection and placement of excerpts in his florilegy. 
Eugippius’ priorities, programme and creativity have to come out in the structure and assembly 
of the excerpts, in the way that he -in modern terms- ‘copy-pasted’ Augustine’s work. For 
Eugippius himself is tight-lipped about his selection and placing criteria. He gives one clue in his 
letter to Proba, when explains his selection of the first and last few excerpts:  
 
Therefore, because of this [broad mandate of double love], I believed it to 
be appropriate and fitting that in these excerpts love, through which generally all 
things, which are dispersed, are united in wholeness, would provide the beginning 
of the book, the love which is both the perfection of all the virtues and the 
fullness of the heavenly law; the same love, which itself has no end, also provided 
the end to the work...Indeed, if anyone, in transcribing this work should wish 
perchance to add other things to these that have been assembled [here], let him 
add [them] in appropriate places in order that the above-mentioned headings on 
the subject of love may alsways maintain [their position as] the end of the 
selections’163  
 
162 ‘Epistula’, 2: Quorum omnium [vicariorum illius] ego prorsus abiectior ex aliquantis eiusdem beati viri praeclaris operibus perpauca 
ruminando quodam modo lambendoque decerpsi, quae praestantibus amicis integra legeram: nam omnia illus habere vel invenire quis 
possit?  
‘Of whom [the very lowly herd] I -even more improper- have straightforwardly gathered from a considerable 
number of very famous works of the same blessed man a few things by chewing them over in some way and 
‘licking’ them gently, which things I had read in their entirety through the offering of friends, for who could have or 
find all works of this famous man?’ 
On the procedure of Eugippius’ ‘licking’, Vogüé (1971), 241-54. 
163 ‘Epistula’, 3-4. Integrum vero librum visum est excerptorum debere esse principium et ille potissimum mihi praeponendus occurrit, 
quem idem beatus Augustinus antistes ad sanctum Hieronymum post primum de animae quaestione noscitur scripsisse presbyterum, 
solvens illam ex epistula Iacobi apostoli quam in primo praenotavi capitulo quaestionem: in quo libro quattuor illas virtutes, id est 
prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem atque iustitiam, ad illud geminae dilectionis dei et proximi latum mandatum nimis, in quo tota 
lex pendet et prophetae, mirifice rettulit Translation of the second sentence is Gomez’. ob hoc [geminae dilectionis dei et 
proximi lato mandato] itaque congruum putavi atque conveniens ut his excerptis caritas, qua dispersa solent adunari integritate, libri 
daret exordium quae et virtutum omnium perfectio et supernae legis est plenitudo; ipsa quoque finem dedit operi, quae non habet finem..si 
quis sane fransferens hoc opus his quae congesta sunt alia addere forte voluerit, congruis adiciat locis, ut praedicti duo de caritate tituli 
finem semper teneant excerptorum. ‘Epistula’, 3. 
The ‘book’ of which Eugippius is speaking in the first sentence is ep. 167. This letter does not deal with the soul, but 
with a question about the exegesis of James 2:10 (‘Whoever observes the whole law, but offends on one point, is 
guilty of all’), in which Augustine argues that one virtue entails all the others. The letter in which Augustine does 
treat the origin of the soul is 166. In 415 Orosius brought these letters together to Jerome, and in the retr. 2.45 
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For the rest he claims his Excerpta are a ‘disorderly heap’ (inordinata congestio), yet some 
more clues may be gained from Eugippius’ praise of Augustine. Eugippius describes how 
Augustine provides ‘abundant sustenance’ (copiosa pabula) for the christian ‘flock’ (oves) ‘from the 
meadows of scripture’ (de pratis scripturarum) and, presumably ‘for the ones hungry’ (esurientibus, 
ieiunis) for initiation into christianity that Eugippius speaks of as well. But Augustine also 
provides ‘those who are fighting with weaponry’ (diminicantibus armatura) against the enemies of 
the church and ‘particularly the bishops of the apostolic seat’ (praecipue apostolicae sedis antistites) 
‘against especially against the shape-shifting enemies of the grace of God’ (maxime contra versipelles 
inimicos gratiae dei doctrina).164  
Does this mean that Eugippius selected his excerpts for both audiences of pupils and 
polemicists? Modern commentators hold that Eugippius was more into teaching than into 
gathering ammunition for debates and that he shied away from debate and controversy. Joseph 
Lienhard states that Eugippius’ ‘interest is in information rather than speculation; his problems 
are the problems of the classroom, not those of controversy.’ Eugippius only had to ‘appropriate 
the truth in Augustine’s writings’ so that a monastic ‘reader, by turning to the correct chapter, 
can solve his problem with this or that verse in scripture; the tranquility of his life will not be 
disturbed.’165 James O’Donnell states that ‘What was valuable about Augustine was not what was 
distinctive about him but what he had said that formed a useful part of the common deposit of 
faith and interpretation... The ‘authority’ of Augustine for Eugippius is what there is in 
Augustine that helps the reader come to a better interpretation and fuller understanding of the 
scriptural text.’166 Conrad Leyser hypothesizes that Eugippius‘ activity as a compiler, both in the 
Excerpta and in the Rule, was -among other things- a strategy to build consensus and to create a 
moral community.167 This picture fits in with Eugippius’ placement of the excerpts on caritas at 
the end and beginning and is further confirmed by both O’Donnell’s and Karla Pollmann’s 
observation that Augustine’s material on grace and the Pelagian issue is underrepresented.168 In 
this chapter I will argue on the basis of his excerpts on the soul that this view is correct but not 
complete: on the surface Eugippius may present the tranquility of orthodox concensus, but 
 
Augustine refers to these letters as ‘two books’ (duo libri). This quotation shows that Eugippius does treat the letters 
as one inseparable text, since it is hard to imagine that Eugippius made an error, given the importance of the 
question of the origin of the soul for Eugippius – as I will argue in this chapter.  
164 I owe ‘shape-shifting’ to Gomez. 
165 Lienhard (1977), 30-1. 
166 O’Donnell (1991), 18-9. 
167 As well as a strategy for political survival and autonomy. Leyser (2001), 67,73. 
168 Pollmann (2009), 25; O’Donnell (1991), 18-9. 
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below the waterline he tries to make a contribution to the predestination debate by way of the 
question of the origin of the soul. And this is also useful for leading minds.169 
 
 
2.1.2 Edition trouble  
 
One would like to make some observations about the structure of the Excerpta. For the 
structure of the Excerpta seems to be compatible with the idea of Eugippius’ presenting an 
orthodox Augustine, useful in monastic context for both instruction and reference. Eugippius’ 
own remark notwithstanding, one must have a particularly low esteem of Eugippius as a 
compiler to suppose that there is no structure to the Excerpta.170 Yet much must remain in the 
realm of the hypothetical. Apart from the scantiness of Eugippius’ own remarks there are 
problems with Knöll’s modern (1885) critical edition. This is due in no small measure to the 
function of the Excerpta. Pollmann sees it as a ‘...ganz aus Augustinus zusammengestellte Proto-
Katene, die nach Eugippius eventuell auch durch spätere Redaktoren erweitert werden kann, 
vorausgesetzt, daß die abschließenden Abschnitte zur >caritas< ihren Ort behalten (CSEL 9/1, 
4, 3-6). Eugippius macht immer wieder deutlich, daß es sich um Auszüge handelt, die dem Leser 
Appetit auf mehr Lektüre über seine Excerpta hinaus machen sollen.’171 And sure enough Knöll’s 
edition of the Excerpta contains a number of interpolations. This is already suggested by 
Cassiodorus’ mention that Eugippius’ Excerpta had 338 chapters, whereas Knöll has 348.172 
Conrad Leyser therefore warns that ‘Eugippius’ very reputation as an augustinian scholar may 
have left his authority vulnerable to appropriation.’173 For Knöll’s modern critical edition these 
problems are aggravated by Knöll’s principal use of the by far oldest manuscript of the Excerpta, 
the sixth-century Italian Vat. lat. 3375 (V), whereas Knöll did not use nor knew what Michael 
Gorman has shown to be the best manuscripts, Monte Cassino 13 (C) and Munich Clm 6247 
(F), both eleventh-century.174 Gorman therefore concludes that Knöll’s edition ‘reveals neither 
the original structure of Eugippius’ work nor the precise text of the archetype’.175 For the student 
 
169 I am here foregoing a more rigorous socio-historical discussion about the intended authorship of the Excerpta 
here, excluding for example lay aristocratic readership, since the focus of the chapter is on the content of Eugippius’ 
use of Augustine.  
170 Apart, that is, from the excerpts concerning caritas at the start and the beginning, for which placement we have 
Eugippius’ own statement, as just given. Brunhölzl (1975), 44 has such a low opinion of Eugippius as compiler. 
171 Pollmann (2009), 24-5. 
172 Cassiodorus, Institutiones 61.23-62.9, Mynors (ed.) (Oxford 1937). Michael Gorman (1982a), 13-14; (1982b), 233-4.  
173 Leyser (2001), 73.  
174 Knöll, praefatio, I; Gorman (1982a), 22, 25-6; (1982b), 233-40. 
175 Gorman (1982b), 263. 
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of Eugippius these problems can be ever so slightly mended by comparing the structure of 
Knöll’s edition to the structure of the edition in the PL (62), in which Migne reprinted the editio 
princeps by Iohannes Herold (Basle 1542). A comparison between the structures of the two 
editions has been made in the appendices 3.3 for the parts of the Excerpta which are relevant for 
this chapter. Some general remarks about the structure of the Excerpta may still be made.  
 
 
2.1.3 Structure of the Excerpta 
 
The Excerpta can be seen as consisting of two parts of roughly equal size.176 The first part 
deals with salvation history from the ‘first’ Fall (not of Adam but of the Devil) and the origin of 
evil to the resurrection (25-174). However, Eugippius does not stick too rigorously to a 
chronological scheme; for instance, he chooses to treat some questions concerning the New 
Testament (such as minor contradictions in the gospels concerning the passion) after the 
resurrection (175-203). One reason for this seems to be that these questions eventually lead to a 
smoother transition from the first part to the second than a rigid chronological scheme would 
have allowed. Yet this placement of the last paragraphs aside, Eugippius gives the reader 
excerpts which could answer some questions and impart some doctrines (e.g. creation at one 
stroke, but fulfilment through rationes in excerpt 11) which are useful when acquainting himself 
with salvation history (as much as some of these events are still supposed to take place in the 
future) through the Bible.  
Eugippius has a different priority in the second part. It is not so much concerned with 
history but with Christianity as theological doctrine and with its religious practices in the here 
and now. The questions which seem to bring a measure of coherence to the paragraphs are 
‘How do I become Christian?’, ‘Who are the relevant authorities to learn Christianity from and 
what is baptism?’, ‘What is the Trinity?’, ‘How do I read the Bible?’ and ‘How do I behave as 
Christian and relate to Christian practices?’ The whole of these two parts are introduced and 
concluded by texts on love and the virtues. This conceptual frame indicates that these are the 
core values of Christianity and the way to the good Christian life. Taken together, the parts give a 
well-rounded introduction to Christianity -leaning heavily on Biblical sources- which in principle 
is useful for both converts (recent or future) and teachers or a as reference work for anyone 
interested.  
 
176 Cf. table 1 in the appendices; Cf. Lienhard (1977), 29-30, Hofmann (1998), 300-1. 
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2.1.4 Eugippius’ Augustine 
 
How do we meet Augustine through Eugippius’ Excerpta? The research presented in this 
chapter is not sufficient for a well-balanced answer, but a sketch must be made here. I will start 
with Eugippius’ use of his sources. A survey of Eugippius’ sources is made easy due to Knöll’s 
index excerptorum. Eugippius uses a wide variety of works of Augustine with an emphasis on 
works on exegesis and hermeneutics (Gn. litt., Qu., Qu. eu., doctr. chr.), on theological speculation 
(Trin., div. qu., bapt.,), the ‘larger’ works Conf. and Civ., and the polemical c. Faust. Notable 
omissions are works which do not make much use of Scripture, such as the mag. and the early 
dialogues. The ord. is an exception to this pattern, which Eugippius uses because of Augustine’s 
views on the proper sciences and curriculum.177 In his selection of Augustine, Eugippius 
sometimes gives a large extract from one text but deletes sentences or paragraphs he deems 
irrelevant. The separate and ‘cleaned up’ stretches of text that remain make up the excerpts. This 
happens for example with paragraphs 80-101 where he uses excerpts taken from the Qu. to treat 
questions concerning the Old Testament. In other instances Eugippius compiled a sort of 
dossier with many relevant excerpts on the same topic coming from a range of different works. 
This happens notably with the two heresies that Eugippius gives attention to, the Origenist 
heresy and the Pelagian heresy, in excerpts 30-37 and 305-323 respectively, even if the anti-
Pelagian materials are under-represented.178 When treating the individual excerpts on the soul 
later in this chapter, it will thus be a relevant question to ask whether Eugippius inserts the 
excerpt on the soul without its context, or whether it fits in a range of excerpts taken from the 
same work in which the excerpt on the soul follows naturally. 
A next question is what, according to Eugippius, Augustine’s most important message is. 
As indicated the Excerpta are ‘enveloped’ with the double commandment of love and the virtues. 
Love is not only an emotion or motivation, but caritas is measured in virtuous action, and the 
four virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice (which would later become the 
‘cardinal virtues’) flow forth from the mandate for the ‘double love’ for God and ‘thy 
neighbour’(Math. 22:37-40). Eugippius’ main concern thus seems to go out to the human being 
in his moral capacity, the rightful actions he can perform and –in contrast with this- the pitfalls 
and temptations drawing him toward sin. The way for the human being to overcome sin, 
through the mediation of Christ, constitutes an essential part of the analysis of the ‘moral human 
being’ for Eugippius. To say that love and the virtues, as forming the beginning and the end of 
 
177 Excerpt 23 uses Ord. 2.7, 2.24-9.  
178 Cf. Knöll’s table (1124-49) for the sources. Pollmann (2009), 25. 
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the Excerpta, are therefore ‘alpha and omega’, is more than just a metaphor. For the love for God 
and one’s neighbour and the virtues lead to a very specific good life, namely the Christian good 
life as perceived by Augustine. This is a life which is concerned with the immutable, the eternal, 
and the divine. In other words, this is a life focused on the immortal God who stands outside of 
time. Caritas and the virtues thus make the reader focus on the timelessness of God, on the cause 
of the universe, its beginning and its end. After the long introduction on caritas and the virtues 
(some 100 pages of the edition on a total of 1100), as a next step Eugippius selects some 
excerpts concerning the creation of the universe. Thus from the focus on the timeless God and 
truth, Eugippius goes on to ‘create’ the world from paragraph 25 onwards. Similarly, after 
treating the temporary life of the Christian, the focus slides again towards the enduring caritas 
and the eternity of the life to come. The concern for love and the virtues can also be detected in 
the two heresies that Eugippius is prepared to spend time on. He focuses not so much on the 
nature of Christ or the Trinity (at least not in a polemical context), but on the Origenist heresy 
concerning the origin of evil and on the Pelagian heresy concerning the relative weight that good 
deeds and grace have for one’s salvation. Both heresies have something to do with the human 
being as moral agent. These heresies therefore bear a relationship to caritas, and the virtues as 
guides for the proper focus of one’s life and principle of choice constitute the goals for the 
human being as moral agent. Caritas and the virtues therefore serve as a principle of choice and 
structure for Eugippius in so far as he is concerned with the human being as a moral agent. 
Instead of having the eternal God as the beginning and end of his work as Augustine would be 
prone to do, Eugippius thus chooses the actions which lead to this eternal God to encompass his 
Excerpta.  
This focus on the moral side of the human being can also be detected in the larger 
structure of the Excerpta. In the first half of the Excerpta Eugippius is concerned with salvation 
history. Salvation history is heavily involved with the moral side of the relationship between God 
and the human being: from his status of untainted created being, towards the Fall from Paradise, 
the redemption by the actions (dying on the cross) of God in human form of the Christ, 
culminating in the resurrection for all and the entering into heaven for those human beings who 
followed the proper moral standards. In the second half, guidelines are given to the proper 
behaviour of the Christian in the present. Caritas and the virtues are the highest expressions, the 
goals that Eugippius sees for the human being as Christian moral agent. He seems to have taken 
the advice from doctr. christ. I.36.40 to heart: ‘Whoever, then, thinks that he understands the Holy 
Scriptures, or any part of them, but puts such an interpretation upon them as does not tend to 
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build up this twofold love of God and our neighbour, does not yet understand them as he 
ought.’179  
Yet Augustine had a wide range of interests, and treated topics which are not included by 
Eugippius. Epistemology or philosophy of language, as we encounter it in the mag., are utterly 
absent from the selection made in the Excerpta. The Augustine we meet through Eugippius’ 
choice of excerpts is a biblical commentator and predominantly concerned with the moral 
outlook of the human being. It is to a much smaller degree that Eugippius also includes 
dogmatic topics like reflections the Trinity and rituals like baptism, aspects not relevant for my 
argument. In the rest of this chapter the focus will be on the excerpts which treat the soul. What 
Eugippius selected from Augustine’s varied works and where they fit into the structure of the 
Excerpta should clarify Eugippiu’s aims with these excerpts.   
 
 
2.2 The origin of the soul 
 
 Given that Eugippius does not write a De anima, but tries to give an overview of 
(Augustine’s) Christianity via eschatological history and ‘timeless’ contemporary Christianity, it is 
not surprising that the relevant excerpts are spread out over the work, with only one explicit 
excerpt dealing with ‘De animae quaestione’ (372). The other excerpts are grouped around the 
creation and the Fall of Adam and sections concerning the Trinity. Moreover, when looking at 
the excerpts concerning the soul, it becomes apparent that Eugippius had a rather limited 
interest in the human soul. Eugippius did not so much want to convey to his audience what kind 
of entity the human soul is, or what its activities and functions are, or how it constitutes some 
kind of individuation of the single person. The framework of the Excerpta, that the human being 
stands in need of God for a good (after)life through a reciprocal love, guided him in the message 
that the soul serves as the anchor for the moral status of a person. It is the soul which loves the 
right or the wrong things, and it is what changes in the moral realm. For people who strive to 
improve themselves through a rigorous regime in day-by-day life, such as the monks who 
constituted at least part of the Excerpta’s audience, this is an important message. In this context 
the relevant question for Eugippius was how evil encroached on the human soul through 
Adam’s original sin and what its consequences were.  
 
179 Quisquis igitur scripturas divinas uel quamlibet earum partem intellexisse sibi videtur ita ut eo intellectu non aedificet istam geminam 
caritatem dei et proximi, nondum intellexit. Transl. O’Donnell.  
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This is expressed in the overriding interest that Eugippius displays in the origin of the 
human soul. This question, although it may appear to be an ontological technicality, is important 
for the question how original sin affects new and existing souls alike. This in turn ties in with 
questions about the fallen state of the human soul and what is needed to redeem it. The wider 
relevance of the question of the soul’s origin may therefore be sought in contemporary debates 
about the nature of the agency of the human being in faith and good works between those who 
propagated an extreme predestinationism on the basis of Augustine and the ‘Provençal Masters’, 
such as Vincent of Lérins, Cassian and Faustus of Riez who reacted against it.180 However, given 
that the Excerpta were probably written before Eugippius took up the abbacy of the monastery at 
Castellum Lucullanum in 511, the upheaval caused by the Scythian monks and Fulgentius of 
Ruspe’s subsequent polemic against the then already deceased Faustus of Riez cannot have 
formed the direct cause for Eugippius‘ selection of excerpts concerning original sin and the 
origin of the soul.    
 
 
2.2.1 Excerpt 372 
 
 The problem of the origin of the soul is treated in excerpt 372, titled ‘De animae 
quaestione’. That the problem of the origin of the soul is identified as the only question gives a 
glimpse of the weight of the question, and this is further underlined by Eugippius‘ very careful 
composition of this excerpt, as it is constructed out of several different texts taken from 
Augustine. This is unusual for Eugippius, who has the majority of his excerpts consist of one or 
a few subsequent paragraphs of the same text. The beginning is made up by the last paragraph 
(19) of ep. 205 (written in 419 or 420) to the catholic layman Consentius on the resurrection of 
the flesh. This paragraph is on the creation of the soul from the flatus dei, affirming that the soul 
is a created being and not divine. Even though Eugippius reproduced this letter (minus the first 
paragraph which is directed to Consentius in a more personal way) in the course of the previous 
excerpts(369-71), he chose with good reason to use this last paragraph as the start to his ‘De 
animae quaestione’. It defines God as the ultimate origin for the created being of the soul, and with 
 
180 These predestination debates were formerly known under the heading ‘semi-pelagianism’, but Augustine Casiday 
has very forcefully deconstructed Prosper of Aquitaine’s framing of anyone who did not agree with his 
interpretation of Augustine (most notably Cassian) as opposed to Augustine (2007), e.g. 41-46. Further on these 
fifth and sixth century debates on predestination from a socio-political perspective Mathisen (1989), esp. 244-72. 
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its absolute certainty forms a good counterpoint to the following tentative discussion of the 
origin of the soul. 
For directly after this certain statement about God as the origin of the soul, Eugippius 
follows up with Augustine’s sentence from the retr. 1.1.3 (427), in which Augustine –speaking 
about the Acad.- mentions that he did not know and does not know when writing the retr. what 
pertains to the origin of the soul: whether Adam’s soul was created earlier than the others and 
how the embodiment of the soul works out technically.181 The bulk of the excerpt, following this 
quote from the retr., is made up by parts from ep. 190 (418) and 202a (420), the two letters that 
Augustine wrote to Optatus, bishop of Milevis, concerning the origin of the soul.182 In these 
letters Augustine defends his agnosticism on the origin of the soul against Optatus’ firm 
creationist position. The polemic in these two letters of Augustine is not so much about all the 
options of the origin of the soul (which as I have stated on p. 30 is more aptly described as the 
question of the embodiment of the soul), but mainly revolves around traducianism 
(propagationism) and creationism.183 Along with his agnosticism, Augustine defends against 
Optatus the necessity that both these positions have to be compatible with the universal nature 
of original sin. Augustine seems inclined towards traducianism, since he sees a possibility of 
defending the universal effect of original sin with it.184 But given that the authority of Scripture 
does not give clear guidance he is not choosing one side over the other; someone else may find a 
way of defending at the same time creationism and the universality of original sin even if 
Augustine himself cannot.185 In his letters he therefore has to give the unequivocal Scriptural 
defence of original sin while showing the pros and cons of each solution to the question of the 
 
181 Nam quod attinet ad eius originem, qua fit, ut sit in corpore, utrum de illo uno sit qui primum creatus est, quando factus est homo in 
animam vivam, an similiter fiant singulis singulae, nec tunc sciebam nec adhuc scio. 
This piece from the retr. is overlooked by Knöll in his edition, who does not mention the retr. as a source for the 
Excerpta at all.  
182 I am following the dating by Roland Teske in his notes to his translation of the letters in four volumes. All these 
letters are in volume 3: Augustine, Letters 156-210 (ed. Boniface Ramsey, trans. Roland Teske), (New York 2004), in 
the series ‘The Works of Saint Augustine. A Translation for the 21st Century’. Eugippius’ mixing of the letters makes 
it clear that he is not so much interested in the chronology of the letters or a development of Augustine’s thought, 
but is looking for the timeless message of Augustine.  
183 The problem of a possible prior spiritual material from which the soul is created is only brought in as a further 
complication of creationism. E.g. ep. 202a.4.8. 
184 E.g. ep. 202a.2.6. 
185 E.g. ep. 190.4.13-14; 190.5.16-19. 
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origin.186 For where the difficulty with creationism is the compatibility with universal original sin, 
with traducianism it is hard to imagine one soul engendering another.187 But it is clear for 
Augustine that Optatus’ argument for creationism does not hold: the fact that God shapes each 
soul does not determine creationism to be true, since God also shapes each body and it is clear 
that bodies are propagated.188  
When reviewing what Eugippius actually selected from these letters (190.5.16-19; 6.23; 
6.25; 202a.2.6; 202a.7.15-8.18) there are several observations to make. Eugippius not only 
removes the personal or historical paragraphs, but also the explanatory material. From ep. 190 
these last are the long paragraphs on the certainty of original sin and God’s justice in electing the 
persons he will save and from 202a the paragraphs which are meant to assure Optatus that there 
is no contradiction between traducianism and the fact that God shapes each soul. What remains 
is a most forceful picture of Augustine’s uncertainty and almost vulnerability on this matter. The 
passage 190.5.16-9 consists of Augustine’s exegesis of the relevant Scriptural passages, in order 
to deconstruct them as arguments for one side or the other. 202a.2.6 again affirms Augustine’s 
uncertainty, where 7.15-8.18 exacerbates the problem since Augustine here asks whether it is for 
the human being to have knowledge of the origin of his soul in the first place. Eugippius further 
added paragraphs stating that infant baptism is an effective sacrament (190.6.23) whichever 
position one holds, and that the soul of Christ was unaffected by original sin (190.6.25). In effect 
 
186 E.g. ep. 190.2.5; Optatus, as a young bishop had difficulties establishing his authority in his diocese against a 
group of older priests. They held on to traducianism since they believed that the soul as material being is propagated 
together with the body from the parents. Optatus argued against them for creationism and sent several letters to 
people in Caesarea, of whom the monk Renatus and Optatus’ relative Muressi came to Augustine, who at the time 
was in Caesarea on business for the pope Zosimus, to question him on the origin of the soul. From ep. 202a one can 
ascertain that Optatus responded to letter 190, stringently asking Augustine for Jerome’s reply to Augustine’s ep. 
166, in which Augustine asked Jerome for his arguments for creationism. But Augustine would never receive 
Jerome’s reply and was unwilling to find himself in another controversy with Jerome by publishing ep. 166 without 
it. Augustine could not therefore help him with further arguments for creationism in ep. 202a. But in the meantime, 
in 418, Vincentius Victor, who was part of the circle around Optatus (and who A. de Veer hypothesizes to have 
been on the lay court that Optatus asked to settle the issue over the origin of the soul, 287 n. 17) found ep. 190 with 
a certain priest Petrus and decided to write two books against Augustine (which are lost except for some quotes in 
the last two books of the an. et or.) to defend Optatus. This prompted Augustine to write the an. et or. in 419 to refute 
Vincent Victor and ask him to recant, which Vincent indeed did. On the further historical circumstances of the 
composition of ep. 190 and 202a and their connections with ep. 166 and the an. et or. cf. the introduction to the an. et 
or. in the BA 22 (La crise Pélagienne II), 275-90 and the notes complémentaires 27-28, 756-64 by A. de Veer. 
187 ep. 190.4.15. 
188 ep. 202a.5.12. 
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Eugippius has almost removed Augustine’s theological arguments for his agnosticism in favour 
of his exegetical reasoning and affirmation that this knowledge may come to close to the mystery 
of how the creation was technically realized. Eugippius was thus not so much interested in the 
theological side of the problem, or what it has to reveal about the soul as a being, but more in 
the mystery about the soul which even Augustine was unable to overcome.  
For the uninitiated reader this must therefore be a strange paragraph to read. If one turns 
to this excerpt as the most general excerpt on the soul and expects to find some kind of 
overview of the positions on the soul that Augustine held, this excerpt would prove a disillusion. 
It is not that the title is a misnomer, but the presentation of the issue is less than clear: Eugippius 
makes the reader find out that the main problem is the origin of the soul, only to leave it in the 
dark, omitting obvious passages on the origin of the soul from the Gn. litt. which treat the 
problem a bit more analytically (to which I will come later). It therefore rather seems as if 
Eugippius is trying to quell a debate rather than to give intellectual support to the inquisitive 
mind.  
It is then revealing to take a further look in order to see whether this interest in the origin 
of the soul is also present in the other excerpts on the soul, and if so, how it is treated there.  
 
 
2.2.2 Original sin and the rationes; excerpt 40  
 
 Other excerpts which convey Eugippius’ overriding interest in the origin of the soul, 
excerpts 31, 40, 53, 82, 103, are all part of Eugippius’ selection concerning salvation history.189 
The focus in the rest of this chapter will be on excerpts 40 and 53. Excerpt 82 defies treatment 
here as it is very short and aporic and even extended analysis would remain in the realm of 
hypothesis. In 31 and 103 Eugippius has Augustine confirm his agnosticism on the problem. 
But, even though Eugippius will not undermine Augustine’s agnosticism, the analysis will 
become considerably more complicated when reading 40 and 53. In salvation history, there are 
two human beings who always have a status apart from the rest of humanity, viz. the first human 
being and the human being who was also God. Even though these two humans are vastly 
different from each other on account of Jesus also being Creator and Adam only creature, theirs 
are the only souls, together with Eve's soul, which have known a state without original sin. These 
 
189 cf. table 3 in the appendices for a complication with excerpt 40, which in my opinion is not grave.  
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two excerpts deal with these two extraordinary human beings. Excerpt 40 revolves around the 
question how Jesus’ soul can be excempted from original sin, as seen from the technical 
background of the origin of the soul. Excerpt 53 revolves around the creation of Adam. These 
two excerpts take the Gn. litt. as their source and in them the rationes, God’s instruments of 
causality to bring about and influence his Creation, play an important role. According to excerpt 
53, Adam, as first human being was created through a ratio, but according to excerpt 40 Christ 
has a special ratio, so that he is not affected by original sin. The combination of these two 
excerpts, together with their respective placing in the history of salvation of the Excerpta, seems 
to suggest that Eugippius has found another vehicle for the transmission of original sin, the ratio 
seminalis of the human body. As a consequence the problem of the origin of the soul would be 
freed from the burden of the transmission of original sin. This idea would therefore ‘neutralise’ 
the problem of the soul’s origin. It is clear that Augustine himself would not see the problem of 
the origin of the soul relieved this way. Augustine’s explanation of Christ’s exemption from 
original sin by way of a different ratio is clearly a hypothesis. And letters 190 and 202a, from 
which excerpt 372 takes its bulk, were written later than the publication year of the Gn. litt. (416), 
and also in the Gn. litt. itself Augustine elaborated greatly on the problem in book 7. None the 
less, Eugippius chose to incorporate these texts on the rationes and leave out other relevant 
texts.190 Eugippius through this bias seems to want to pin Augustine down on this solution.  
  
Let’s explore the just sketched line in more detail. Excerpt 40 is taken from book 10 of 
the Gn. litt. which deals with the origin of the human souls after Adam. In the excerpt, Gn. litt. 
10.20.35-21.37, the question is how Hebrews 7:4-10 bears on the origin of the soul of Christ 
(especially 7:9-10: ‘And, as it is right to say, because of Abraham Levi too, the receiver of a tithe, 
was tithed; for he was still in the loins of Abraham’191). It revolves around the tithes which the 
priests are due from the Jewish people. In order to distinguish the priesthood of Christ from the 
Levitical priesthood, Augustine took the position that Christ was not tithed as Levi was, with the 
implication that Christ did not suffer the consequences of original as other humans such as Levi 
do. The question then becomes how Christ was – or more importantly was not – present in 
Abrahams loins. Since it is clear that Christ, by way of Mary, was as present in Abraham just as 
Levi according to his physical substance, Christ’s soul must not have been present in this 
 
190 as explained in paragraph 2.2.5. 
191 As taken from the Gn. litt. 10.19.34: Et, sicut oportet dicere, propter Abraham et Levi accipiens decimam decimatus est; adhuc 
enim in lumbis patris sui fuit. All translations from the Gn. litt. are from Edmund Hill.  
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bloodline.192 Two things are important here: (1) which consequences Augustine drew from ‘the 
case of Christ’ for the origin of the soul and (2) how Augustine speaks about Christ’s exception 
from the universality of original sin and the transmission of the human bodily nature.  
As may be expected Augustine refrained from drawing any clear inferences for the origin 
of the soul. For one may explain this text in several ways which lead to the opposing positions of 
traducianism and creationism. One may come to a reading of the text in which Christ is not 
affected since his special soul is not part of the normal human ‘chain’ of souls, so that his soul 
was not subject to tithing. Then the consequence is that Levi’s soul was in the loins of Adam – 
the key difference being that Christ’s soul as special soul was not –, so that one comes to a 
traducianist position. On the other hand, one may say that the difference between Christ and 
Levi was not in the presence of their souls in Abraham (Levi’s was and Christ’s was not), but in 
the way the seed of their bodies were present; Levi’s in the normal way through sexual 
intercourse, Christ in a different way. With this explanation the text is still compatible with 
creationism, since Christ’s special soul can no longer be taken as the exemption to the rule of 
traducianism. And so Augustine is not inclined to choose sides (1).193 It is clear that these two 
readings are hypotheses, but it becomes interesting when we take a closer look at his explanation 
for creationism (Christ was conceived differently).  
Augustine explains the difference between Levi and Christ with the rationes seminales, the 
‘seminal reasons’, or as in 10.20.35 with the invisibilis ratio (‘invisible formula’ – after Edmund 
Hill’s translation).194 Augustine uses the rationes to solve the tension which exists between God’s 
continued interference in his temporal creation, and the idea that God himself stands outside of 
time and created everything to completion in one instant.195 The rationes are the causal conditions 
 
192 Gn. litt. 10.19.34. 
193 Gn. litt. 10.20.35-21.37. 
194 Gn. litt. 10.20.35 cum enim sit in semine et visibilis corpulentia et invisibilis ratio, utrumque cucurrit ex Abraham vel etiam ex 
ipso Adam usque ad corpus Mariae, quia et ipsum eo modo conceptum et exortum est. Christus autem visibilem carnis substantiam de 
carne virginis sumsit; ratio vero conceptionis eius non a semine virili, sed longe aliter ac desuper venit. Proinde secundum hoc, quod de 
matre accepit, etiam in lumbis Abrahae fuit. 
 ‘Since, you see, there is in the seed both visible bodiliness and an invisible formula, each of these ran from 
Abraham, or even from Adam himself, as far as the body of Mary, because this too was conceived and born in that 
way. Christ, however, indeed took the substance of his flesh from the flesh of the Virgin; but the formula for his 
conception did not come from male seed, but in a very different way from above. Accordingly, following this line of 
argument, what he received from his mother was also in the loins of Abraham.’  
195 This is a theme which is recurrent throughout the whole of the Gn. litt., e.g. 1.9.17; 1.18.36; 4.33.51-34.54; 
5.12.28; 6.10.17-11.18. cf. de Veer’s ‘notes complémentaires’ of the BA 48, 653-668. The notes draw attention (662-
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which God planted in his temporal creation which bring everything to fruition in their own time. 
In order to gain at least an initial understanding in the notion, there are two things to be kept in 
mind. The first is that Augustine is rendering the Stoic idea of logos with his term ratio, with 
which the Stoics indicated the principle, cause and reason of a being. In their ideas about 
causation, some Stoics made a difference between the divine generative cause of things on a 
cosmic scale (pneuma, logos spermatikos) and a ‘swarm of causes’, the conditions which give rise to 
certain situations inside the cosmos (with which difference some Stoics wanted to explain 
fate).196 The second is that Plotinus took the term logos spermatikos to refer to the creative power 
of the Ideas in the Intellect. With this information the more analytical explanation of the rationes 
of Gn. litt. 6.10.17 (a passage which is used by Eugippius in excerpt 53, which will be discussed 
shortly) can be understood. In this passage Augustine says that things pre-exist in their causes on 
four levels197: in the Word of God as an eternal presence (I), in the primordial causes (primordialis 
causa) with which God instated his creation (‘the framework’) (II), in the proximate causes which 
lead to an individual being in time (a single being within the time-bound operating of ‘the 
framework’) (III), and finally ‘in the seed’ with which he wants to say that some (living) being 
can pre-exist in the (re)productive power of a previous created (living) being in time, so that this 
previously created being in time can be compared – albeit on a smaller scale – with a primordial 
 
3) to the fact that Augustine gave several accounts of the rationes, notably in 5.12.28 and 6.10.17, the passage treated 
in the main text. The account in book 6 mentions the rationes seminales but the account in book 5 does not. De Veer 
explains this with Augustine’s interest in the human being in book 6 of the Gn. litt, and concludes that Augustine 
there is not only interested in how the rationes cause the physical or chemical transformations of the universe, but 
rather in biological phenomena. Eugippius’ choice to use book 6 instead of book 5 in excerpt 53 is very 
understandable since his main focus is on the human being, for which the rationes seminales are important. De Veer in 
his description focuses on the Plotinian heritage of the rationes, but leaves the Stoics out completely. Cf. also note 13, 
247 of Edmund Hills’ translation: Saint Augustine On Genesis, New York 2002). The idea of the rationes is also tied 
up with the bible text of Wis 11:20 ‘You have arranged all things in measure and number and weight’. The mensura, 
numerus and pondus stand for the plan according to which God made his creation, cf. Gn. litt. 4.3.7-5.12, esp. 4.5.12. 
196 Frede (2003), 187. She points to Cicero’s De fato 41 (ed. Remo Giomini, Leipzig 1975): “causarum enim” inquit 
[Chrysippus] “aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae. quam ob rem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis 
antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus: causis perfectis et principalibus, sed: causis adiuvantibus [antecedentibus] et proximis” 
‘Among the causes some are complete and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. For this reason when we say 
that everything happens by fate through antecedent causes, we do not want this to be understood as if it were 
through complete and principal causes, but through auxiliary and proximate ones (transl. Frede). 
197 A turn of phrase I have taken from Hill’s chapter heading, On Genesis, 310.  
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cause (IV).198 The great divide in these levels of causality lies between the first two and the last 
two, the first two being atemporal and the last two temporal. Augustine seems to have taken the 
Stoic notions of causality to explain the workings of our day to day cosmos, over and above 
which he instated the Plotinian notion of the logos spermatikos. For in Augustine’s classification of 
causes the Plotinian logos spermatikos can be interpreted as the Ideas in God’s head, which is cause 
I. With these Ideas God created his cosmos (reminding one of the mensura, numerus and pondus 
from Wis 11:20), so that the functionality of the Ideas in God’s head in the process of creating 
can be taken as cause II. The Plotinian logos spermatikos therefore seems to be accountable for the 
first two levels of causality. The Stoic ‘swarm’ of causes are the proximate causes, thus cause III. 
The pneuma together with the further seeds they produce can be taken as cause IV.199 When 
Augustine wants to speak about the temporal creation of Adam, of Christ (as human being) or of 
any other human being, he will point to the latter two temporal levels of causality, since these are 
internal to the Creation, just as these creatures are internal to Creation. It is in this way that both 
Levi and Christ can be said to be in the loins of Abraham, since the ‘seminal reason’ or ‘invisible 
formula’ was present in Abraham as waypoint along the causal chain leading up to them. 
Yet, when we compare the birth of normal human beings with the special human beings 
Adam and Jesus (and Eve?), these third and fourth levels of causality are not in the same way 
effective. The difference between the third and the fourth levels of causality is that the third level 
 
198 Gn. litt. 6.10.17 ‘sed haec aliter in verbo dei, ubi ista non facta, sed aeterna sunt, aliter in elementis mundi, ubi omnia simul facta 
futura sunt, aliter in rebus, quae secundum causas simul creatas non iam simul, sed suo quaeque tempore creantur: in quibus Adam iam 
formatus ex limo et dei flatu animatus, sicut fenum exortum, aliter in seminibus, in quibus rursus quasi primordiales causae repetuntur 
de rebus ductae, quae secundum causas, quas primum condidit, extiterunt, uelut herba ex terra, semen ex herba.’ 
(I) ‘But all this is very different in the Word of God, where these things were not made but are eternal; (II) different 
in the constituent elements of the universe, where all things to come were made simultaneously; (III) different again 
in things that are being created, not now simultaneously but each in his own time, in accordance with its 
simultaneously created causes, like Adam already formed out of mud and ‘ensouled’ by the breath of God, like the 
hay that sprang up; (IV) different in seeds, in which it is as if the primordial causes are being repeated again, derived 
from things which came into being in accordance with the cause which he first established, like grass from the earth, 
seed from grass.  
As can be seen from the quotation Augustine does not use a technical term for ‘proximate cause’. However, it is 
clear that he has something in mind which can be described by the term, and the term itself was around, cf. Cicero 
De fato 41, n. 196. For the first level of causality, the creation of the things ‘in the Word of God’ Augustine likes to 
use Wis 11:20, cf. note 196. 
199 Even though for the Stoic the pneuma may be the highest imaginable divine cosmic cause, for someone who 
claims that God is not inherent in the cosmos but is an external creator this cause on a cosmic scale is superseded by 
the cause of an ‘extracosmic’ scale. 
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lacks the fourth level’s (re)productive animated power, which is involved in normal human 
reproduction. Augustine will therefore never refer in the Gn. litt. to the creation of Christ as a 
human being (or Adam for that matter) with the term ratio seminalis, since the whole point of the 
passage at hand is that Levi was born via the natural human way, the sexual intercourse of which 
spreads the stain of concupiscence, while Christ was not born through a human ratio seminalis, 
but had a divine supernatural ratio (supernatural at least from a human perspective).200 There is 
thus a strong connection implied between the normal bodily procreation of the human being via 
rationes seminales and original sin, since through Adam’s Fall it involves concupiscence. Thus this 
is the way in which Augustine speaks about it:  
 
‘The very flesh indeed, not just of Abraham but of that first and earth-
made man, had in it simultaneously the wound caused by the transgression and 
the medicine to heal the wound; the wound from the transgression in the law of the 
members fighting back against the law of the mind, which through all the flesh 
propagated from there is, so to say, encoded in the seminal formula; and the medicine for the 
wound in what, without any lustful activity, was taken from there of the Virgin in 
its bodily material alone by means of a divine formula for its conception and formation – 
this for the sake of sharing in death without iniquity, and providing an instance of 
resurrection without falsity.’201 [my italics] 
 
Augustine thus explains the absence of original sin for Christ by stating that there is a 
different ratio for his human body. Augustine thus separates in this passage the transmission of 
original sin from the problem of the origin of the soul by tying this transmission in with the 
seminal reasons of the body. It is in this way that the creationist could answer the traducianist.  
 
 
200 Cf. de Veer 662: ‘If faut bien noter pourtant que lui-même n’emploie l’expression ratio seminalis que deux fois, et 
chaque fois apropos d’un être vivant susceptible de se reproduire par un semen (IX, xvii, 32; X, xx, 35)’. Even though 
Christ and Adam themselves may have been ‘susceptible of reproduction through a semen’, their own genesis was 
none the less supernatural. 
201 Gn. litt. 10.20.35 eadem namque caro non Abrahae tantum, sed ipsius primi terrenique hominis simul habebat et vulnus 
praevaricationis et medicamentum vulneris: vulnus praevaricationis in lege membrorum repugnante legi mentis, quae per omnem inde 
propagatam carnem seminali ratione quasi transcribitur; medicamentum autem vulneris in eo, quod inde sine operae concupiscentiali in 
sola materie corporali per divinam conceptionis formationisque rationem de virgine adsumtum est propter mortis sine iniquitate 
consortium et sine falsitate resurrectionis exemplum. 
Eugippius 
 
60 
2.2.3 Chapter headings for excerpt 40 
 
In the previous pargraph it was stressed that the explanation concerning Christ’s 
different ratio was a hypothesis. Yet the argument at present hinges on the idea that Eugippius 
took this hypothesis as the solution to the question. How can we know Eugippius‘ thoughts on 
that piece of the Gn. litt.? The capitulum is not very helpful in the case of this excerpt (40): ‘On 
the tithing of Levi in the loins of Abraham’. The title is useful for a reader with a strong knowledge of 
Scripture, but does not hint at the fundamental problems, nor does it show Eugippius’ mind. 
Fortunately, with the excerpts taken from Gn. litt. we have other capitula as well, namely the 
chapter titles which are present in the medieval manuscript tradition and which Michael Gorman 
has shown to be inserted by Eugippius himself.202 These chapter titles need to be ‘read’ not only 
for their meaning, but also for the way in which Eugippius divides the text into chapters, seeing 
how his chapters do not agree with the Maurists’.203 Eugippius thus at times perceives a different 
coherence then a modern reader is lead to see through the Maurists‘ eyes. The capitula for the 
Gn. litt. from which Eugippius took his excerpt 40 are XXIX-XXXV (this takes a little more of 
the Gn. litt. into account -from 10.18.33 onwards- but these chapters form a coherent part of text 
in which the origin of the soul of Christ is discussed, eventually leading up to the quotation from 
Hebrews 7:4-10).204 . The chapter titles relevant for the argument are XXXI and XXXIV205:  
 
XXXI   Argumentum pro secunda opinione. 
  Argument for the second opinion. 
 
202 Gorman (1980), 88-104; esp. 100-4. The edition by Zycha of the Gn. litt. (CSEL 28) has these chapter titles 436-
56. Solignac reproduces them in BA 49 461-93 with some remarks 461-3. Both the CSEL and the BA edition 
therefore lacks the chapter titles of book 1 (due to a lacuna in the ms. on which Zycha based his text edition), but 
Gorman provides them 89-90. The corrections he gives on 97 concerning book 10 are meant to put the chapter 
headings in a different place in the text.  
203 Solignac inserts the location of these chapter titles in the Latin text with small Roman numerals. On the basis of 
further manuscript research, Gorman emends some of the starting points of the chapters 95-7. Relevant for this 
excerpt is that Gorman changes the beginnings of chapters XXX, XXXI and XXXIII, 97. According to Gorman 
XXX starts at ‘aut quod fidenter dicendum est’ (10.18.33) and not at ‘et fortasse ideo ait’; XXXI at ‘at si propterea decimatus est 
Levi’ (10.19.34) and not at ‘hic existent ill, qui traducem animarum defendunt’ (10.20.35); XXXIII at ‘quapropter nec Levi nec 
Christus in lumbis Abrahae secundum animam’ (10.20.35) and not at ‘Ille est ergo decimatus in Abraham’ (10.20.36). 
204 BA 49, 483-4.  
205 Zycha (CSEL 28) 449 = BA 49 483-4.  
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XXXIII Argumentum pro prima opinione. 
  Argument for the first opinion. 
XXXIV  Quod anima Christi non sit ex traduce Adae adversum opinionem secundam. 
That the soul of Christ does not come from Adam as propagator, against the second 
opinion. 
 
In these capitula, the ‘second opinion’ is the traducianist hypothesis, the ‘first opinion’ is 
the creationist hypothesis. A preliminary observation is that with chapter XXXI Eugippius sees a 
coherent unity between a) Augustine’s argument in 10.19.34 that Christ was present only with his 
flesh in Adam, but not with his soul and b) the traducianist position which he derives from this 
argument in the beginning of 10.20.35. Yet, this unity is not necessary, since a creationist starts 
out from the same premise, but follows up with another line of argument (Christ is present in 
the flesh, but not with his soul since all souls – Levi’s too – are created separately for each 
individual). The modern editors thus have this chapter start in 10.20.35. 
For the present argument – that Eugippius wants to press Augustine with the solution of 
propagation of the consequences of the Fall through a connection with the rationes – the 
following two observations are important. The first is that Eugippius misrepresents traducianism 
in his title for chapter XXXIV. Augustine clearly states at the end of 10.20.36 that even 
traducianists would agree that in the special case of Christ’s unaffected soul there is no 
propagation from Adam.206 Christ cannot be constructed as a counterexample to traductiansim 
since he was not conceived sexually so that his soul could not propagate. Yet this is exactly what 
Eugippius implies with his chapter title. This confirms Solignac’s observation that the titles 
sometimes incorrectly reflect the argument.207 More importantly, the effect of this 
misrepresentation is that it tips the reader’s disposition in favour of the creationist explanation 
 
206 quapropter quod anima Christi non sit ex traduce animae illius primae praevaricatricis, puto, quod etiam ipsi, qui animarum 
traducem defendunt, consentient - per semen quippe concumbentis patris transfundi etiam semen animae volunt, a quo genere conceptionis 
Christus alienus est - et quod in Abraham, si secundum animam fuisset, etiam ipse decimatus esset; non esse autem decimatum scriptura 
testatur, quae hinc quoque sacerdotium eius a levitico sacerdotio distinguit. 
‘Accordingly, that the soul of Christ does not come by transmission from that soul which was the first to transgress 
is something, I think, that even those who support the transmission of souls will agree, because their idea is that the 
seed of the soul is also transfused with the father’s seed in the sexual act, a kind of conception quite foreign to 
Christ. Again they will agree that if he had been in Abraham as regards the soul, he too would have been tithed; but 
scripture testifies to his not having been tithed, distinguishing his priesthood from the Levitical priesthood as it does 
by this very fact.’ 
207 Solignac, BA 49, 463, cf. Gorman, (1980), 98. 
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(‘first opinion’) of the transmission of original sin involving the rationes seminales of the body. 
Eugippius thus seems to have regarded the transmission of original sin through the rationes 
seminales of the body as the correct explanation. The preliminary observation strengthens this 
notion. For Eugippius treats Augustine’s explanation of propagation of original sin through the 
seminal reasons of the body in chapter XXXIII as one coherent passage. (in the Maurists 
division it would be the last part of 10.20.35 and the first of 36).  
 
 
2.2.4 Excerpt 53 
 
As mentioned earlier, for a correct understanding of salvation history not only the origin 
of Christ’s soul is important but also the creation of Adam. Augustine treats the creation of 
Adam in book 6 of, again, the Gn. litt. and it is from this book, 6.18.29 -together with the last 
sentence of 6.9.16, conforming to the start of his chapter X of the Gn. litt.- that Eugippius takes 
his excerpt concerning Adam, ‘On the creation of the first human being and on the causal rationes 
or how it can be said that fifteen years were added to the life of king Hezekiah, whom he had 
foretold not to live.’208 In the paragraphs leading up to 6.9.16, Augustine has been describing 
several options for reading Gen. 2:7. The problem that Augustine has to explain is the human 
being is created twice in Genesis, once in 1:26-7 (discussed in Gn. litt. 3.19.29-24.37) and once in 
2:7. In the Gn. adv. Man. (finished 388) Augustine had grappled with the same problem and had 
decided that the two texts describe the same moment in creation.209 The consequence of this 
exegesis was that the distinction between Adam and the other human beings is minimal, since 
the ‘generic’ human being of Gen. 1:26 is indistinguishable from Adam in Gen. 2:7. The 
 
208 De creatione primi hominis et de causalibus rationibus vel quomodo dicantur additi anni XV Ezechiae regi ad vitam, quem 
praedixerat non victurum. From 6.9.16 Eugippius only takes the last sentence, with which he also starts out his chapter 
X of the Gn. litt.  
209 Gn. adv. Man. 2.7.9. sed etiam si nunc quoque hominem ex corpore et anima factum intellegamus, ut non alicuius novi operis 
inchoatio, sed superius breviter insinuati diligentior retractatio isto sermone explicetur, si ergo, ut dixi, hominem hoc loco ex corpore et 
anima factum intellegamus, non absurde ipsa commixtio limi nomen accepit. 
But even if we understand that at this point too the man was made of body and soul, not in the sense that some 
altogether new work was being undertaken, but that what had been stated in summary form earlier on was here 
being unwrapped in a more detailed account; so if, as I am saying, we understand that in this place the man was 
made of body and soul, it was by no means absurd to give that mixture the name of mud. Trans. Edmund Hill. Cf. 
O’Daly (1983), 185. 
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interesting thing is that it was specifically Augustine’s view on the origin and Fall of the soul 
which was responsible for this exegesis. In order to defend the Christian world-view against the 
Manicheans and in order to provide a theodicy, Augustine argued that the soul was not of divine 
origin and that the evil that it encountered was of its own doing, thus upholding God’s justice. In 
this period of his life Augustine may have held that the human soul was a fallen soul which was 
incarcerated in the body. The Fall of the first soul in this case directly means the Fall of all souls. 
In any case, there was no reason for Augustine at that moment to make a distinction between 
the creation and origin of the first soul and the creation and origin of subsequent souls. The 
creation of the soul and the Fall of the human being (in general) according to Augustine did not 
have to be treated in a historical manner.  
But Augustine changed his idea that there is no distinction between Adam and 
subsequent human beings with regard to the creation of their souls, perhaps prompted by the 
question of Caelestius while writing the lib. arb (finished 395).210 Augustine came to contemplate 
the differences between the situations of Adam and other human beings, and the relationship 
between them, as specifically treated in book 10 of the Gn. litt. The soul was no longer regarded 
as having fallen from a state of bliss (as exemplified in the story of Adam) even though all souls 
currently do live in a fallen state.211 This is a paradoxical statement, and it is exactly from 
explaining this paradox that all the problems stem. For his explanation Augustine had to show 
that, logically speaking, there is no necessary relationship between the consequence (‘we live in a 
fallen state’) and the premise (‘our souls fell from bliss’). Augustine found the proof in Romans 
9:11, where God is free to choose between Jacob and Esau, without any action on their part.212 If 
 
210 lib. arb. 3.19.53. ‘si Adam et Eva peccaverunt, quid nos miseri fecimus’ “If it was Adam and Eve who sinned, what did we 
poor wretches do?”  
211 The question of the origin of the soul is more aptly described as a question of the embodiment of the soul. Given 
that – at least from Augustine’s point of view – the option of the divinity of the soul had already been ruled out, 
both creationists and traducianists agree on the point that God is the creator of all souls, but disagree on the way 
that they find their place in the human body (but as the case of Vincentus Victor shows not all Christians at that 
time were ready to accept the soul as a created being, cf. note 186. In that case the differences about the origin of 
the soul between a creationist and a traductionist are also about the ontological status of the soul which becomes 
embodied).  
212 From the same book, 9:21-23 comes the citation which Augustine would use to great effect in his letter 190.3.9 
and his manner of referring to the human being as ‘vessels’ (‘vasa’) (of mercy or anger). There are two interesting 
conclusions to be drawn from this quotation. The first is that humanity is compared to a bodily lump of clay, from 
which God as a potter can make his vessels, into which he can subsequently pour something. Hence, Adam through 
his Fall condemns the whole lump from which humanity is made, so that Augustine can speak of humanity as a very 
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God would have to send the soul to the body for incarceration as a punishment, His justice 
would trump His freedom.213 Consequently Augustine identifies the origin of the soul as based 
on previous merits with the heresy of Origenism, e.g. in ep. 202a4.8. Augustine could therefore 
no longer easily identify Adam’s Fall with the fall of other human souls.  
This is reflected in the way that Augustine in the Gn. litt. treats the different accounts of 
the creation of the human being in Gen. 1:26-7 and of Adam in Gen. 2:7. Now Augustine sees 
Gen. 1 as an affair on a spiritual level, in which the ‘framework’ of the cosmos is created and Gen. 
2 as a history from the workings of the cosmos in time in which not all human beings were 
created, but only the first one. And this is where we pick up the story in excerpt 53, with the 
creation of Adam in history. It is from the beginning of this excerpt that the analysis of the 
rationes given in paragraph 3 stems. In this excerpt Augustine treats the creation of Adam 
consisting of soul and body, and from 6.12.20 onwards specifically in his bodily aspect, insisting 
that the origin of the first soul will be treated later, which eventually happens in book 7. It is 
therefore the specific technicalities of the creation of the human body of Adam in terms of the 
rationes which bears the brunt of the content. Questions such as whether Adam was created as 
adult or went through the process of growing up, whether his coming into being was necessary 
or possible, whether that was natural or supernatural, whether Adam’s rationes were inserted 
along the lines of natural determinism or according to some special will of God occupy 
Augustine in this passage. The chapter titles that Eugippius gives in the Gn. litt. range from X to 
XXII.214 It would go too far to treat them in detail, but I would like to shortly draw the attention 
 
bodily ‘lump’ – or ‘mass of condemnation’ (massa damnationis, e.g. 190.3.10). The second is that with this quotation 
Augustine tries not only to uphold God’s freedom, with which He as a creator can create, but – at least as important 
– God’s justice: since we are all condemned through Adam, the dispensation of grace is a gift freely given without 
obligation, the condemnation is a just course for the rest.    
213 Cf. Gn. litt. 6.9.15. And thus the need for child baptism: if our souls did not come into the body because of 
previous personal sin, we are all equally condemned owing to the Fall of Adam, so that adults and babies have the 
same need for baptism.  
214CSEL 28 441-4 = BA 49, 472-3, cf. Gorman (1980), 96 for alternate beginnings. Apparently the manuscript 
tradition has several ways of counting the manuscript titles (Gorman eventually gives XXXIII headings, whereas 
Solignac XXXI), Gorman 92-3 (indicating a very frequent use of this specific book?). Gorman chooses from chapter 
XI onwards to give the chapter numbers as nSolignac+1. As well as this choice may represent the manuscript tradition, 
it leads to the problem that the content of the chapter titles now covers the next chapter. This is especially clear e.g. 
for the chapter on Hezekiah (XXI for Solignac, XXII for Gorman, but the title of XXI mentioning Hezekiah while 
XXII mentions Adam). I therefore hold on to Solignac’s numbering and stop at XXII, not at XXIII.: Cf. appendices 
2.4 for the chapter titles. 
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to the following. It has been mentioned that Augustine in book 6 mainly treats the creation of 
the body of Adam from mud, juxtaposing this with the creation of the soul in book 7. This is 
especially clear from the first sentence of 6.12.20. Therefore the modern editor chooses to 
commence a new paragraph, even if Augustine in the following paragraphs still goes on to 
discuss the finer technical details in relation to the rationes.215 But looking at the chapter titles and 
divisions given by Eugippius to the Gn. litt. it becomes apparent that he does not share this 
understanding of this passage. He does not start a new chapter at 6.12.20, instead including it in 
XIII (‘Here he teaches that the human being is formed in his time visibly and invisibly, i.e. soul 
and body, and before this formation he says the human being was predestined in the prescience 
of God’). Eugippius’ chapter titles themselves only start specifically mentioning the body (of 
Adam) from chapter XXIII onwards (‘It is asked whether our animal body was formed from 
mud or our spiritual body’. Quaeri solet, utrum animale corpus hoc nostrum sit formatum e limo an 
spirituale) until XXXI. And it is from this chapter XIII onwards that Eugippius declines to copy 
the Gn. litt. into his Excerpta. Eugippius thus does not lay the stress on the bodily creation of 
Adam in book 6, but on the creation of Adam by way of the rationes. It thus seems as if 
Eugippius up to XXIII (6.19.30) perceives Augustine to speak of Adam as a whole human being, 
body and soul, even if Eugippius presumably recognizes that Augustine declines the idea of 
rationes for the soul in 7.23.34 with his chapter title XXIX for book 7 (‘It is asked whether 
perhaps this causal ratio was inserted by God in the nature of this first day.’ Quaeritur an fore in 
illius primi diei natura causalis haec ratio sit a Deo inserta).216 It thus seems that Eugippius with his 
excerpt 53 tries to cover the creation of the whole of the first human being by way of the rationes, 
foregoing book 7 on the creation of the first soul.  
How then does this relate to the ongoing investigation? For neither original sin is 
mentioned in this excerpt, nor does Eugippius understand Augustine to be speaking about the 
body, as I have just argued. However, I maintain that this excerpt supports the impression which 
was formed previously in this chapter, when it is taken in the context of the history of salvation 
as portrayed by Eugippius throughout the excerpts. After creating the world in excerpt 27 and 
pushing on to time and light (28-30), the next important topic on Eugippius’ list is giving a 
theodicy (underlining the overall moral focus of the Excerpta). Eugippius does this through 
excerpts 31-45, showing how the world is not created for the punishment of souls (31), that evil 
 
215 iam ergo videamus, quomodo eum fecerit deus, primum de terra corpus eius, post etiam de anima videbimus, si quid valebimus.  
‘So now, then, it is time for us to see how God made him, first his body from the earth; later on we shall also see 
about his soul, if we find we are up to it.’ 
216 BA 49, 476. 
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was introduced through the free will of the devil (36-38), that God is not responsible for the sins 
of human beings (39), how the propagation of original sin technically works in the human being 
through the rationes seminales of the body (40!), and how evil and sin eventually fit in God’s greater 
providential plan with the cosmos (41-45). Herewith Eugippius has finished his theodicy on a 
cosmic scale, but he has not yet shown the Fall of Adam in history.217 This is what Eugippius 
does through 50-53, first giving ‘the story of evil’ in three parts (part 1: the devil in 50; part 2: 
Adam in 51; part 3: expulsion from paradise in 52) before (!) he goes on create the first human 
being through the rationes.218 Eugippius therefore wants us to understand with excerpt 53 not 
only how Adam as first human being was created, but also how he fell, how this sin was 
transmitted subsequently through the rationes that Adam passed on (as treated in 40) and how 
this fits into God’s plan (the rationes eventually being the means of providence). He still wants to 
show how the human being is responsible for his own fallen state through the rationes with which 
he tries to stress an alternative line of explanation for the transmission of original sin rather than 
via the question of the origin of the soul, a question which Eugippius keeps on stressing in 372 
and 40 is impossible to solve.  
 
It depends on the use of the Excerpta how much a reader perceives of Eugippius’ agenda 
in his presentation of Augustine. If a reader would use the Excerpta as a reference work and turns 
to single excerpts for some clarification, e.g. if he would read excerpt 53 only to get an overview 
or reference of either the creation of Adam or of the workings of the rationes, he would not likely 
be aware of this agenda. This is not to say that he would not be reading Augustine through 
Eugippius’ eyes, because this is the case. He would for example still read excerpt 372 and take 
Augustine’s agnosticism from it, without being informed of Augustine’s analysis of creationism 
and traducianism. But only when he tries to get an overview of, say, the workings of evil in 
history, or specifically selects the excerpts on the soul, then Eugippius’ agenda impresses itself 
on the reader to its full extent. Eugippius’ Excerpta is thus constructed to suit the needs of the 
reader. Only the readers who invest enough time or who already know where to look will 
perceive Eugippius’ program. But should one yet be ‘ready’ yet for these difficult questions, then 
excerpt 372 serves as a firm dead-end.  
 
 
 
217 in this way of presenting salvation history Eugippius mirrors Augustine’s understanding of the creation in ‘two 
moments’ of prima conditio and administratio. Cf. BA 48, 659-61. 
218 Cf. table 3.2, p. 176 in the apendices for the exact passages. 
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2.2.5 From silence 
 
Arguments from silence are often dangerous. If not mentioning something is significant, 
a strong case needs to be made that this was actually in the forefront of the mind of the locutor, 
which necessitates that he has the knowledge of what is not mentioned and judged it as not 
fitting. If there is jackpot, we have hit it with Eugippius. The brute existence of the Excerpta 
already shows that Eugippius was an encyclopaedic and prolific reader of Augustine, and if there 
is a plan in the Excerpta, which newer scholarship holds, Eugippius must have read more of 
Augustine then he selected.219 Moreover, in this investigation the chapter titles that Eugippius 
gave to the Gn. litt. have already been mentioned and used. But it must be stressed here that 
these chapter titles mean that Eugippius read the whole of the Gn. litt., a hugely important work 
for Augustine’s theorizing on the origin of the soul, and made an effort to understand it. We can 
thus proceed without any hesitation to draw inferences from Eugippius not using book 7 of the 
Gn. litt. on the origin of the soul (and book 10 ‘only’ for the creation of Christ and transmission 
of original sin). Unfortunately we do not have the same advantage we have with the Gn. litt. for 
some other relevant texts. Eugippius used lots of letters of Augustine and it is common sense to 
suppose that he would have a letter collection at his disposition. But Eugippius did not use letter 
166 to Jerome on the origin of the soul. Would this popular letter have been omitted from this 
collection?220 And what about the lib. arb., where Augustine writes on the origin of the soul as 
theodicy in 3.21.59? Already during Augustine’s lifetime the lib. arb. was well disseminated and in 
letter 166 Augustine makes many references to the work.221 But how certain can we be that 
Eugippius left the lib. arb. out intentionally, if he does not use it in the Excerpta? Or did the work 
just not fit his more scriptural selection criteria and was it to analytic for his taste? 
Yet, when we place all the relevant passages on the soul of Gn. litt. 7, Gn. litt. 10.2.3-
10.17, lib. arb. 3.20.56-21.59 and ep. 166 next to each other, a pattern emerges. In all these 
passages Augustine analyzes, although in a more or less extended version, and explicitly 
enumerates the alternatives for the origin of the soul. The options may change a bit in 
formulation or enumeration throughout these passages (and in the lib. arb. Augustine still takes 
 
219 Hofmann (1998), 299;, and despite some reservations of O’Donnell (1991), 19.  
220 Moreover Eugippius does use ep. 190, 202a and the an. et or. which together with ep. 166 seem to form a dossier 
of texts concerning the origin of the soul, cf. note 186, making it further questionable that Eugippius did not have 
access to ep. 166. 
221 ep. 166, e.g. 3.7. 
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the possibility of a fall into the body into account, which he leaves out in the Gn. litt. but still 
mentions in ep. 166.3.7). These options for the embodiment of the soul are (in the first mention 
of the lib. arb. 3.21.59) traducianism, creationism, and the sending of a pre-existent soul by God 
to the body (and finally the Fall of a pre-existent soul into the body). In Gn. litt. 7 this third 
option of a pre-existence of the soul, whether in rationes or by some material, is extensively 
researched and finally rejected, which search is repeated, albeit on a smaller scale, in Gn. litt. 10. 
But none of these passages are taken into account by Eugippius and we can be sure that he knew 
at least the Gn. litt. thoroughly. The reason for this cannot be neglect but must be conscious 
exclusion.  
The effect of this exclusion is that the number of options for the origin of the soul is 
reduced from three (or four) down to two: traducianism and creationism. Since Augustine comes 
to a negative answer concerning the technical options of a pre-existence of the soul, one might 
say that there is no need for Eugippius to include this particular research; it was an hypothesis 
which was rejected. Yet, a significant side effect of this reduction is that Eugippius also does not 
have to mention anything which potentially undermines the role of the rationes for the 
transmission of original sin, even if Eugippius used Augustine earlier to show that it was 
specifically the rationes seminales for the body which are responsible and not any of the rationes 
which are responsible for the coming into being of the soul. A further inquiry into the function 
of the rationes in the Excerpta (also mentioned explicitly in excerpt 11, but given the abundance of 
material of the Gn. litt. in the Excerpta there must be more) would be recommendable. The fate 
of the other two options is well known from excerpt 372: Augustine does not know. But, on the 
bright side, Eugippius had already shown in 40 and 53 how influential the rationes can be, so that 
Augustine could be absolved from his agnosticism and the sting maybe could be drawn out of a 
contemporary debate. 
 
 
Conclusion   
 
Eugippius in his Excerpta shows a marked concern for the moral side of the human 
being. The soul does interest Eugippius as the fundamental constituent of the human being, but 
he is mainly concerned with the fact that it serves as the anchor for moral change of the 
individual. The ontological questions concerning the soul (e.g. divinity, corporeality, connection 
with the body) with which Augustine occupied himself are not taken into account by Eugippius 
except for the question of the origin. Nor are questions considered about the Trinitarian 
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structure of the soul’s activities or questions about how these activities or the place of them in 
the mens constitute a principle of individualization. The one ontological question concerning the 
soul which did occupy Eugippius is subsumed under an umbrella of ethics: the impact of the 
question of the origin of the soul has everything to do with the theodicy and the transmission of 
original sin. The human being for Eugippius is thus especially a moral agent. 
This tunes in with O’Donnell’s overall view of the Excerpta: ‘the `authority' of Augustine 
for Eugippius is what there is in Augustine that helps the reader come to a better interpretation 
and fuller understanding of the scriptural text.’ The more intricate questions concerning 
ontology, dynamics and individualization concerning the soul did not fit this goal: 
 
 ‘Eugippius had no idea of producing `The Essential Augustine' with a 
view to illuminating Augustine's special contributions to Christian thought or his 
distinctive positions. Rather, the usefulness of Augustine lay in his way of 
representing the common Christian tradition. What was valuable about Augustine, 
put another way, was not what was distinctive about him but what he had said 
that formed a useful part of the common deposit of faith and interpretation. He 
had acquired his authority not by being unique and brilliant and original, but by 
accomplishing the common task of interpretation and teaching in a way that 
others could share wholeheartedly.’222 
 
All the elements of this view expressed by O’Donnell are correct, and yet this is not the 
whole story. This account of the Excerpta portrays Eugippius as a bland compiler who takes all 
the ‘hot stuff’ out. It does not give credit, or at least not enough, to the persona of Eugippius as 
a scholar of Augustine and to his creativity as a scholar and interpreter of Christianity. The way 
that Eugippius selects and manipulates Augustine on the soul as shown in this chapter, can be 
taken as a case study for this. O’Donnell may have been caught in a ruse of Eugippius. Conrad 
Leyser has argued that Eugippius may have placed himself consciously in the ancient tradition of 
compiling, not because of his ‘lack’ of persona, but in order to avoid controversy as newcomer in 
the contemporary Italian political climate: ‘Eugippius’ marked preference for compilation can in 
turn be understood as a strategy for consensus-building’ and ‘Eugippius’ activity as a compiler 
can be understood both as a tactful strategy of political survival, and as a determined assertion of 
 
222 O’Donnell (1991), 18.  
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moral autonomy.’ 223Indeed, Leyser calls attention to the fact that in 5th century Gaul the 
Augustinian florilegium was an established strategy to argue for a position in the 
predestinationsist controversies around 430. Leyser sees the possibility that Eugippius actually 
was prompted to compose his Excerpta because of this controversy as well. Whether this is the 
case or not, Leyser sees this controversy at work in the compilation of Eugippius’ Rule of the 
Master: ‘The tenor of the Rule of Eugippius suggests that, like ascetics in Gaul – Caesarius of Arles 
included – Eugippius was keen to avoid polarisation over the issue of grace and free will. The 
Rule as we have seen balances out an augustinian emphasis on the grace of charity with a 
commitment to a science of moral progress drawn from the work of Cassian, the arch ‘semi-
Pelagian’. Here, again, Eugippius seems to have taken advantage of the florilegium as a literary 
space in which contrary perspectives could be reconciled.’224   
And here we are, with the Excerpta in which Eugippius regards the soul mainly as a place 
of moral change, and is only interested in its origin when it comes to the soul as a being in its 
own right. It is not difficult to contextualize the argument from this chapter with the historical 
circumstances. Several commentators have already remarked that there is little material in the 
Excerpta referring to Augustine’s theory of grace.225 And in this chapter I have argued that 
Eugippius shows a bias in his selection of excerpts concerning the soul, through which he (1) 
stresses Augustine’s agnosticism in the debate about its origin between creationists and 
traducianists and (2) tries to solve the underlying problem of the transmission of original sin with 
the rationes which are transmitted through the body. It is just as if Eugippius tries to remove the 
sting out of the debate between the traducianists and the creationists, while not using any 
material from Gn. litt. 7 which could undermine the status of the rationes as alternate explanation 
for the transmission of original sin. When we remind ourselves that the debate between 
traducianism and creationism can easily be framed (albeit imperfectly as Augustine argues in ep. 
 
223 Leyser (2001), 67 and 73. He draws attention on both pages to the dedication of the Excerpta to Proba, who was a 
member of the Symmachan faction to offset his association with the Laurentian Paschasius.  
224 Leyser (2001), 74. 
225 Pollmann (2009), 25; O’Donnell (1991), 18-9: ‘What was valuable about Augustine, put another way, was not 
what was distinctive about him but what he had said that formed a useful part of the common deposit of faith and 
interpretation. He had acquired his authority not by being unique and brilliant and original, but by accomplishing the 
common task of interpretation and teaching in a way that others could share wholeheartedly. So we might think 
that, especially in view of the controversy over grace and free will that had animated Gaul in the fifth century, a 
reasonable anthology would have a distinct section of clear and concise excerpts from the anti-Pelagian writings, to 
make Augustine's position clear. Those writings are seriously underrepresented in the collection as a whole, and the 
few excerpts that do appear come near the end, with no special emphasis.’ 
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190) as a debate between anti-Pelagianism and Pelagianism, it seems that we are allowed to 
remove the words ‘as if’ from the hypothesis of this chapter. Caritas is the overarching principle 
of the Excerpta, but the moral transformation of the inner man towards God is what Eugippius 
stresses when it comes to the soul. He thereby not only avoids controversy, but tries to build 
unity. ‘By the time he wrote the Commemoratorium, Eugippius, notoriously, assumed that the 
Roman Empire had come to an end, its paychests for the legions now empty: what his work 
makes clear is that he expected moral community to endure.’226 The case of Eugippius thereby 
shows that the reception of Augustine is a creative meeting between older texts and 
contemporary concerns. It is this creative act which forms a living tradition. A tradition is thus as 
much a treasured relic as it is a treasure trove, with which one can both look back at history and 
forward to solutions to contemporary problems at the same time, which is the ultimate raison 
d'être of a tradition in the first place (as the notion of ‘invention of tradition’ also shows). It is 
through the reception of a tradition that a culture tries to transform its ‘inner man’, if not 
towards God, at least towards one’s neighbour.
 
226 Leyser (2001), 75. 
 Chapter 3. Augustine and Cassiodorus: 
an uneasy mixture. 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Goals of the chapter 
 
Cassiodorus Senator’s use of Augustine in his De anima, written 538-540, is paramount. 
Augustine must have served as guide for Cassiodorus in more ways than one. Both converted to 
Christianity from a thriving secular public life, established a monastic community, and in 
between those two both took a ciceronian retreat to produce literary work. Cassiodorus wrote 
his De anima during this retreat (1.2 quietus portus), as a stage of his conversion not unlike 
Augustine’s Cassiciacum, on ‘the bridge’ between public life and monastic life.227 It was 
composed directly after the Variae, as Cassiodorus’ first specifically Christian work, and in the 
manuscript tradition this is reflected since it is sometimes included as the thirteenth book of the 
Variae.228 Textually, Cassiodorus certainly was very familiar with a few works of Augustine, and 
probably had had a wider reading of ‘that excellent teacher, warrior against the heretics, defender 
of the faithful and winner of the palm in widely known contests’ when he came to compose his 
De anima.229 The critical edition of the De anima by James Halporn lists many instances of use of 
Augustine, though probably not all.230 Mark Vessey has judged that, whoever made Cassiodorus 
write the De anima, ‘its textual occasion was a dialogue with Augustine’.231 First, Augustine is the 
only authority mentioned by name, Christian or secular,232 and second, already the build-up of 
the text of the De anima betrays its roots in Augustine’s texts. The introduction features an 
 
227James O’Donnell (1979), 109; Kannengiesser (2001), 28.  
228 cf. De an. 1.1 (after this only the chapter and lines will be mentioned), Halporn (1973) ‘introduction’, 526-7; 
Vessey (2004) ‘introduction’, 19. 
229Ipse etiam doctor eximius beatissimus Augustinus, debellator hereticorum, defensor fidelium et famosorum palma certaminum. 
Cassiodorus, Institutiones, 1.22. ed. Mynors (1937), trans. James Halporn, 1.22, 154.  
230 There are a few cases where Cassiodorus used Augustine which are not listed by Halporn. For example in the 
introduction to the translation Mark Vessey notes the similarity in clearly identified questions in the an. quant. and 
the De anima (intr. 21). I will identify them where they are useful for my argument. But Halporn’s notes can overall 
be taken as a very good guide, of which I have made ample use. 
231 Vessey, ‘introduction’, 21. 
232 9, 552; 11, 557. cf. Vessey ‘introduction’, 20. 
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explicit list of questions similar to the questions in the introduction of the an. quant. 1.1 and 
Cassiodorus’ prayer at the end of the text reminds one of the frequent prayers in the Conf. 
During his composing Cassiodorus must have had the excruciating experience that all 
students of Augustine sometimes have: trying to pin down Augustine on an opinion or line of 
argument, while the tenets of faith he adheres to are always indubitable. This is at least how 
Cassiodorus himself later would come to describe reading Augustine for his monks in Vivarium: 
‘[Augustine] is in some books obscure because he is so difficult; yet in others he is so clear that 
he is available even to children; his clear statements are sweet, but his obscure words are a rich 
feast of great usefulness.’233 But Augustine himself never wrote a specific De anima, which exactly 
is the purpose of Cassiodorus, who thus in some way or another had to collect and colligate 
Augustine. The reception researcher has an embarras du choix with Cassiodorus’ text, and the 
question is not so much to find out where Augustine is hiding, but rather where to start writing. 
But this does not mean that Cassiodorus used every text of Augustine with the same intensity. In 
Cassiodorus’ mind the an. quant. was always present, followed at some distance by book 7 of the 
Gn. litt. and books 21 and 22 of the civ. One of the aims of this chapter will be to explain why 
these texts were deemed so useful by Cassiodorus. 
Nevertheless, from a first reading of the De anima it is also clear that this is not Augustine 
speaking. Apart from differences in style there are some topics which do not appear in 
Augustine, such as chapter 12 ‘how to recognize bad men’, for which topic Cassiodorus probably 
felt the need after his political career. Moreover, however much Cassiodorus used Augustine, 
Michele Di Marco and Marcia Colish recognised some elements of Stoicism in this text as well. 
Di Marco speaks of the De anima as originating partly from a ‘koine stoicizzante’ and relates 
some of Cassiodorus’ ideas to the materialist Faustus of Riez (against whom Claudianus 
Mamertus composed his De statu animae) and Colish notes Cassiodorus’ acquaintance with the 
hegemonikon and the Stoic sage.234 In stark opposition to Augustine, the Stoics believed the soul to 
be material. A second goal of this chapter is to show in more detail than hitherto has been done 
how this tension between Cassiodorus’ use of Stoic views and Augustine’s texts playes out. This 
goes to show that, perhaps not unsuitable for a politician, Cassiodorus was an eclectic thinker 
who was informed by the major schools of thought in his era, but not overly concerned with the 
consistency of the underlying philosophical mechanisms of the systems he encountered.  
 
233 [Augustinus] in quibusdam libris nimia difficultate reconditus, in quibusdam sic est planissimus, ut etiam paruulis probetur 
acceptus; cuius aper ta suauia sunt, obscura uero magnis utilitatibus farcita pinguescunt. Institutiones, 1.22.  
234 Di Marco (1985), 98; 101. Colish (1985) vol. II, 250.  
Cassiodorus 
 
74 
In this chapter some investigation will be done to see how far Augustine's thought 
actually reached through to Cassiodorus. The investigation will be carried out in the way of a 
detective. For Cassiodorus' De anima presents itself as something which it is not. It presents itself 
as a work in tune with Augustine and his concepts on the soul, keeping to a spiritual and 
immaterial notion of the soul. But an analysis of Cassiodorus' actual treatment of the soul will 
bring out the Stoic models at work in the background. In this chapter a careful eye will therefore 
also be cast upon the signs of Stoicism in this De anima. 
 
3.2 Reading Augustine 
 
Augustine was Cassiodorus’ largest religious ‘authority of learned and truthful men’ 
veracium doctorum auctoritas (4.4-5) and is the only authority, Christian or secular, mentioned by 
name.235 It will therefore be useful to first give an overview of Cassiodorus’ use of Augustine 
before going into the process of close reading. However, directly a caveat must be placed. 
Cassiodorus does not employ direct quotations of Augustine, even if he is largely working under 
an Augustinian framework, and even if the majority of Augustine’s important ideas about the 
soul can be found in this De anima in some way or another. But for a wide reader such as 
Cassiodorus, who would later set up his encyclopaedic project of the Institutiones, it cannot be 
excluded that he had picked some of these ideas up from other texts. An example is the idea of 
the body as a prison of the soul in 4.39-41, which Augustine affirms in Acad. 1.3.9 but denies in 
the rest of his work, such as ep. 166.9.27. Halporn duly reports these instances in Augustine, but 
the option really cannot be excluded that Cassiodorus (also) found this in (other) (Neo-)platonic 
texts available to him. Yet I will rely on Halporn’s authority for this paragraph and it cannot be 
denied that Cassiodorus’ conceptual framework seems very similar to Augustine’s: the immortal 
human soul is created (although the technicalities of this creation are unsure), different from 
bodies, rationally seeks God but rules (and often becomes enmeshed in) the body with a mutable 
will, has an interiority of the memory in which it can be illumined by God, is saved by Christ 
from the Fall but has to deal with the adverse effects in secular life, and will come back gendered 
and bodily to receive its eternal reward or punishment. In the text this materialises as follows. 
 
235 9.21-2; 11.55. On Cassiodorus’ amplification of the difference between secular and Christian authority, cf. Vessey 
‘introduction’, 27-8. In his own introduction 1.5 Cassiodorus already made a difference between ‘certain obscurities’ 
he found in libris sacris quam in saecularibus. 
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Cassiodorus poses the following questions: What the soul is (3-6), what the soul does (7-
8), how the soul is related to the body (9-11, with 9 treating the question of the origin of the 
soul), how to recognize virtue and vice in others (what is the sage like, and what is the opposite?) 
(13-14), and where the soul will eventually be going to (14-15). In the chapters on the ontology 
of the soul (3-6), Cassiodorus’ program of defining the soul is very much taken from Augustine. 
He is arguing for an immortal, rational, and mutable soul (4). Furthermore Cassiodorus wants it 
understood that the soul is a creature (4), but that it does not have a place (or rather as we would 
say ‘location’ 6). Other topics in these chapters are the correct naming of the soul (3) and the 
quality of the soul (5), the last of which is rather barren on Augustine (and will be treated in 
paragraph 3.4, p. 80). Examples of Cassiodorus’ use of Augustine are his stress on the soul as a 
‘distinct substance’ (propria substantia, e.g. 4.5; 4.37) and ‘simple nature’ (simplex natura 4.200) taken 
from an. quant. 1.2, and the idea that the soul cannot be corporeal since it ponders immaterial 
principles, which thought is often expounded by the early and middle Augustine (e.g. imm. an. 17 
and Gn. litt. 7.21.28). Usually the Gn. litt. (esp. 7), an. quant. and ep. 166 are identifiable in arguing 
for these points.  
Cassiodorus answers with the ‘virtues’ of the soul to the question what the soul ‘does’. 
These are divided into moral virtues, such as prudence and justice (7), and natural ‘virtues’ 
(powers), such as sensation and control over the limbs. There is a very brief Trinitarian structure 
in 7, resembling Augustine’s Trinity of memory (memoria), will (voluntas) and understanding 
(intellegentia), e.g. in the trin. 10.11.18. According to Cassiodorus the soul has contemplation 
(contemplatio), judgement (virtus iudicalis), and memory (memoria). Contemplation confirms with 
Augustine’s understanding. Memory is similar to Augustine’s memory as a notion of interiority in 
conf. 10.8.15. But judgement does not confer directly with Augustine’s will. The subsequent 
investigation will bring out that in Stoic vein Cassiodorus will positively evaluate judgement and 
associate it with reason. But for Cassiodorus judgement does not replace Augustine’s will 
(voluntas), which Cassiodorus evaluates negatively and connected with the mutability of the soul. 
Cassiodorus uses very little of Augustine’s works which one associates with the dynamical 
discourse. An example of this is the way in which Cassiodorus treats illumination. He mentions 
that ‘we are not among those who say that the soul recalls rather than learns’ in 4.218-9 and that 
‘[the soul] sees obscure things that it could not know by its own means illuminated by its 
Creator’, but there is no sign of any familiarity with the mag. or Augustine’s development on this 
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matter in e.g. the trin. 12.15.24.236 This is especially interesting, since in Cassiodorus’ much used 
an. quant. (20.34) Augustine still believed in knowledge as remembering (and the concomitant 
pre-existence of the soul for the body). Cassiodorus probably neglected Augustine’s dynamic 
discourse of the soul since his Stoic background gave rival answers to the question of the activity 
of the soul so that he did not need to confer to Augustine on that account. 
In the chapters on the relationship between the soul and the body, Cassiodorus 
description of the problem of the origin of the soul (9) confers with only three of Augustine’s 
possibilities, i.e. creationism, pre-existence of souls which God later sends to the body, and 
traducianism. It leaves the option of a pre-existence of the soul which later falls into the body 
out. This is ironic given that Cassiodorus himself mentions the body as prison in 4.39-41. One 
therefore suspects that Cassiodorus here rather followed Gn. litt. 10.3.4-6 than lib. arb. 3.56-9. Yet 
Cassiodorus follows Augustine’s agnosticism on the problem, explicitly mentioning Augustine as 
his authority.237 In the chapter on the seat of the soul (10) Cassiodorus uses Augustine’s idea in 
Gn. litt. 7.20.26 that the mind’s forgetfulness of the body during intense concentration shows 
that they are different.238 However, Cassiodorus provides a very different context. He reworks it 
into an argument for the head as the seat of the soul (the mind forgetting the bodily senses in the 
head during concentration). Rather Stoically, it shows for Cassiodorus that the mind tends to 
move upwards in the body, just as mortal fire moves upwards (11.15-6). Cassiodorus also 
describes the Fall and the consequences for this life in this chapter on the seat of the soul in a 
way compatible with Stoicism. In a story reminiscent of the lib. arb. Cassiodorus mentions how 
Adam was created with ‘free will and an inviolate sense of judgment’ (arbitrii liberi potens et inviolata 
sententia 10.48-9), but lost it due to disobedience. But Cassiodorus differs from Augustine in his 
idea of the consequences of the Fall. For Cassiodorus these are mainly on the plane of cognition. 
From the lib. arb. 3.18.52 only the ignorantia is taken, but not the weakness of will of the difficultas. 
Cassiodorus thus removes Augustine’s use of akrasia as effect of the Fall and sees its effects in us 
having to use signs as access to things. God’s help for the human being subsequently consists of 
illuminatio, and Cassiodorus studiously avoids the word gratia for God’s aid to the human being in 
(10.66), using the word auxilio instead. Gratia nor concupiscentia figure prominently in Cassiodorus 
 
236 4.218-222, Nec de illis sumus qui dicunt recolere magis animas quam discere usuales artes et reliquas disciplinas, cum et ad 
interrogata sint paratae, ubi potuerint intellectue perveniente contingere, et nova sic audiant quasi nihil ex eis ante didicissent. ‘We are 
not among those who say that the soul recalls rather than learns the ordinary arts and the other sciences, since the 
souls are prepared for asking questions that they could have grasped intellectually, and they hear everything as new 
just as if they had learned nothing of these matters before.’ 10.66-8, Illuminata videt a creatore quae fuscata non potest a 
semetipsa cognoscere. ‘It sees obscure things that it could not know by its own means illuminated by its Creator.’ All 
translations by James Halporn. 
237 9.21-4. 
238 10.40-4. 
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conceptual toolbox. Cassiodorus’ stress on the soul’s use of reason (treated in paragraph 3.6 and 
3.7, 86-86) and his emphasis on the consequences of the Fall as epistemological, make for an 
intellectualistic De anima. In the chapter on the ‘situation of the body’ (11), Cassiodorus explicitly 
uses Augustine’s authority (Hoc etiam sensit pater Augustinus 11.54-5) for the idea of the eyes 
emitting rays, which Augustine describes in an. quant. 23.44. 
The chapters on the recognition of good and bad men do not employ Augustine, but 
there is some in the chapters on the eschatology of the soul. Cassiodorus is in accordance with 
Augustine civ. 22.17 when he says that the soul will come back embodied and gendered. Yet 
Augustine’s civ. 21.2 and 21.4 are clearly identifiably in Cassiodorus’ affirmation of an eternal 
punishment. Employing the same reasoning as Augustine, he mentions that since already in this 
world fire-salamanders and some worms have fire and heat as habitat, it cannot be denied that 
souls can be punished eternally in fire without decay. 
The picture that emerges from this oversight of Cassiodorus’ use of Augustine is that 
Cassiodorus especially wants to learn from Augustine how the human soul differs from the rest 
of creation, whereas he is not as interested in Augustine’s dynamical discourse or Trinitarian 
structures of the soul. His use of Augustine’s texts is accordingly, with the an. quant. and Gn. litt. 
7 holding pride of place. Yet, this paragraph has also indicated that Cassiodorus sometimes gives 
Augustine a Stoic context, or adapts Augustine so as to be compatible with Stoicism. It is to this 
Stoicism in Cassiodorus that we must turn.  
 
 
3.3 Spiritus 
 
Cassiodorus’ most important explicit interpretation of Augustine’s theory of soul is with 
the word ‘spirit’ (spiritus). Cassiodorus used the qualification ‘spiritual’ to denote the substance of 
which the soul is made:  
 
‘Moreover, the soul of the human being, as the authority of learned and truthful learned 
men concurs, is a distinct spiritual substance.’239  
 
Throughout the De anima Cassiodorus often uses this qualification when talking about 
the substance of the soul. With this qualification he wants to further express the special status of 
 
239 Anima autem hominis est, ut veracium doctorum consentit auctoritas, a Deo create spiritalis propriaque substantia. 4.4-5. 
Cassiodorus 
 
78 
the substance of the soul as a sui generis substance.240 What does he mean by this? We are not 
meant to guess. Cassiodorus spends chapter three on the question ‘why it is called the soul 
(anima)’. In this chapter the meaning of the word spiritus are explained: 
 
‘Spirit, then, is differentiated in three ways. That is properly and truly called spirit 
which requires nothing, but is required by all creatures. It inspires what it wishes and arranges 
all things according to what it wishes. It fills everything and is complete in the whole. Motionless 
in space and eternal in will it is uniquely influential over all the highest things. We also call 
spirit the fine substance invisible to us, created, immortal and endowed with as much power as it 
can use. Thirdly we give the name spirit to the substance scattered and contained throughout the 
entire body, which maintains mortal life with essential breath and which never rests but is 
constantly refreshed by its mobility.’241  
 
Apparently this spiritual substance of which the human soul is made comes in a ‘family’ 
of three members. One of the members is something which more or less resembles the Holy 
Ghost, having a divine nature through its power and stability. Both the second and the third 
meanings of ‘spirit’ are coined in terms of substance, thereby presumably setting them as created 
beings aside from the divine first member. The difference between these last two members is 
that the substance of the third meaning is confined to the body. But for the moment it remains 
unclear whether they are two different substances or only differ in place (body) and function (life 
giving). However, it is clear that we here encounter the meaning of ‘spirit’ that Cassiodorus 
wants us to understand when we hear him speak about the ‘spiritual substance’ of the soul. It is a 
spiritual substance because it is life giving, spread throughout the body and constantly moving. 
Augustine would certainly concur with these characteristics of the soul. The soul is after 
all the principle of life, contained throughout the whole of the body and mutable, thus 
susceptible to movement. He calls the soul spiritual in Gn. litt. 12.7.18-8.19, where Augustine 
indicates what he means by Paul’s ‘spiritual vision’ of Jerusalem. And Augustine occasionally 
speaks of spiritalis substantia, e.g. conf. 6.3.4 although Augustine admits at that point that he does 
not have a clue about it.  
 
240 4.195-203. 
241 ‘Spiritus itaque tripici modo dicitur. Appellatur enim veraciter et proprie spiritus nullis indigens, ipse vero a creaturis omnibus 
indigetur; inspirans quod vult et dispensas omnia prout vult; complens universa, totus in toto, immobilis loco et volntate aeternus, 
cunctaque quae summa sunt singulariter potens. Vocamus et spiritum substantiam tenuem nobisque invisibilem, creatam, immortalem, 
quantum illi utiliter datum est valentem. Tertio, spiritum dicimus per totum corpus emissum atque receptum per quem vita mortalium 
flatu necessario continetur, nec aliquando otium capiens, iugi mobilitate reparatur.’ 3.15-26; trans 240-1. 
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But normally his appliance of the adjective would be narrower. This has to do with his 
exegesis of Gn 2:7, in which God breathes life (‘blew into him the spirit of life’) into the first 
human being. In order to prevent the conclusion –in line with Hellenistic thought- that the 
human soul is therefore divine, Augustine would resist connecting the human soul too closely to 
this spirit. Augustine does this both in his spiritual exegesis of the Gn. adv. Man. 2.8.10 and the 
literal exegesis of Gn. litt. 7.6.9-7.10. It is also in this use of spirit, of the Christian life of the inner 
man, or the Christian guideline that should keep the soul on the right track, that Augustine uses 
the term spiritus in the Gn. litt. 6.28.39 and chapter 75 of the an. quant. In the literal explanation of 
Gn 2:7 Augustine wonders whether God’s breathing should mean that the soul has been formed 
from ‘spiritual material’ (spiritalis materies). In Gn. litt. 7.6.9-7.10 he therefore hypothesizes the 
existence of such a spiritual material. However, the problems with a spiritual material are that if 
the material is rational, it leads a blessed life before it becomes soul, but then is formed by God 
into the worse form of the not so blessed human soul. But if the material is not rational and thus 
did not have a blessed existence before God’s formation into the human soul, then the same 
material may be used to form the animal soul. That would lead to the trouble of transference of 
the animal soul into a human body, something which was too much for Augustine as well. And 
thus the hypothesis of a spiritual material is rejected. Notice, however, that Augustine here does 
not speak of spiritual substance (substantia), but of spiritual material (materies). To take ‘substance’ 
as matter is a specific interpretation. Augustine therefore does not reject spiritual substance as 
something immaterial. But it remains that he uses a lot of space in the Gn. litt. to show that the 
soul cannot be too closely connected to the spirit. Augustine thus would not normally call the 
soul ‘spiritual’. And the likelihood of Cassiodorus coming across these differentiations of spirit 
and soul is high, given his knowledge of the an. quant. and Gn. litt.  
Even though Cassiodorus may have felt supported by Augustine’s calling the soul 
spiritual in Gn. litt. 12.7.18-8.19, his real motivation to do so comes from his Stoicism. 
 
 
3.4 Stoicism 
 
When discussing the quotation of Cassiodorus’ definition of ‘spirit’ in the previous 
paragraph, I spoke of a ‘family’ of three more or less Christian species of namely (1) the Holy 
Ghost, (2) the soul and (3) some other substance. The definitions actually are elements of the 
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same Stoic creative fire.242 For the Stoics the divine, active principle (thus not the element ‘fire’) 
is immanent and pervasive in the cosmos. It is creative, self-sufficient, causes growth and 
preservation in the living beings, serves as their soul and is the substance of the stars.243 It is a 
distinct substance, on which everything depends but which itself is autonomous and immortal 
(and therefore the divine active principle – a conclusion from which Cassiodorus understandably 
shies away, solving the problem by cutting the substance up in three more or less Christian 
elements), permeating the whole of the cosmos (in souls, but also around souls). Below the 
surface of a conceptual framework given by Augustine –although as shown adapted at points- 
there are drops of Stoicism and it comes through at the definition of spiritual. Yet it must be 
noted here as well that Cassiodorus also upholds a firm belief that the human soul has a 
substance which can be distinguished from other spiritual substances, since the soul is the only 
type of spirit which assumes flesh.244 Thus the Stoic fire is what lends coherence to his definition 
of ‘spiritual’, yet at the same time Cassiodorus undermines this coherence with his Christian 
commitment to the unique nature of the human soul. I have no doubt that Cassiodorus thinks 
the latter is more important, and when accused of contradiction would reject the notion of the 
coherence of the spirit. But this does not mean it is not in the text. 
With this Stoicism in mind it is interesting to see how Cassiodorus is describing the 
‘quality’ of the soul. Following the Aristotelian categories, after giving the definition of the soul, 
the quality of the soul is described, followed up by the quantity of the soul (or the lack of it). But 
Cassiodorus does not call the chapter ‘quantity’ but rather ‘that the soul does not have form’. 
The soul, according to Cassiodorus, can be called a ‘light’, since it is created in the image of God. 
This is an interesting use of the argument. Augustine would state that God is light, and that he 
created the intellectual light which the soul sees.245 Accordingly, there would be an ‘eye of the 
mind’ which sees the ‘intellectual light’. But Augustine would never use the image of God idea to 
state that the soul therefore is light. Augustine’s argument of the image of God is used to state 
that the soul is immortal, or that it is rational. Cassiodorus is here expanding on Augustine with 
Stoicism in mind. For the idea that the soul can be called a light is consistent with other 
qualifications of the soul throughout the text. The soul is a ‘fiery force’, it brings ‘heat’ to the 
limbs and has an ‘innate mobility’, its vital power is a ‘natural heat’, the soul is mainly seated in 
the head, since already ‘mortal fire aims upwards, and because it has a most refined nature it 
 
242 di Marco (1985), 96-100 and Colish (1990) vol. II, 249-52 have earlier noted the Stoicism in Cassiodorus, both in 
1985. In volume I, 333-4 Colish also notes some reception of Stoic logic in the Institutiones.  
243 cf. White (2003), 133-8. 
244 4.37-9.  
245 e.g. sol. 1.1.3; contr. adv. leg. 1.7.10. 
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rushes without hesitation to the higher places’, implicating that the soul substance does doubly 
so.246 This is clearly not Augustine. According to Gn. litt. 7.13.20-15.21 fire and air serve as the 
messengers of soul, to carry information from the senses to the soul through the nervous 
system. But they are definitely different from the soul, even if they come closest to being 
incorporeal. Cassiodorus is in line with Stoicism.  
A further view on this Stoicism can be taken from the secular authority which is 
mentioned in the chapter on the quality of the soul. The strategy that Cassiodorus adheres to is 
to mention the secular authority first and following up with the Christian authority. The 
relationship between these kinds of authority is not one of strict opposition. It is rather the case 
that Cassiodorus briefly sums up the secular theory in order to emend it or deepen it with 
Christian authority, which is held in higher esteem. Cassiodorus is adhering to principles of 
exegesis, giving a ‘literal’ natural philosophical explanation and following it up with a more useful 
Christian ‘spiritual’ (in its exegetical sense) explanation. This is at least how it seems in chapter 4 
on the definition of the soul, and here as well.247 What is Cassiodorus thus giving as the secular 
theory of the quality of soul? 
 
‘Authorities have said that this substance has a fiery quality. It is active because of its 
ever-moving heat, which gives life to the limbs when the soul has been joined to the body. Further 
they say that all things in heaven are made up of a fiery element, not the smoky fire of this world, 
exhaustible and temporal, but calm, nourishing and immortal. This fire neither diminishes nor 
increases, but continuously endures in the excellence of its origin. It cannot have an end because it 
is not, like a body, a combination of diverse elements. Being a simple element it does not admit 
an opposite; and thus it always remains since there is no conflict in its essence. In this way all 
created beings who have been granted a spiritual substance are said to be immortal.’248 
 
This description is certainly Stoic in origin.249 For the Stoics the soul is either made up of 
some divine creative fire, or of a mixture of fire and air (pneuma). In either case the soul has a 
fiery and very mobile nature. Moreover, at least some Stoics make a distinction between the 
 
246 resp. 4.60; 4.62-4; 4.203-4; 8.19; 10.15-7.  
247 4.1-7; 4.115-32. 
248 5.1-12, Qualitatem itaque substantiae huius auctores igneam esse dixerunt propterea quod mobili semper ardore vegetetur et iuncta 
corpori calore suo membra vivificet. Deinde quod cuncta caelestia flammo referunt vigore constare, non isto fumeo, consumptibili, et 
temporali, sed ex tranquillo nutritore atque immortali. Hoc neque minuitur neque crescit, sed in susceptae originis dignitate iugiter 
perseverat. Quod ideo finiri nequit, quia nulla, ut corpus aliquod, elementorum diversitate concretum est. Unum enim atque simplex 
habere nescit adversum et ideo semper manet, quoniam in essentia sua non habet litem. Sicut immortalia cuncta creata dicunt quibus 
spiritalis est concessa substantia.  
249 cf. Annas (1992), 18-9 and 45-6. 
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element (stoicheion) of fire and the principle (arche) fire.250 The element fire is uncreative and 
consumes the fuel, the principle is creative, self-sufficient, causes growth and preservation in the 
living beings, serves as their soul and is the substance of the stars.251 The secular authority that 
Cassiodorus here relates, describes rather the creative principle of fire, than the element of fire. 
Given Cassiodorus’ three species of spirit, it is likely that this is what he is thinking of when he 
gives the soul a fiery quality. It seems that Cassiodorus in some way is drawn to the Stoic theory 
of the soul, but at the same time he largely operates under Augustine’s conceptual framework of 
the soul. But, in opposition to Augustine, a central tenet of the Stoics is that the soul consists of 
matter. Could Cassiodorus be caught displaying materialistic tendencies in his De anima?  
 
3.5 Materialism 
 
Given Cassiodorus’ reliance on Augustine, it is remarkable that one of the most central 
tenets in his theory of soul, that the soul is immaterial, is not really taken in by Cassiodorus. For 
it is in this aspect that the tension between Augustine’s views on the soul and Cassiodorus 
reliance on Stoicism is most profound. Cassiodorus seems to follow Augustine in his idea of an 
immaterial soul. Cassiodorus records the secular teachers saying that the substance of the soul is 
‘distinct from the matter of its body’ (4.2-3 [substantiam] distantem a materia corporis sui), and adds 
Augustine-like arguments that the soul is not corporeal with the idea that the soul ponders 
principles252 and cannot be circumscribed by lines or dimensions like bodies.253 
Yet, despite these statements, Cassiodorus has some materialistic tendencies in his 
thinking about the soul.254 It starts with the idea that Cassiorodus’ definition of the spirit can be 
seen as the Stoic divine fire. As mentioned earlier the Stoics were materialists.255 For them the 
possibility of interaction between the active and the passive principle is ensured by the fact that 
they are alike. The Stoics believed in a strict causal determinism and for them a cause can only 
have an effect of the same kind. We can all vouch for the fact that the passive principle, the stuff 
that we in our day to day lives interact with, is matter. Therefore the active principle, the divine 
creative fire which is the cause of it all, is material too. Cassiodorus’ definition of spirit, as a fine 
substance spread out through the body, certainly carries materialistic overtones, and this is what 
 
250 cf. White (2003), 134-6 for the difficult relationship between pneuma and the creative fire.  
251 a distinction reported in Stobaeus. White (2003), 134. 
252 4.30-3. cf. imm. an. 17, Gn. litt. 7.21.28. 
253 4.20-4; 6.24-32. cf. an. quant. 3.4-4.5, Gn. litt. 7.21, ep. 166.2.4.  
254 Colish (1990) vol. II, 249; Di Marco (1985), 95-6. 
255 one of the notable exceptions being the lekton, which Augustine uses in his dial. and translates as ‘dicibile’. The 
Stoics did allow for a class of things which are not beings (onta), but also not nothing. They are ‘something’ (ti).  
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Marcia Colish notes.256 But apart from this definition I would here like to show with two 
examples that Cassiodorus not only quasi-defines the soul as a material entity, but that he 
actually treats the soul as a material entity as well.  
One of the apparently vexing questions in the theory of the soul is the mental 
development of the child, and in the exceptional cases in which this goes awry. How can the 
theory which gives everybody in every age group the same rational soul account for the 
observable fact that babies and children do not behave rationally like adults? For a materialist the 
answer would run along the line that the body of a child is smaller, or at least different from the 
body of an adult, so that the substance of the soul has a different interaction with the body. A 
very simplistic way of arguing, used by Augustine as a ‘straw man argument’ in the an. quant., is 
to say that a larger body can simply accommodate for more soul. An adult thus behaves more 
rational because he or she has more of the rational matter in his or her guts. But if one claims 
that the soul is immaterial and therefore fundamentally different from the body one will have 
pains to explain how the differences in the body can account for differences in the functioning 
of the rational soul. Thus the answer to this question was a struggle for Augustine, who spends 
chapters 15.25-19.33 of the an. quant. on it. The conclusion Augustine arrives at is that the soul 
of a child needs to grow metaphorically by learning. The soul of a child is the same as the soul of 
an adult, but it lacks the same potency to act, which it increases through training. The interesting 
thing is that Cassiodorus duly reports Augustine’s answer to the question of child 
development257, but at the same time has a totally divergent explanation for the mentally 
handicapped:  
 
‘If one shuts up a high blazing fire in a narrow container, it cannot strive 
upward in its usual way because a very constricting obstacle checks it. To each 
thing its own power seems sufficient when nothing contrary can oppose it. Thus 
one finds idiot children because, by an imbalance of the parts of the body or the 
thickness of the humours caused by a defect in the mother’s womb, the imbecilic 
mind is too much compressed in its dwelling and cannot exercise its strength 
while restrained in an inappropriate home.’258  
 
 
256 Colish (1990) vol. II, 249-50. 
257 7.54-8. 
258 7.34-42, Ut si ignem angusto vase concludas, altum, ut illius moris est, nequit appetere, quia eum artissimum obstaculum constat 
operire. Tunc enim unicuique rei facultas sua videtur suppetere, cum illi nihil contrarium praevalat impedire. Sic stultis iuvenibus obviat 
quod aut imparilitate partium aut crassitudine humorum materni uteri vitio suscepto, anima inepta nimis habitatione deprimitur et vim 
suam exercere non praevalet, inconvenientis domicilii sede praepeditia.  
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Again a simile with fire in this citation. But notice also the explanation of the imbalance 
of the limbs or defect in the humours. The first explanation is only viable if one thinks that the 
dimensions of the body have anything to do with the working of the soul in that body, 
something which should be denied by Cassiodorus since the soul according to him and 
Augustine has no dimensions in the first place. The second explanation is only viable if one 
thinks that the soul is actually mixed up with the humours. And how is that imaginable if the 
soul is immaterial? It seems as if Cassiodorus here is thinking that, even if the soul has a 
substance of its own, it is fundamentally on a par with the body, which explains the influence of 
the body on the soul and the mishaps for the mentally handicapped.  
Another example is Cassiodorus’ description of the eternal punishment of the damned. It 
is clearly taken from civ. 21.1-4. Augustine apparently had people asking him how it is possible to 
eternally burn in hell if common experience teaches that fuel is actually consumed in a fire so 
that it is no more. Augustine reacts, as Cassiodorus will later duly reflect in his text, that 
volcanoes persist and that fire salamanders have fire as their habitat, implicating that already in 
this world fire does not necessarily destroy everything it comes into contact with, and thus much 
less in the next. Augustine here does not speak of a substance of the soul or about the process of 
consumption itself. This is how Cassiodorus speaks about it:  
 
‘Therefore from this source, as from a vast river, issues forth a stream of 
dispute over how continuous punishment is supposed to be eternal since decay 
hardly allows a substance to exist that it does not allow to repair itself at any time. 
But it is completely unnecessary to think of this in terms of eternal principles. The 
punishment can also be of such a kind that it tortures without diminishing, and 
the substance can be of such a kind that it heightens the sense of pain without 
causing the decline characteristic of mortal things.’259  
 
Cassiodorus expands this explanation of Augustine with some natural philosophy. Mortal 
substances decay in fire, if they cannot repair themselves. But the soul, being a distinct immortal 
substance, does not need repair. This sounds quite innocent and at this point Augustine himself 
would probably not object. But what happens if Cassiodorus had to answer the question why 
 
259 15.20-6, Ex hoc igitur quasi vasto flumine quidam videtur rivulus altercationis exire, si iugi poenae concedatur aeternitas, dum 
consumprio vix substantiam permittat existere quam nullo se tempore permittit reparare. Sed istud omnino superfluum est in causarum 
perennium ratione cogitare. Nam et talis esse poena potest quae torqueat, non imminuat; et talis substantia quae sensum doloris augeat, 
non defectum mortalitatis incurrat.  
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this is so? Why does immortal substance transcend the ‘eternal principles’ that hold sway over 
mortal substance?  
Cassiodorus’ religious authority’s explanation why the soul is immortal is that it is made 
in God’s image.260 But this answer does not explain the physics behind it. That is what secular 
authority does. In 4 on the definition of the soul one of the many secular proofs of the 
immortality of the soul is that ‘whatever is not destroyed by an inherent opposition continually 
maintains itself as immortal’.261 The substance the soul is simple, without such a destructive 
inherent opposition.262 Thus the follow up question is how it is that mortal bodies have such an 
inherent opposition which the soul lacks. This is explained, again, in the much longer and much 
more detailed quotation of Stoic heritage given in paragraph 3.4, p. 81. The fire of which the soul 
is made is a simple element, whereas mortal bodies are made up of a mix of diverse elements. 
And these carry the oppositions (e.g. hot-cold, wet-dry) which mean the inevitable decay of the 
body. Thus when Cassiodorus is expanding on Augustine’s explanation of the possibility of an 
eternal fire of damnation, it is understood in the terms given by secular authority and best 
understood relating a Stoic material account of the soul. Augustine, deeming the soul 
incorporeal, would not care much for an explanation for the immortality of the soul which treats 
the ‘substance’ of the soul as some sort of special substance when compared ‘physically’ to other 
substances. He would take the (Neo-)platonic discourse in which the soul is connected with 
rationality and eternal truth, thereby showing that the soul is to be seen in a category with things 
that are unlike the body. But the upshot of the explanations of retardation and of the eternal fire 
of hell is that the soul is a substance mixed up with the body, although it is operating under its 
own laws. And on these premises it does not seem strange to regard is as a material, perhaps as 
some fifth type of element next to the usual four. 
What then about the arguments which made Cassiodorus’ soul seem immaterial at first? 
One may find philosophical arguments to account for the Augustine-like tone Cassiodorus takes 
on this topic at first reading: The question is whether Cassiodorus would think it possible for 
something not to be corporeal, but still material. Yes, if you consider the substance of the soul 
for a Stoic to be in a state of mixture with the bodily substances without ‘behaving like a body’, 
thus without all the inherent oppositions. This not only goes for the large bodies, like trees or 
stones, but also for corpuscles, the four elements. This is consistent with the Stoic’s rejection of 
corpuscularianism, even if they were materialists. They believed the basic coherent unit of the 
 
260 an adaption of an. quant. 2? 
261 4.121-4 Iterumque proponunt: quicquid a contrarietate originali non corrumpitur immortale iugiter perseverat. 
262 This is one of the things which make God so ineffable and good men so beautiful. They combine opposing, 
seemingly contradictory traits. 13.62-5; 16.23-34. Cassiodorus takes this from conf. 1.4.4.  
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cosmos to be the cosmos itself, not an atom, and thus stated a seamless continuity.263 The soul is 
therefore mixed in even with the four elements, which are the basis for the inherent oppositions 
which destroy normal bodies. Seeing the Stoic background to some ideas in Cassiodorus thus 
alters the way in which one reads those words. And if the spiritual material is permeating the 
whole cosmos as it seems to do for Cassiodorus (invisible around us and making up for our soul, 
thus in effect being everywhere), would it still be meaningful to cut a section of it up and draw 
lines around it?264 But, the impression remains that Cassiodorus took no pains to commit to a 
thorough analysis of his varied sources. 
With this paragraph the most important tension between Cassiodorus’ commitment to 
Augustine’s model of the soul and a Stoic model of the soul has been treated. But materialism is 
not the only topic at which both models clashed and where Cassiodorus adapted Augustine. 
Other topics are judgement, reason and the will. Cassiodorus used Stoic inspired rational 
judgement as a positive feat of the human soul, but Augustine’s will to account for the mutability 
of the soul and sin. 
 
 
3.6 Judgement instead of Will: restriction to the human being 
 
Paragraph 3.2, p. 75 shortly touched upon Cassiodorus’ Trinitarian structure in 7 and his 
substitution of ‘will’ with reasonable ‘judgement’.265 Cassiodorus must have understood the 
discussions around predestination to mean that the human will is responsible for human 
hardship.266 But the Trinitarian structure of our soul is wherein we are made in God’s image, so, 
as moral virtues of the soul, they cannot be rated negatively. Cassiodorus therefore again 
followed his Stoic line with his insertion of judgement. For the Stoics, judgement is the 
reasonable assent or dissent given to, for example, sense-data and desires. With it we are tapping 
into our divine part of the soul, gain understanding about the truth and keep ourselves in check. 
Compared to Augustine’s Trinity, judgement keeps some sort of middle position between will 
and understanding, since it draws upon reason and decides on the truth of things, but also has 
 
263 White (2003), 146. 
264 The Stoics would speak of a total ‘mixture’ (krasis) 
265 7.18-20. 
266 I have not doubt that Cassiodorus tried to stay away from these discussions, as he emphatically emphasises 
Augusutine’s agnosticism on the origin of the soul. The somewhat enigmatic remark at the end of that chapter (9), 
may also point in that direction, 9.59-61: Suavis quidem nimium mihi facta digressio est, dum suspiciones improbas amovere 
contendo, sed dum ad aliud tendimus, hinc dicere multa non possimus. ‘I have made a digression that was indeed very sweet to 
me, while attempting to counter unfortunate suspicions. But while I direct my attention to something else, I cannot 
say much here.’  
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the final say when deciding upon action. Cassiodorus therefore also had to adapt Augustine’s 
intellegentia with something else, deciding upon the (increasingly?) monastic contemplatio. 
Cassiodorus’ Trinitarian structure is a light sauce which only slightly flavours the Stoic steak 
beneath. But that does not mean that Augustine’s will is nowhere to be found. Yet, just as in the 
case of materialism, Cassiodorus is not prepared to go into the structural tensions between Stoic 
judgement and Augustine’s will. Judgement and reason receive their eulogies, but will is not per 
se treated. Cassiodorus does not seem to think that Augustine’s will involves reason (which it 
surely does for Augustine), but that it only involves irrational desire. In this optimistic De anima, 
which purports to describe that we are human through the use of reason, the will hardly finds a 
place. But it is Cassiodorus’ ideal scapegoat to blame for our problems. 
Cassiodorus’ treatment of judgement, reason and will shall be shown through two topics. 
The first is a comparison between Cassiodorus’ views on human and animal souls, which will 
establish the soul as a specific human feat and judgement as a specific human capacity. The 
second is a comparison between his respective treatment of reason and will as movements of the 
soul, which will show his different evaluation of the will. 
The Stoic model of the soul and Augustine’s model diverge in how they see the soul 
structured, and Cassiodorus positions himself along Stoic lines. Although the Stoics would reject 
Cassiodorus’ idea that only human beings have a soul (they would rather separate sentient life 
from non-sentient life267) they would certainly agree that the human soul is in some ways unique, 
since it is wholly rational. They reject the Platonic division of the soul into three parts, 
maintaining instead that there is but one kind of soul, accounting for the different levels of 
complexity in life with a differentiation in structure of that one kind of soul. The Stoics therefore 
state that the human being does not share some division or structuring of the soul with the 
animal. Judgement, the rational assent or dissent, is for the Stoic specific to the human being as 
well. 
 According to Augustine the soul is the animating principle, so that every living thing has 
a soul, including plants and animals. The soul can therefore, in line with the platonic tradition, be 
divided into three parts of rising complexity, which all have their different functions. There is a 
vegetative part of the soul, which provides the impetus to grow, accounts for urges such as 
hunger, spreads nourishment throughout the body, and keep the body an harmonious whole. 
There is an animal part of the soul, which takes care of sensation, and regulates the appetites and 
 
267 Annas (1992), 51; 71. The tonos (tension) of the pneuma decides whether the soul of the item is in a lifeless state 
(pneuma is also responsible for the coherence of e.g. stones) hexis, has vegetative growth by its soul in condition of 
fusis, or has perception and impulse because of the pneuma in state of psuche. However, only the human beings have a 
rational soul (nous).  
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movements of the body. Thirdly there is a rational part of soul, which only humans (and angels) 
possess, which accounts for the understanding of eternal truths. This theory is set out by 
Augustine explicitly in the two works that Cassiodorus used most: the an. quant. (33.70-73) and 
the Gn. litt. (7.16.22). How does Cassiodorus use these models for his De anima? 
 
Cassiodorus acknowledges that the soul is a ‘life giving power’, something which is 
supported by both secular and Christian authority.268 But, other than Augustine and the platonic 
tradition, he would restrict the usage of the word ‘soul’ for the human being:  
 
”Soul”, first of all, is properly spoken of for man, not for animals whose life is grounded 
in the blood.’269  
 
The reason that Cassiodorus gives for this divergence is physical. Other than with the 
human being the animal soul resides specifically in the blood and is therefore only to be called 
‘soul’ by an improper extension of the word.270 This is in opposition to Augustine, who spends 
chapter 31 of the an. quant. wondering over the consequences of the case of vivisection of a 
worm for his theory of the soul. One wonders whether Cassiodorus constitutes a step towards 
our modern tendency to restrict the use of the word soul to human beings. But it is clear that the 
whole theory of the soul in Cassiodorus is simplified from a three level building of rising 
complexity to account for all life on earth to a one-storey flat in which only human beings live. 
Cassiodorus defines this in the beginning of his De anima, and there is no misunderstanding that 
all that he has to say on the soul will specifically deal with the human being.  
In line with this restriction of the word ‘soul’ for the human being is Cassiodorus’ move 
to reserve judgement to the human being as well, thereby separating us from animals. In his 
description of the ‘situation of the human body’ in 11, Cassiodorus states:  
 
‘This animate body is, however, governed and ruled by the five senses. Although we 
share these senses with beasts, in us they are better distinguished and perfected through the use of 
reasonable judgement.’271 
 
 
268 4.1-3; 8.19-20. 
269 3.1-2 Anima igitur hominis proprie dicitur, non etiam pecudum, quia illorum vita in sanguine noscitur constituta. 
270 Cassiodorus’ Stoicism would also be the origin –as also noted by Di Marco (1985), 96- of this idea since blood is 
the vehicle of the pneuma.  
271 9.45-8, Hoc autem corpus animatum quinque sensibus administratur ac regitur, qui, licet sint communes cum beluis, a nobis tamen 
rationabili iudicio melius distinguuntur atque complentur. 
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 James Halporn correctly directs the reader to the lib. arb. 2.8.26.272 Although there is no 
talk of ‘reasonable judgement’ (rationabili iudicio) per se in that specific part of the lib. arb.273, in the 
larger discussion the idea of judging is prevalent. According to Augustine, judgement is a process 
that goes up all along the chain of perception and knowledge. The senses judge the quality of the 
object they sense, the inner sense judges the sense data given by all five senses to judge what is 
perceived and whether it is harmful or beneficial. Reason judges the (sensory) objects for what 
they are in order to gain understanding.274 Animals therefore certainly have judgement for they 
must have an ability to distinguish friends from foes. What Augustine denies animals is the 
highest forms of judging. In the civ. Augustine denies the bodily senses (presumably including the 
inner ‘sense’ as well) the judgement which consents or not to the truth of their sensory data, by 
implication barring them from knowledge275 In the Gn. litt. he denies animals a free judgement 
how to react on sense information, thus animal behaviour is instinctive.276 In Augustine animals 
therefore are not exempt from judging, but for the highest forms which lead to such human 
affairs as knowledge and virtue. What is Cassiodorus doing with this theory?  
First of all, Cassiodorus has removed the step of inner sense, which combines sense-data, 
from his description of the body and the senses. This removal serves his own goal, namely to 
point out how the human being excels the animals, playing down the features that the human 
body shares (i.e. the senses) with beasts. By not discussing judgement per se, by not indicating 
that judgement can be taken as ‘process’ to progress from one level to the next (e.g. from the 
senses to the inner sense), but just by mentioning that human perception excels animal 
perception through the reasonable judgement, Cassiodorus is also restricting judgement itself for 
the human being. Of course Cassiodorus’ statement is in accordance with Augustine’s theory. 
Augustine certainly concurs that ‘reasonable judgement’ only pertains to the human being, not to 
animals, since only the human soul has reason. But if Cassiodorus’ intention was just to point to 
reason, he would have had no use for the word iudicium. Cassiodorus does not only want to say 
that animals lack reason, but also that they lack judgement, thereby opposing Augustine. Further 
evidence for this is that in 10 (‘The seat of the soul’), the ‘animal’ level of judgement of the soul 
–thus discerning between the beneficial and the harmful- is reserved for the human soul as 
well.277  
 
272 cf. Gn. litt. 7.13.20-18.2 for a cruder description of the difference between the bodily senses and reason. 
273 It deals with the inner sense which combines sense data into objects and an awareness of the external world, but 
lacks the ability to be conscious of its task. That requires reason, for which the inner sense is not suited.  
274 lib. arb. 2.12. 
275 civ. 8.7. 
276 Gn. litt. 9.14.25.  
277 10.44-7. The chapter as a whole deals specifically with the human body as a seat for the human soul.  
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Thus, according to Cassiodorus, judgement is how the human being employs reason and 
is what separates us from the animals, and as such it is positively evaluated. We will now take a 
look at Cassiodorus’ evaluation of reason and the will as movements of the soul. 
 
 
3.7 Movement of the Soul: Rationality and the Will 
 
According to both the (neo-)Platonic and the Stoic worldviews, judging, thinking, and 
anything that involves reason, are movements of the soul. For both Augustine and Cassiodorus 
willing is one of those movements, and they can therefore be compared and their different 
evaluations highlighted.  
It all starts out with a fine case of collation –and thereby interpretation- of Augustine. 
Rationality is one of the possible ‘motions of the soul’. For a treatise on the soul motion is 
important, since the soul was considered to be the cause of the motions of the body. Hellenistic 
philosophy had already established that a) the cosmos and everything in it moves, but that b) a 
distinction must be made in the cause of the movement. Bodies can be compelled to move by 
other bodies, such as when billiard balls clash, or bodies can have an internal cause for 
movement, for example when an animal searches for food. If a body moves because of an 
internal cause, it is a living body. The internal cause is ascribed to something called ‘the soul’ and 
this soul then is thought to be the principle of life and movement. Thus the search for what this 
soul is, sets off.      
Cassiodorus actively used Augustine for the idea of the movement of the soul itself. All 
movement, or with another word ‘change’, must have a cause, thus the movement of the soul 
has a cause as well. On this point Cassiodorus states the following: 
 
‘I think that reason is an evident motion of the soul that advances from agreed-on facts 
towards some unknown and thus arrives at a <previously> hidden truth.’278  
 
This sentence is an amalgam of two pieces of Augustine. In the ord. (2.11.30) Augustine 
says that: 
 
 
278 4.85-8, Rationem vero dico animi probabilem motum, qui per ea quae conceduntur atque nota sunt ad aliquid incognitum ducit, 
perveniens ad veritatis arcanum.  
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‘Reason is a mental operation, capable of distinguishing and connecting things that are 
learned.’ 279  
 
and in the an. quant. (27.53) that: 
 
‘…I must agree with you that we have knowledge before reason, because reason proceeds 
from a basis in something known in leading us to something unknown’280  
 
Cassiodorus chose these texts well since Augustine was treating rationality at both places. 
In the an. quant., Augustine is making a distinction between ever present rationality and hard won 
knowledge, and in the ord. he is explaining what rationality is and what disciplines it leads to as 
training curriculum for students. I have some observations about this use of Augustine by 
Cassiodorus.  
Cassiodorus grasps what Augustine says, but by combining the two sentences he is 
performing a ‘mental operation’ himself. The effect is that he makes a kind of abstract. He takes 
out the core of this thought of Augustine –that reason is a movement of the mind- with the half 
of the sentence of the ord., and elucidates and explains it with second half of the sentence from 
the an. quant. With this shortcut from the ord. to the an. quant., Cassiodorus makes it tangible 
what this movement of the mind consists in: it means the progression from agreed upon facts 
through dialectical reasoning to certain, though unforeseen conclusions. He thereby conveniently 
dismisses the surrounding discussions and difficulties and provides a shortcut to conclusions for 
which Augustine needed a long discussion. For in de ord. the whole of Augustine’s object is to 
discuss what the distinction is between reason and its products and consequences. In the an. 
quant. Augustine displays a for the early dialogues usual caution in discussing what it means for 
the soul to be rational. Moreover, the rhetorical function of the sentence taken from the an. 
quant. changes radically. In the an. quant. the speech act of the sentence is to problematize the 
previously reached conclusion that knowledge or wisdom only follows after the application of 
reason. The problematization from the an. quant. thus becomes a definite statement.    
Secondly, Cassiodorus’ treatment only focuses on the dialectical side of reason as the 
motion of the soul. This focus can be seen as an interpretation of Augustine. For when 
Augustine regards the motions of the soul there is also is a definite moral component. For 
 
279 Ratio est motio mentis, ea quae discuntur distinguendi et connectendi potens. Russel’s translation. 
280 propterea me tibe debere adsentiri scientiam nos habere ante rationem, quod cognito aliquo nititur, dum nos ratio ad incognitum ducit. 
Colleran’s translation 
Cassiodorus 
 
92 
Augustine motion of the soul always has a direction: it can move towards its source or it can 
move away from its source. It moves towards its source when it uses reason to arrive at eternal 
truths, and it moves away when it becomes enmeshed in the life of the senses. Cassiodorus 
subscribes to the same ideas about reason and sensual life in 4.244 But the point is that 
Cassiodorus never connected these evaluations of reason and the senses with the idea of 
movement of the soul. The moral aspect of reason as movement of the soul is kept beneath the 
surface. 
But Augustine never believed that reason was the only movement of the soul. Affections, 
for example, provide another source of movement of the soul. But, even though he did not 
believe that only one source of motion for the soul exists, Augustine singled out one source of 
motion in his writings. Moreover, this stress changed during his lifetime. In the early dialogues 
the most interesting source of motions of the soul for Augustine is reason.281 This interest is, as 
we have seen, duly reflected by Cassiodorus. This is understandable since Augustine in these 
dialogues was concerned to show how the rational human being takes a special place in the 
Creation and how reason is a way to trace his provenance back to the divine. Reason thus serves 
as the bond between God and the human being. However, from the lib. arb. –finished in 395-, 
Augustine would stress the difference between Creator and creature, in order to provide for a 
stronger theodicy. The stress on what moves the soul for Augustine therefore changed from 
reason, which is dependent upon divine truth, to the independent human will.282  
We can see this in Augustine’s ideas on the mutability of the soul. The mutability of the 
soul, thus the motion of the soul, has always been used by Augustine in order to separate the 
human soul from the divine. In early works such as the imm. an. the example that Augustine 
would give of this mutability is that we can gain knowledge, where there was a lack of it before. 
That we are sometimes foolish, sometimes wise. But later Augustine would say that the soul 
moves because it can want different things at different times. In the lib. arb.(1.25.12) the will is 
even taken as a necessary condition for the use of reason: if you don’t want to understand, you’ll 
never use your rational abilities. 
The interesting question thus becomes what we read in Cassiodorus about the mutability 
of the soul. Cassiodorus subscribes to the importance of the mutability of the soul for the same 
reason, i.e. that it is not part of God. But what is the cause of the soul’s mutability for 
Cassiodorus? We read an echo of the idea that it is reason, when we are told that: 
 
281 e.g. imm. an. 5.7. 
282 e.g. ep. 140.31.74 (411/2); Augustine also accounts for the mutability of the soul through emotions (affectus, 
commotio), e.g. vera rel. 18, ep. 184A.2 (418). The emotions of the soul are much more akin the will than reason.  
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‘And so we are wise when we conduct ourselves well because of divine 
enlightenment and we are foolish when blinded by the mists of misdeeds.’283  
 
But the real conclusion Cassiodorus reaches is this: 
 
‘We have shown that the soul is changed in this world by an unstable and 
variable will, that it can both lose and receive good things, that it does not have 
constant and inflexible will, but can even change in various ways 
unintentionally.’284 
 
We thus see that when speaking about the mutability of the soul Cassiodorus reflects 
both of Augustine’s sources of motion of the soul, but in the end follows the later Augustine. It 
also is to be noted that here in treating the mutability of the soul Cassiodorus does describe it in 
the moral terms, which were lacking in the treatment of reason.  
The conclusion can be that when speaking about reason, Cassiodorus follows the young 
Augustine and his stress on reason as ‘motion of choice’. But when speaking about the 
mutability of the soul, Cassiodorus follows the later Augustine and his stress on will as the cause 
for this mutability. Cassiodorus thus separates the movement of the soul as a dialectical search 
for truth, from the mutability of the soul as a moral path of the will. But he does so without 
showing awareness that the actual movement of the soul is the same, even if the causes differ. 
Cassiodorus seems to create a real distinction between ‘movement of the soul’ and ‘mutability of 
the soul’, thus between different faculties of the mind which provide different movement of the 
soul. Augustine was only prepared to separate these conceptually, as his thinking of the mind in 
Trinitarian structures shows.   
By not connecting these two sources of motion, Cassiodorus is exploiting the neo-
Platonic side of the early Augustine. For the respective parts that reason and will play in 
Cassiodorus’ De anima are not balanced. Reason occupies a much larger place than the will in this 
De anima. The only, although admittedly not unimportant, mention of the will as the power to 
undertake a course of action is as cause of the just mentioned mutability of the soul. Cassiodorus 
does speak of an ‘imperative power’ (virtus imperativa) elsewhere, in the chapter on the natural 
 
283 ‘Et ideo sapimus, cum divina illuminatione bene gerimus, atque iterum desipimus, cum delictis caligantibus obceaecamur.’ 4, 543; 
trans. 250. 
284 ‘Constat ergo animam in hoc mundo instabili et variabili voluntate converti bonarumque rerum esse amissibilem ac receptibilem, nec 
uno semper voluntatis suae rigore subsistere, sed etiam contra dispositum suum multiplici se conversione mutare.’ 4, 544; trans. 251. 
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powers of the soul, yet he interprets this as the power to put the organs and the limbs of the 
body into motion. This is but a very technical aspect of the will that is one of the courses of the 
mutability of the soul.285 Reason, on the other hand, receives a more extensive treatment under 
its own heading (thus not as cause of some other feature of the soul). Moreover, when 
Cassiodorus speaks about the power that makes a person choose one course of action over 
another, he speaks of ‘reasonable judgment’ (iudicium rationabilis) rather than the will.286 This 
‘Neo-platonisation’ of Augustine also goes well in-hand with the Stoic idea that reason is 
altogether different from the motivations and emotions which make up our desires. Since 
judgement is led by reason, a human being is not free to judge. Truth, thus good (true) and evil 
(false) are objective data, and reason will lead one to a proper true judgement. This is why 
judgement is a positive virtue of the soul. But this is not the case for the will. The will is free to 
will what it wants (although the right will needs grace) and that is the root of all evil, which is 
why will is often treated negatively. Perversity ensures that one can have a proper judgement, but 
not a right will (Adam knew it was wrong what he wanted). This analysis therefore serves as 
explanation why Cassiodorus would want to substitute will, with its negative connation for a 
Stoic, for judgement in a positive part on the virtues of the soul. For practical purposes 
Cassiodorus thus interchanges ‘will’ and ‘judgement’, depending on whether he needs the 
positive rational judgement or negative will. We can see this in the application of will by 
Cassiodorus to show the mutability of the soul.287 Since this mutability of the soul is considered a 
negative trait (stability is better then perturbance), Cassiodorus chooses negative will over 
positive judgement to account for this mutability (‘we sometimes want wrong things’ instead of 
‘we sometimes make wrong judgements’). How Cassiodorus thus juxtaposes Augustine's thought 
with the Stoic model that he adhered to, with all the contradictions this entails, took some 
detective work to bring out. Yet different though Augustine’s and the Stoic’s model of the soul 
may be, Cassiodorus, in the end used them both for the same reason: to show how the soul is 
different from the rest of creation. 
 
 
 
 
285 8,550; trans. 258. 
286 7, 549; trans. 256 and 11, 557; trans. 266. Even though in both circumstances the stress on the reasonable aspect 
of judgment can be understood in the context of both passages (the virtues and the difference between the human 
being and the animals), this does not detract from the fact that one finds ‘reasonable judgment’ in all the places 
where ‘will’ could have been –with the exception of the negatively valued mutability of the soul.  
287 4, 544.  
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Conclusion 
 
The method with which Cassiodorus presented Augustine’s arguments is very often by 
shortcut. Cassiodorus is presenting the results of Augustine’s discussions, not the polemic itself. 
But in presenting these results, he makes some adaptations and interpretations of his own. 
Cassiodorus not only uses Augustine’s model of the soul, but also the mutually exclusive Stoic 
one, which is most easily visible in his use of the qualification ‘spiritual’ of the substance of the 
soul. This indicates that Cassiodorus also had a -possibly prior and still hard to relinquish- 
materialistic way of thinking about the soul. This materialistic way of thinking may have 
influenced Cassiodorus reading of Augustine in the first place, since it prompted him to look for 
answers regarding the question of the interaction between the body and the soul. It prepared 
Cassiodorus for the question what to select and –perhaps more importantly when confronted 
with an abundance of sources- what to forget when writing his own De anima. Cassiodorus all 
but forgets Augustine’s dynamical discourse, having alternative Stoic answers to what the soul 
does. Augustine’s will, however, is used as a convenient scapegoat to account for the 
responsibility of our sins, whereby Cassiodorus forgoes further deliberations on the relationship 
between judgement and will. 
Cassiodorus thus is not passively repeating Augustine, but actively adapting, interpreting 
and using Augustine for his purposes. One of the main purposes of his De anima is to convince 
his readers that the substance of the soul is not like the substance of the body. His use of the an. 
quant. and Gn. litt. 7 is accordingly. But Cassiodorus never came to a thorough analysis of his 
views in the light of the mutual exclusivity of both his models. Cassiodorus solved his conceptual 
problems cosmetically rather than structurally.288 Cassiodorus’ conversion took place when, as 
Vessey has it, ‘Late ancient notions of Christian conversion, especially those articulated in 
monastic milieus from the fifth century onwards, laid more emphasis on continuance in a style 
of life than on any signal moment of crisis.’289 This ‘continuance’ does not only seem to have 
counted for Cassiodorus’ style of life, but also for his style of thinking.
 
288 Concerning Cassiodorus’ revision of Pelagius’ commentary on the Pauline epistles along Augustine’s lines, David 
Johnson (1991), 163 remarks ‘Cassiodorus at times follows Augustine’s doctrine, which gives the priority to 
predestination, and at times follows another doctrine entirely, found in the words of Pelatius, which gives priority to 
foreknowledge. His theological acumen is simply not acute enough for him to maintain consistency.’  
289 Vessey, ‘introduction’, 18, with a reference to O’Donnel (1979), chapter 4. 
 Part Three. The ninth century 
 
 
From the sixth century to the ninth 
 
With the following two chapters this investigation leaves the sixth century in order to 
explore some aspects of the reception of Augustine’s ideas on the ontology of the soul in the 
ninth century. In this century, one of the themes of the sixth century, predestination, became 
prevalent again. Gottschalk started the debate with his concept of ‘double predestination’, i.e. 
that the elect may go to heaven, but that therefore the rest is predestined to damnation. This 
sparked off the predestination debate in the 40‘s and 50’s of the 9th century, since it not only 
calls the efficacy of free will into question -one of the main points of the predestination debate 
of the 5th and 6th centuries-, but also the universality of Christ’s sacrifice and the power of the 
church to administer sacraments, to attend to its faithful and to spread the faith. Apart from the 
personal and political concerns of the participants, these were the theological reasons in the 9th 
century which rekindled this debate.290 Especially the Christological and ecclesiological aspects of 
the debate made this a typical debate for the ninth century291 but this predestination controversy 
is especially known for its being rooted in Augustine’s works. Even though Augustine was a 
major source for Carolingian scholars in all the other 9th century debates (the adoptionism 
debate with Alcuin, the debate on the imago dei with Theodulf of Orleans and on the Eucharist 
with Ratramnus), this debate on predestination specifically hinged on the point who was 
correctly interpreting Augustine’s ideas. Whereas the predestination debate in the 5th and 6th 
centuries hinged on how far one had to follow Augustine, where Augustine was orthodox and 
where he left the perceived common tradition, the 9th century debate declared Augustine in sum 
total as orthodox, and the proponents tried to appropriate the standards for the correct 
interpretation of Augustine’s predestination.292 
Among all the theological debates of the ninth century, the debate around predestination 
specifically was conducted most acerbically, since it served, during the very turbulent middle 
decades of that century (rebellion, fraternal wars and Viking raids), to define factions among the 
 
290 Diana Stanciu (2005), 14-15, although this general interplay is one of the concerns of the whole book.  
291 Otten (2001), 81.  
292 cf. Stanciu (2005), 29-30, Schrimpf (1982), 847. E.g. Eriugena in the De divina praedestinatione liber 11.2.46-9 ...quod 
necessarium duximus et utiliter ad rem pertinere videmus illius auctoris (i.e. Augustinus) dicta ponere, cui maxime Gotescalcus 
haereticus sui nefandi dogmatis causas solet referre. ‘...because we think it necessary and see it as useful and relevant to cite 
the words of that author (Augustine) to whom the heretic Gottschalk is principally accustomed to refer the causes 
of his abominable doctrine.’ transl. Mary Brennan.  
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clerical elite.293 Given the responsibility they saw for themselves for the salvation of their 
respective kingdoms294, the political troubles, and the accumulation of sins these troubles 
entailed, led to a spiritual sense of crisis from which a way out had to be envisaged. For 
Gottschalk this meant looking into the theoretical foundations of predestination. He probably 
was concerned that the clergy was preaching the false idea that being baptised equaled being 
saved, which might lead to moral complacency.295 Convinced that no one would be saved by 
falsehoods, he countered that idea by describing a theoretically coherent world in which 
Christians too sin and are lost, and in which God alone keeps his few elect from pursuing their 
sinful impulses.296 For Hraban, the first ‘churchauthority’ to take note of Gottschalk’s ideas on 
predestination, this meant reacting against Gottschalk and stressing an active moral stance to 
change for the good in order to be saved.297 Less concerned with theoretical coherency, he feared 
that Gottschalk’s ideas would lead to moral apathy.298 Although both Gottschalk and Hraban 
were in principle concerned with inciting people to lead a moral life299, they arrived at opposite 
theoretical conclusions. This set off the predestination debate. On a doctrinal level a way out of 
the crisis could be to put oneself into the hands of an all-powerful and intervening God, which is 
the way Gottschalk and his more moderate supporters took. Another could be to stress personal 
responsibility in the world300, to which Hrabanus Maurus, Hincmar of Rheims, Pardulus of Laon 
and John Scot Eriugena turned. This intertwinement between secular and theological factors is 
underscored by the fact that the theological debate itself became an official concern from 851 
onwards (when Louis the German, Charles the Bald and Lothar decided communally to fight 
God’s enemies), whereas its end was determined by politics.301  
The general circumstances, participants and contents of the texts produced during this 
controversy are well known.302 In this research Gottschalk and Eriugena will be focussed upon 
 
293 Ganz (1981), 286.  
294 ibid. 286; 299.  
295 Schrimpf (1982), 822, 830-1 and (1980), 169, after Devisse (1975), 120f.  
296 Schrimpf (1980), 171. 
297 ibid., 169-70. 
298 According to Hraban one can only lead a moral life once baptised, so that he could not explain how the 
unbaptised were punished for sins to could not help committing. He also cannot explain why this individual is 
baptised or saved and not another, whereas Gottschalk is able to show that God has a volition for every individual. 
Schrimpf (1980), 166-7, 169 and (1982), 827, 839. Gottschalk’s and Hraban’s different concerns were also informed 
by partaking in what Stanciu (2005), 19 calls the different ‘scholarly discourse’ (Gottschalk) and ‘official discourse‘ 
(Hraban), the last one presenting the point of view and ‘actionplan‘ of the church as institute.  
299 Schrimpf (1982), 831, stresses that a theoretical foundation for christian moral exhortation was necessary in the 
context of the carolingian framing of identity as an imperium christianum.  
300 also in line with the contemporary concept of renovatio, to which Stanciu (2005), 120 has drawn attention. cf. 
Schrimpf (1980), 165. 
301 ibid., 297; 300-1. 
302 e.g. Ganz (1981) for the historical circumstances, Stanciu (2005) for a further description of the content of the 
treatises.  
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for their ideas on the ontology of the soul. Gottschalk started the controversy through his 
teachings on double predestination, and he put his thought down especially in the Confessio brevior 
(produced for the Council of Mainz 848) and the Confessio prolixior (written against Hincmar’s Ad 
reclusos et simplices 849). Eriugena wrote his De divina praedestinatione liber (851) against Gottschalk’s 
ideas at Hincmar’s behest. However, should one be interested in the general positions of the two 
camps, Gottschalk and Eriugena are certainly not the best authors to look at. Both antagonists 
took radical opposite positions.303 Moreover if ‘the correct response to uncertainty about 
doctrine was not novel argument but the careful assembly of texts’, their original modes of 
arguing set them apart.304 Their reward was condemnation at ecclesiastical councils (Mainz 848 
and Quierzy 849 for Gottschalk, Valence 855 and the meeting at Langres before the Council of 
Savonnières 859 for Eriugena). Furthermore Gottschalk underwent incarceration in the 
monastery at Hautvillers, which turned out to be life-long, and without Charles the Bald’s 
patronage Eriugena’s fate might not have been much better.  
Yet these two authors provide excellent candidates to check their use of Augustine’s text 
for the formation of their views of the soul and their arguments. Schrimpf has shown how their 
theories of predestination served to explain their anthropology.305 Gottschalk used it to explain 
how human beings in general came to be impulse driven (because of the Fall), but how the elect 
can exert self-control when grace blocks those sinful impulses. Eriugena used the doctrine of 
predestination to explain how human beings lost their knowledge of good and evil and power of 
choice (because of the Fall). Yet this knowledge and power may be retrieved through a correct 
understanding of God and when God elects one through the aid of grace to exert self-control 
and steer one’s will in the right direction. Given that anthropology lies at the basis of their (or 
indeed any) predestination theory, their views on the ontology of the soul (what the soul is and 
how it is affected by original sin, and how it transmits original sin) are relevant for the debate. 
 
303 That raises the questions what the mainstream position was. Ganz (1981), 290, speaks of ‘an Augustinian 
tradition in which the sacraments do not bypass the limited nature of the elect Church’ but leaves it at that. Stanciu 
(2005), 22 speaks of -among others such as ‘threatened theological tradition’, 42- ‘attempts to preserve a threatened 
Augustinian tradition’ (threatened presumably by both Gottschalks and Eriugena’s extreme positions). Despite her 
evident learning on the topic it would have been fortunate if it would have been spelled out what that tradition 
exactly contained. In the conclusion she states, however 115: ‘As for the issues of divine grace and free will, they all 
[minus Gottschalk that is] tried to assert the necessity of free will for salvation, even if the aid of divine grace was 
emphasised, regarding the corrupted human will after the Fall, to a lesser degree by Hrabanus and Hincmar and to a 
higher degree by the others.’ 
304 Ganz (1981), 284. cf. Schrimpf (1982), 848-50. This is not to say that one cannot argue for new positions through 
collecting texts, as has been shown through Eugippius. Nor does it imply that Gottschalk or Eriugena refrained 
from carefully reading Augustine widely.  
305 Schrimpf (1982), 839. 
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Finally, these two authors exhibit in their writings a particular expertise of Augustine which 
makes their investigation especially worthwile.306 
 
306 Not everyone had good libraries stocked with Augustine’s texts at their disposal. Hincmar for example did not 
have Augustine’s late texts at his disposal at the beginning of the controversy and took the Hypomnesticon as written 
by Augustine up until the end, although Florus of Lyon proved it was not in 854. Stanciu, 36-7. Undoubtly this 
controversy was a factor in the dissemination of Augustine’s texts throughout the Frankish realms.  
 Chapter 4. Gottschalk of Orbais and 
ontological predestination in his 
Quaestiones de anima. 
 
 
 
 
The text under consideration in this chapter is the Quaestiones de anima. This is a short 
theological opuscle which explicitly treats the soul and its origin. As an additional boon it so far 
seems to have escaped the attention of the scholarly community.  
 
 
4.1 Structure of the Quaestiones de anima 
 
Lambot edited and brought together the several writings of Gottschalk (808-867) that 
Morin found in 1930 in Berne.307 Among those theological opuscles of Berne ms. 584, the 
Quaestiones de anima (opuscle XXI) holds a specific interest for the purposes of my research topic. 
As the time of writing of the opuscles, or any specific context of this opuscle seems as yet 
uncertain, it will be hard to answer questions about its specific place in the larger predestination 
debate in the 9th century. However, given that the opuscle is situated in a late 9th century 
manuscript,308 its context in the manuscript could provide some clues for future research. This is 
facilitated by the fact that Lambot fortunately exercised the good judgment not to alter in his 
edition the order of the opuscles as he found them in the manuscript.309 Among the other 
opuscles, only the Responsa de diversis deals explicitly with the soul, in questions x to xv. 
Unfortunately, in the manuscript precisely the pages containing questions xi to xv are missing, as 
if someone took out those pages to have a dossier on the soul ready at hand. My research will 
therefore have to be restricted to the Quaestiones de anima as regards Gottschalk’s employment of 
 
307 Oevres Théologiques et grammaticales de Godescalc D’Orbais (Leuven 1945).  
308 Lambot, Introduction, xx. 
309 Lambot, Introduction, xxiii. 
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Augustine’s writings and ideas. At some later stage and in another context, the relation of this 
opuscle XXI to Gottschalks’ writings on predestination could be further taken into account. 
None the less a short sketch of Gottschalk's predestination theory has to be made here in 
order to see the material of the Quaestiones de anima in their proper context. Gottschalk started 
preaching his ideas on double predestination already on his journeys to Italy, from before 840 to 
846, as the letters of Hrabanus of 840 and 846 show.310 But it is far from clear when Gottschalk 
wrote many of his theological opuscles. Yet the historical context of the two main texts in which 
Gottschalk expressed his ideas on predestination is clearer. Gottchalk wrote the Confessio brevior 
to defend himself at the Council of Mainz in 848, and the Confessio prolixior to defend himself 
against Hincmar's Ad reclusos et simplices of 849.311 In the following sketch the opuscles will be 
used as well, however. 
Gottschalk’s theory is known as 'double predestination', of the elect to heaven and 
consequently of the reprobate to hell, citing among others Isidorus' Sententiae (Gemina est 
praedestinatio sive electorum ad requiem, sive reproborum ad mortem) as authority.312 In the Confessio 
prolixior Gottschalk would explain that this predestination is not actually double, but 'two fold' 
(gemina or opus bipertitum) since God is simple.313 God's foreknowledge and predestination are 
therefore the same.314 Yet it has different effects on different groups. The consequence of this 
position is that Christ's sacrifice was not made for the whole of the human race, but only for the 
elect.315 Human nature alone therefore cannot be sufficient for salvation, but needs grace, all the 
more so since the Fall.316 Free will therefore only can lead to slavery.317 True liberty can only be 
attained when the will is directed towards the good by grace.318  
We will see that the ideas that Gottschalk expresses in his Quaestiones de anima do not so 
much concern this theory of predestination. Gottschalk will entertain a notion of, what I call, 
'ontological predestination', i.e. that every individual human soul comes into being through a 
special divine volition.  This kind of 'ontological predestination' is morally neutral however, as 
 
310 In 840 Hrabanus wrote a letter to Noting of Verona, 'Epistola V ad Notingum cum libro de Praedestinatione 
Dei', PL CXII, cols. 1530-53; in 846 Hrabanus wrote a letter to Eberhard of Friuli, 'Epistola ad Eberhardum 
comitem, Monumenta Germaniae Historica Epistolarum V (ed. Dümmler) (Berlin 1974), 481-7. 
311 The Confessio brevior is in Lambot, 52-4 and the Confessio prolixior on 55-78. Hincmar of Rheims (ed. W. Gundlach), 
'Epistola ad reclusos et simplices in Remensi parochia', Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 10 (1888), 258-309. 
312 For this paragraph I have made ample use of Sanciu (2005), 24-42. Confessio brevior, 52, 1-10 and 54, 15-6; Isidore 
of Seville, Sententiae 2.6.1. 
313 Confessio prolixior, 67, 4-68, 2. 
314 ibid., 57, 13-9. 
315 Responsa de diversis, Lambot, 157-8. and Hincmar reporting in his Epistola ad Egilonem Archiepiscopum Senonensem in 
866, Lambot, 46.  
316 De praedestinatione, Lambot, 185-6. 
317 Responsa de diversis, Lambot, 146-7. 
318 ibid., 153. 
Gottschalk 
 
102 
opposed to the gemina praedestinatio of the elect and the reprobate. Yet Gottschalk's ideas on the 
soul, especially on the propagation of the soul and the universalisation of original sin in the 
Quaestiones de anima are very much in tune with Gottschalks further ideas on predestination. 
The Quaestiones de anima seems to be written for one specific addressee, and was in the 
first instance not intended to be released.319 Even though it is not a long text (11 pages in 
Lambot’s edition), it has the structure of a De anima text. It is therefore tempting -but 
speculative- to think that the book that Gottschalk pledged to write about the nature of the soul 
would have used this opuscle as its basis. As it stands, the text is directed to one specific reader, 
giving it a rather hybrid nature between epistle and a De anima treatise. As the structure will 
clarify, Gottschalk had two guides for his ideas on the soul, Augustine and Gregory the Great. 
Gregory the Great proved to be of minor relevance for Gottschalk, the major guide was 
Augustine. His thoughts about the origin of the soul set the terms from which Gottschalk’s 
thinking for this Quaestiones de anima started out. But it also provided Gottschalk with the reason 
for writing it in the first place, since it is Gottschalks ‘discovery’ of traducianism that prompts 
him to fix his thoughts in this debate in writing. The elements of a theory of the soul which do 
not directly relate to the question of the origin of the soul (e.g. soul as life of the body and the 
simple nature of the soul) are set up in direct quotations by Gregory and Augustine (see below), 
whereas the paragraphs which deal with the origin of the soul are written by Gottschalk. One 
might therefore say that if the genre of the De anima set the frame of the text, Augustine 
provided its focus. The structure can be analysed as follows.  
 
 
 
319 Gottschalk, Opuscula Theologica, 290. Precor vos tamen propter dominum ut sit apud vos tamdiu secretum hoc scriptum meum 
quamdiu fuero sicuti nunc sum, quia certe sextus horno id est hoc anno completus est annus quod est hoc mihi a domino deo 
manifestatum et habeo factum votum hinc deo miserante et adiuvante cum placuerit ei scribere librum.  
‘I beseech you, for our Lord’s sake, that you keep this writing of mine as a secret with you for so long as I will be in 
the position that I am in now, since it is the case that with the spring of this year really the sixth year is passed that 
this has been revealed to me by the Lord our God and hence I have made a pledge to write a book, with the mercy 
and help of God, if it pleased him.’ 
This is an intriguing quotation. The context of the quotation clarifies that it is his conviction of traducianism. But 
was this insight of such an importance for Gottschalk to count the years hence and to have pledged to write a book? 
God’s help and pity would have been scarce if this 11 page opuscle, a page and a half of which are direct quotations 
from Gregory and Augustine, would be the fulfillment of this pledge. The book is lost, if Gottschalk kept his pledge 
in the first place. Secondary literature does not mention any reference to a longer de anima type of work of 
Gottschalk in contemporary texts. Given the importance of the question of the origin of the soul for the 
predestination debate it is highly likely that his insight into traducianism was connected with his ideas of double 
predestination (which elaborated in paragraph 5), and it may even have served as a catalyst for these beliefs. This 
would place the time of his ‘revelation’ perhaps in Italy, but the writing of the Quaestiones de anima may rather have 
taken place in Hautvillers. The tentative quamdiu fuero sicuti nunc sum seems to refer to his incarceration, so that the 
n.post quem of the Quaestiones seems to be 849. If that is correct, it would suggest the post quem of the ‘revelation‘ in 
843.   
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part page, line content 
   
I 283-284, 21 history of Aug.’s de an. et or. 
II 284, 22-285, 14 uncertainty on the origin of the soul and statement of 
faith about the universality of original sin. 
III 286, 15-287, 13 nature of the soul (=Greg., Homil. in Ezech. 2, hom. 5, 
n.9-11)320: 
A) soul is life of the body 
 B) the simple nature of the soul 
IV 287, 14-288, 2 Three short paragraphs on the soul, the body, and the 
intellect.  
 A)  is the soul self-sufficient? no, only 
truth=God, the soul can be fallacious  (=Aug., div. qu. 1) 
 B)  did God make the body? yes, all beauty 
and good in as far as it exists comes from God. the body 
has some beauty and goodness, therefore it comes from 
God (=div. qu. 10). 
 C)  the human intellect comprehends itself, is 
limited to itself and loves itself it wants to know itself it 
loves itself. (=div. qu. 15).321 
V 288, 3-291, 12 Origin of the soul; Gottschalk’s ‘revelation’ of 
traducianism.  
 A)  Augustine’s biblical evidence weighed 
against Jerome’s biblical evidence, preference for 
Augustine. 
 B) ‘empirical’ evidence: cutting the centipede 
in half creates two independent centipedes. 
 conclusion: making/procreating is not proper 
creation, which belongs to God. since parents are not the 
 
320 PL 76, 990A-991B.  
321 In qu. 15 Augustine writes about the intellect in general, and there is no doubt that he includes God’s intellect as 
well. In Gottschalk’s text, however, the focus is clearly the human being, so that this quotation of Augustine is 
framed to talk about the human intellect only.  
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creators of the soul, traducianism is possible. 
VI 291, 12-294, 20 on the soul seeds. The human soul is sown into the 
womb by certain seeds. All the souls and their ‘sowings’ 
are predestined by God. 
 
 
We can now see how the structure resembles a De anima. After an introduction or 
potentially a doxography, what follows is a description of the nature of the soul, followed by an 
analysis of the soul in the context of the whole person (soul, body, mind) and by an investigation 
of the origin of the soul. We have seen a similar structure in Cassiodorus (whose De anima 
Gottschalk mentions in the part where he describes the history of Augustine’s an. et or.). It is 
clear that Gottschalk in this opuscle was not interested in the nature of the soul and the soul in 
the context of the whole person. As mentioned before, Gottschalk gives direct quotations from 
Gregory and Augustine which keep the level of information to a bare minimum. With respect to 
the quotations of the div. qu. 1, 10 and 15 one might add the following. It seems likely that these 
elements of the soul, body and the intellect were meant by Gottschalk to make up a theory of 
the whole of the human being. But if this is the case, Gottschalk did not deem it necessary as yet 
in this text to clarify that. These quotations on the nature of the soul and the relationship of the 
soul to the whole of the human person therefore seem to be condensed summaries, which he 
later meant to elaborate upon. In the rest of the letter however, which completely deals with the 
origin of the soul, Gottschalk himself is very present and the quotations he gives are short and to 
the point.  
 
 
4.2 The origin of the soul: a case of agnosticism? 
 
The real, and only, question of this text therefore is -again- the origin of the soul. This is 
directly clear from the beginning. We start in medias res with the history of the an. et or., of which 
Gottschalk was perfectly aware. He refers to Augustine’s ep. 166 to Jerome, 143 to Marcellinus, 
190 and 202a to Optatus, tells how Vincentius Victor read and wrote against Augustine and how 
Augustine, notified by the monk Renatus, wrote the an. et or. against Vincentius Victor, addressed 
to Renatus and the priest Petrus.322 Apart from the ‘dossier’ of these letters and the an. et. or., the 
 
322 Gottschalk, 283-4. 
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texts which Gottschalk employs are predominantly from Augustine’s very early work (an. quant., 
div. qu.), besides one reference to the contr. Iul., one of Augustine’s latest works. The Gn. litt. 
seems not to be used in this text.323 It is possible that Gottschalk would have taken more 
extensive material from Augustine into account in his larger book.  
The text’s line of argument starts out on a familiar note. Augustine did not know what 
the origin of the soul was, whereas Pelagius was convinced of creationism. Gregory and 
Fulgentius of Ruspe followed Augustine in his agnosticism, just as Cassiodorus.324 Moreover, 
Gottschalk commends the person to whom this opuscle is addressed for his (rather than her) 
caution in this matter: 
 
‘I felt this had to be remembered because your caution pleases me and the 
impudence of some others displeases me, in the same way as if for instance where 
the eagles are blind, the screech-owls and owls could see all the way through the 
mist.’325 
 
A little later Augustine is praised for his agnosticism: 
 
‘Among the many other things of the holy Augustine, who was laudably 
unsure about the origin of the soul, this most forceful expression was made in the 
Books against Julian,...,: “Why do you flee towards the most obscure problem of 
the soul? For either it came from a transferral and hence it contracted sin, or if the 
soul was not drawn from there, it was sent into the body, which was liable to sin, 
and the soul was stained with sins and showed itself as sinner, just as the clean 
vase is soiled when something unclean is put into the vase.” ‘ 326 
 
 
 
323 despite Gottschalk’s use of Sap. 11.21 (‘Thou hast ordered all things in measure, number and weight’) in his last 
paragraph on the seeds of the soul. Since this is also one of Augustine’s favourite bible quotations in -among others- 
the Gn. litt., one might suspect the Gottschalk’s use of the Gn. litt. in this paragraph. However, the content of this 
paragraph on the seeds of the soul is far from anything Augustine ever was prepared to consider.  
324 Gottschalk, 283-4.  
325 Gottschalk, 284-5. Hoc idcirco commemorandum censui quia cautela tua placet nonnullorum displicet impudentia mihi, quasi 
videlicet ubi caecuciunt aquilae, ibi absque caligine cavanni cernant et ululae. The eagles seems to refer at least to Augustine and 
the owls are at least to Pelagius. But it may well also refer to Gottschalk himself and some of his detractors. 
326 inter cetera multa sancti Augustini laudabiliter dubitantis de origine animae, hoc potissimum in Libris adversus Iulianum, ..., 
dicitur: Quid fugis ad obscurissimam de anima quaestionem? Aut enim ex traduce venit et inde peccatum contraxit 
aut si inde tracta non est in corpus missa peccatis obnoxium et ipsa peccatis inquinata peccatrix inventa est, sicut 
inquinatur vas mundum si intra vas mittatur inmundum. 
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This quotation from c. Iul. 2.10 would seem to set Gottschalk up for his conclusion: 
 
‘Let us both therefore patiently remain in doubt together with such a great 
man, as long as we are in dark exile, and with us all the others who know that 
because of that single original sin we and all people ever had been worthy not only 
of that punishable ignorance about the origin of our soul, which we suffer with 
sufficient merit according to God’s just judgement, but also have been worthy of 
the perpetual torment of a hell whence from here specifically only thousands of 
little babies float, and that this is not only valid for those who had existed, but also 
for those who are born to be and for those which will be born to be‘.327 
 
And so Gottschalk seems to end the first two parts of his text with the wish that the 
origin of the soul remains hidden to us and our posteriors, just as it was hidden to our 
predecessors (veluti latuit antecessores nostros sic etiam nos et posteros nostros lateat origo animae). 
 
 
4.3 It is indeed a case of traducianism 
 
After a short intermezzo, Gottschalk takes up the origin of the soul again in the fifth part 
of the text. He sets scriptural evidence from Jerome328 (John 5:17 and Eccle. 12:7) off against some 
other Biblical texts (Gen. 46:26-7, Ex. 1:5 and Hebr. 7.9-10). It is worth noting that these latter 
Biblical texts are treated in Augustine, mainly in his epistles.329 Gottschalk prefers Augustine’s set 
of biblical texts, since they are more easily applicable in the explanation of the universality of 
original sin.330 Gottschalk chooses to explicitly identify Jerome, but not Augustine as his source. 
Maybe the biblical quotations of Augustine were commonplace for Gottschalk and his 
 
327 Gottschalk 285-6: Hinc ergo cum tanto viro, dum sumus [in] caliginoso exilio, patienter dubitemus ambo et nobiscum ceteri qui 
noverunt nos et omnes etiam propter illud solum originale peccatum fuisse, et eos qui nascuntur esse, et illos qui nascituri sunt fore dignos 
non modo hac poenali ignorantia de origine anime nostrae quam patimur satis merito iusto dei iudicio, sed insuper etiam perpetuo 
gehennae quo fluunt hinc solummodo multa milia parvulorum supplicio. 
328 with Lambot 288, Jerome, Commentarius in Ecclesiasten 12.6/8, line 270-1 in CCSL 72 (ed. Adriaen) and ep. 126.1, 
line 12-3 in CSEL 56 (ed. Hilberg). 
329 ep. 143, 8-9; ep. 166, 5.11 and 8.26; ep. 190, 5.18. Lambot states in p. 289 that ‘De Exod. et Hebr. nihil inveni in 
Augustini operibus animam tractantibus.’ This can be augmented by Gn. litt 10.19.34 and qu. in hept 1.43. 
330 Gottschalk, 289. Mihi tamen plus incomparabiliter placent (i.e. the second set of scriptural evidence) ad nostrum sensum quam illa 
quae secundum sancti Hieronimi sunt prolata commentum id est expositum, quia revera propter originale peccatum multo magis mihi 
placet sensus et sententia nostra quam sua quia profecto non est firma. 
‘But they please me for my ideas incomparably more than those which were put forward according to the 
commentary, i.e. the explanation, of the holy Jerome. For indeed on the account of original sin, our opinion and 
judgment please me much more than his, which really is not firm.’ 
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intellectual circles, or maybe he wanted to keep his powder dry and keep Augustine’s authority 
for the argument which will settle the debate on the origin of the soul. For after his judgement of 
this biblical evidence, Gottschalk introduces a piece of ‘empirical’ evidence, referring to an. quant. 
31, which will settle the debate. Separating a centipede, the two parts will go their separate ways. 
It is as if from one soul, two souls can be made. Gottschalk ‘reads the book of nature’ in a way 
which is also favoured by Augustine (e.g. the life of the fire salamander in the volcano explains 
the possibility of the eternity of the soul in the flames of hell in civ. 21.4). If human beings can 
separate the soul in a centipede, how much more certain is it that God ‘ is so much more able -- 
in the same way as he created, is creating and will create --, to create a soul as if by transferral 
from another soul and to give it to each individual new-born’ (...multo magis potest sicut et fecit et facit 
et faciet tamquam de traduce animam de anima creare et singulis nascentibus dare). Here Gottschalk stresses 
again that this is compatible with the universality of original sin.331 
What has happened in this paragraph? Gottschalk makes a very bold move, but his 
rhetorical strategy is somewhat below the surface. His first step is to give the biblical evidence of 
Jerome and Augustine, so that he repeats very briefly Augustine’s and Jerome’s debate on the 
origin of the soul. Jerome was a creationist, but Augustine was -as mentioned in other chapters, 
e.g. 1, p. 33, not convinced, since creationism makes the universality of original sin harder to 
defend. But Gottschalk does not lay down the terms of the debate on the origin of the soul, nor 
does he refer to the debate between the two church fathers or mention Augustine by name. 
Instead, he uses Augustine’s authority in the second step, where he uses the centipede to break 
through Augustine’s own agnosticism to a traducianist position. This is all the more noteworthy 
since Augustine in the very an. quant. 31 is unwilling to explain this phenomenon, since it might 
support a materialist account of the soul and rather tries to divert the mind of his conversation 
partner (Evodius) elsewhere. Thus, Gottschalk here uses this piece of evidence of the an. quant. 
for a very different discussion. For the question of the (im)materiality of the soul is not 
necessarily related to the problem of the origin of the soul. Gottschalk’s need for ‘misapplying’ 
this text -or any of Augustine’s texts for that matter- is clear, since he will not find any text of 
Augustine which will explicitly break through his agnosticism. But it is therefore all the more 
poignant that he uses Augustine himself in the first place to force the discussion into a direction 
Augustine would never have endorsed. For Gottschalk did not choose to simply state the natural 
phenomenon as a matter of fact, and draw his conclusions from there. Gottschalk rather put it in 
a very ‘textual’ context, elaborately explaining that this is from the an. quant. and what the 
 
331 Gottschalk, 290. 
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circumstances were in which Augustine came upon the phenomenon, as mentioned in the 
dialogue of the an. quant.332 He explicitly ties the name and the authority of Augustine to this 
piece of information, which leads to Gottschalk’s ‘revelation’ of the truth of traducianism.   
Thus, where Gottschalk seemed to be following Augustine, he is rather using him as a 
stepping stone for his own insight. Yet, although it is Gottschalks’ own insight, it is thoroughly 
bred through reading and contemplating Augustine. Gottschalk thus struggles in a way with the 
same problem as Eugippius, yet his strategy is fundamentally different. Gottschalk, not prone to 
strive for reconciliation between opposing parties or for the middle ground, clearly chooses one 
option. Yet, although certain, he is also afraid of the consequences, and thus asks his addressee 
to keep the text unpublished for the moment (see above n. 1). It is as if Gottschalk started out 
writing a text which would safely confirm Augustine’s doubts, but in the end Gottschalk could 
not keep silent about his own conviction.  
 
 
4.4 Seeds of the soul 
 
But Gottschalk does not end his Questiones de anima with this realisation of traducianism. 
If the soul is transmitted through the generations, in what way does this come about? In a last 
paragraph Gottschalk draws some inferences from his traducianism about this question. The 
Latin, however, is difficult to read and one of the reasons is that Gottschalk maybe did not yet 
himself have clarity on the questions he was treating.333 He argues against an imagined 
interlocutor on the point of the seeds of the soul (semen animatum). What the seeds of the soul 
exactly are is presumed as known, but from the text it becomes clear that Gottschalk means male 
 
332 And even throws in a detail which is not in the an. quant. at all, namely that Augustine and Alypius and other 
disciples were sitting at the mensa lusoria (betting table) when they started maltreating the insects. Gottschalk here 
rather reminds us of conf. 6.7.11, were Augustine recalls how his classes healed Alypius from his betting addiction in 
Carthage. Gottschalk invents a detail, which is verisimilar because of the story in the conf. But the detail is also an 
obvious fraud -obvious at least for the people who have both texts at hand- for the story of Alypius takes place in 
Carthage, whereas Augustine informs us in the an. quant. that he came upon the phenomenon (much later) in the 
Ligurian (Italian) countryside. But with this detail Gottschalk opens up the opportunity to quote from ps. Cato’s 
Disticha: Trocho lude, aleam fuge (‘play with the hoop, avoid the dice’). The Disticha served as a school text to learn Latin 
and as a moral compass in the middle ages, so Gottschalk is probably referring to a piece of knowledge already in 
his readers mind and not showing off his erudite knowledge of classical texts. So why does Gottschalk include this 
detail and the quotation of ps. Cato? It remains a bit elusive, but in my opinion the detail serves to further construct 
the image of Gottschalk’s extensive knowledge of Augustine, so to speak of Gottschalk’s authority of the authority 
of Augustine. For if one wants to make a story more believable, adding some small details which give colour and 
flavour (as the movie ‘The usual suspects’ so nicely illustrates). The quotation of common knowledge then again 
brings the story closer to the reader. But eventually it is all a distortion, for it turns the mind of the reader away from 
the obvious fact that Augustine in no way whatsoever would endorse Gottschalk’s use of his text. 
333 Others speak in general about Gottschalk’s ‘intense and aphoristic style’. Ganz (1981), 297. 
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sperm, as the seeds are sown in the wombs of women. The immaterial soul thus has some 
material carrier to cross the generations. 
 
 
4.5 Predestination 
 
4.5.1 Ontological predestination 
 
In this last paragraph, Gottschalk has one concern. He argues that every seed of the soul 
and its sowing in the womb with an new human being as a result, is fore-ordained.334 His 
evidence is biblical; God sometimes opens, or closes the wombs of women for childbirth, e.g. in 
Gen. 20:18, Gen. 30:22 and 1 Sam. 1:6-6. This scriptural fact is used to solve some problems with 
traducianism and a material seed of the soul. It sets human procreation apart from animal 
procreation (would Gottschalk say that animals are not predestined to be, or is there some kind 
of special human predestination?), and it prevents technical questions about the fate of souls 
which were tied to seeds that ‘did not make it’ into a human body. One might otherwise ask 
where the souls went that were attached to the seeds of unsuccessful instances of intercourse, or 
more importantly, whether the souls of unborn children would have to suffer (or enjoy) the fate 
of the soul of the father in the afterlife without having had life on earth itself and be without 
their own body in the resurrection. En passant the predestination of childbirth as explained in 
the Bible gives Gottschalk another argument against creationism. If God opens and closes the 
wombs of women, apparently there must be a seed of the soul. And why would that be the case 
if God would just create each soul anew, as the creationists have it? But otherwise Gottschalk 
remains silent on questions regarding the status of the ‘unborn’ soul in the parent (are they 
dormant? where are all the soul seeds stored? etc.). These inferences from traducianism and 
 
334 Gottschalk, 291. Ego quidem, gratis auxiliante clementia dei, propter evitandam vel evadendam difficilem vel potius difficillimam 
de seminibus animatis quaestionem vel obiectionem beati Augustini atque sancti Fulgentii scilicet post apostolos tam profundorum 
fluminum quam nihilominus luculentorum luminum mundi, tunc tantummodo humanum satum seri serendumque dixi, vel ut recordaris 
et scripsi, semen animatum quando dumtaxat est a deo corpus hinc praedestinatum ut esset vel sit animandum. 
‘Because of the difficult (or rather, very difficult) question or objection about the seeds endowed with life, ([a 
question] one would like to avoid or pass over), which was raised by the blessed Augustine and St Fulgentius 
(profound rivers and - after the Apostles- brilliant lights of the world as well) I said at that time that human planting 
(or, as you recall and as I wrote, ‘seed endowed with life’), has been and should be sown in such a way that it would 
be and is endowed with life, because, as far as this is concerned, a body has been foreordained by God [to come] out 
of it.’  
I am grateful to Professor Maxwell-Stuart for his help with this translation, and all other translations from this last 
paragraph. 
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argument for predestination in this last paragraph are far from anything Augustine would have 
imagined.  
The predestination Gottschalk is talking about in this last paragraph is, so to say, amoral 
and ontological. It does not have anything to do with predestination as understood by Augustine 
(and Gottschalk himself in the wider debate), that is, with the fate of the soul in the afterlife, or 
at the resurrection. Moreover, it does not state that the mass of the human race will have to 
suffer for the original sin they committed when they were as one person in Adam. It just states 
that the being per se of each human being in its composite of body and soul is fore-ordained. 
There is a special kind of predestination, a special kind of divine volition for the coming into 
being of each human person. There is thus a special relationship between God and each human 
being on the ontological level.  
How does that compare with Augustine? It is clear that there is a special ontological 
relationship between God and the human being for Augustine as well. The human soul is after 
all a strange kind of being which does not follow the rules of the other created beings in that it 
has no precursor (like for instance a ratio or a seed), and although it is mutable like the rest of 
creation, it is also persistent like the divine. It is in this respect not strange that Augustine never 
came to a satisfactory solution for the problem of the origin (i.e. transmission) of this strange 
being of the soul. It is clear that the human holds a special position in Augustine’s ontological 
scheme of things, and that God has a special ontological relationship with the human soul 
according to him. But this regards the human soul in general and does not specify individual 
souls. It is clear that there was a special divine act for the creation of Adam’s and Eve’s soul, but 
it is not clear that God determines each individual soul more than he does each individual tree. 
To my knowledge Augustine never states that God has a special will for the creation of each 
individual soul as Gottschalk does. On the other hand, the fact that in Augustine the soul has no 
precursor necessitates a special volition on God’s part for each individual soul, but this is an 
implicit consequence. However, it is clear that the human body is not included in any of these 
special ontological deliberations; it is as much part of normal creation as any other living thing.  
A likely reason why Augustine did not have to stress a special divine volition for each 
individual human being, or why he did not come so far to do so, is that the human soul already 
holds such a special place in the ontological scheme of things. It is clear for everyone reading 
Augustine that the special moral relationship between God and the human being (as underlined 
by the predestination question commonly understood) is underpinned by a special ontological 
relationship. The reason why God cares so much about us is because we are created in his image. 
The human soul thus stands out from the backdrop of normal creation. The human soul’s 
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introduction, transmission and projected end needs some divine intervention, while normal 
creation proceeds in a more process-like manner once set in motion. If we compare this to 
Gottschalk’s description of affairs, however, Gottschalk’s human soul is disconcertingly normal. 
It is much more part of normal creation than it is for Augustine since it has a rather normal 
precursor in the seeds linked up with male sperm and is transmitted by the parents, just like the 
rest of living nature. How then is Gottschalk going to create a special ontological relationship 
between God and the human being in order to underpin the moral relationship? How is he going 
to show that the human merits God’s special moral deliberations? As we have seen, with a deus ex 
machina Gottschalk comes with his divine ontological intervention in the form of a special divine 
volition for each and every soul, so that they are again distinguished from the rest of nature. The 
one on one predestination between seeds of the soul and actual souls, thus the idea that there are 
no more seeds than there will be actual souls and vice versa, that Gottschalk posits is relevant for 
technical reasons (to prevent problems with fate of seeds that did not make it) but it also serves a 
far deeper need. It is an expression of the deep ‘personal’ involvement that God has with the 
human being and justifies God’s moral concern with the human being. 
 
 
4.5.2 Relationship with Gottschalk’s double predestination 
 
Although Gottschalk’s predestination in the last paragraph of the Quaestiones de anima is 
an ontological predestination, it is legitimate to ask in what way the Quaestiones de anima relates to 
the predestination debate in general. Gottschalk’s main point of the letter, his insight into 
traducianism, is closely tied in with ‘moral’ predestination since traducianism serves as an easily 
understandable explanation for the universality of original sin, and this universality is a necessary 
element of Augustine’s predestination theory. God can only justifiably elect individuals to 
dispense grace gratuitously if the whole of humanity is in a fallen state for which it has itself to 
blame. If humanity would not be in a fallen state, grace would not be necessary, and if this state 
was not our own fault, God should not elect gratuitously. Gottschalk’s focus on traducianism 
has two effects.  
Traducianism, and the universality of original sin which it serves to underscore, rather 
focus on the negative side of the coin of predestination. We have seen that Gottschalk professed 
his belief in the universality of original sin in the beginning of the letter (note 327, p. 97), and 
that in a rather pessimistic way. But we must realise that, even if Augustine would paint a bleak 
picture for humanity in general in his later anti-Pelagian works because of polemical necessity, 
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his focus was on the elect and the dispensing of grace, i.e. on the predestination of those that 
would be saved.335 Although there is therefore no mention of double predestination in 
Gottschalk’s letter, it not only is compatible with it, but also serves as a step towards it. The 
numerous polemical formulations in this letter, and the fact that Gottschalk asks his reader to 
keep it secret also suggest that the predestination controversy was well under way when 
Gottschalk wrote his Quaestiones.336 It seems likely that Gottschalk acquired his traducianism 
through his ideas on predestination rather than the other way around.  
Secondly, in order to make traducianism itself best understood, Gottschalk introduced 
the idea of seeds of the soul, which nearly levels the human soul with the rest of living nature 
and introduces some technical problems. Therefore Gottschalk needs a special divine volition 
for the existence of each and every human being so that it merits God’s special ‘moral’ 
predestination. Compared to Augustine, Gottschalk’s approach leads to a focus on the 
individual, whereas the individual was never a special concern for Augustine. This is in line with 
Gottschalk’s views of ‘moral’ double predestination, which focusses on the individual as well. 
Double predestination shows that each individual human being has a determined fate, as 
opposed to Augustine’s predestination, which only deals generally with God’s gratuitous election 
of the saved from the mass of damned humanity.337  
 
 
 
 
 
335 e.g. ench. 103 with the exegesis of I Tim 2.4 Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri. cf. BA 9, note 48, 409-11. James 
Wetzel (2001), 49 rightly talks about Augustine’s doctrine of predestination as being encapsulated by the definition 
in persev. 14.35 (Haec est praedestinatio sanctorum, nihil aliud: praescientia scilicet, et praeparatio beneficiorum dei, quibus certissime 
liberantur, quicumque liberantur.), which only talks about the elect, not of the damned. The fact that if you are not a 
saint, you are a member of the massa perditionis is for Wetzel not so much part of the doctrine, but its ‘dark corollary’. 
I would maintain, however contentious, that the effects of the doctrine are pessimistic, nasty and grim, but that the 
doctrine itself is about the people who are indeed saved, however few they may be. The one who tried to make the 
corollary into doctrine would be Gottschalk.  
336 e.g. the following -which I find telling- after the quote of note 334 Gottschalk follows up (291): 
Namque cum dominus de duobus loquens atque de quinqui passeribus dicat: Et unus ex illis non cadit super terram sine patre 
vestro et sine voluntate patris vestri, valde ridiculum prorsus id censui si vel coniciatur nedum dicatur a quovis tenuiter ne dico 
mediocriter acuto vel astuto, instar avivum vel more brotorum animantium semper aequaliter animatum semen humanum fusum fundi 
simul atque fusum iri. 
‘For because the Lord, speaking about two and five sparrows, says, ‘One of them does not fall to the earth without 
your father’ (and without your father willing it), I thought it very silly indeed if anyone were to interpret this, (much 
less say carelessly), as my saying, (without any great acuity or shrewdness), that human seed is always and invariably 
poured out and is going to be poured out, after the fashion of birds or in the manner or brute creatures.’  
Gottschalk apparently earlier aired his views in some way and had to defend himself against all kinds of criticisms. 
This would explain both the straw man argument that he sets up in the last paragraph and his request for secrecy of 
the letter.  
337 cf. Schrimpf (1982), 839. 
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4.5.3 Materialistic tendencies 
 
Another consequence of Gottschalk’s views is that he widens Augustine’s special 
relationship between God and the human soul proper to God and the composite of human body 
and soul. The reason why Gottschalk is forced to do this is that his biblical evidence speaks 
about shutting up and opening wombs. Gottschalk reads this evidence literally, having to do with 
the human body and physical process of conception and childbirth. Therefore he posits 
materialistic seeds of the soul. Consequently, he has to state that there is a one-to-one 
relationship between body and soul so that no soul gets lost in the process of intercourse 
(spilling of seeds) without conception or ‘premature’ death of the father (before the sowing of 
the relevant seeds). But it is worth noting that this is a step which is not necessary in the first 
place; Augustine might have read Gottschalks biblical ‘closing’ and ‘opening’ of wombs as a 
metaphor and it is perfectly possible to think of some way of transmitting the soul through the 
generations without tying it up to a material seed. The real problem lies with the mysterious 
connection between the human soul and the body. As long as one has not reached some view on 
the nature of this connection, a traducianist does not have to vex himself with the relatively 
minor problems of the technical nature of transmitting the soul through the generations. 
Augustine might have said that Gottschalk here is still fighting to open his spiritual eyes and rid 
himself of any materialism of the soul.  
Regarding the material seeds of the soul one may remark that therefore this is a step that 
Augustine would never take, since it would provide a possible breach in the barrier he erected 
against any materialism of the soul. If one reviews the concepts of material seeds of the soul, 
traducianism (through which universality of original sin is easily plausible) and ‘negative’ 
predestination, one can see that although the connections between these concepts are not 
necessary, they do form a powerful explanatory scheme. The question whether the soul has a 
precursor and the question what God’s justification is for condemnation of the soul, are 
fundamentally different. But coupled through traducianism the soul seeds explain the 
transmitting of souls through the generations and the transmitting of souls explains Gods 
justifiable punishment of all souls from the first one. However, at a cost! The bodies of human 
beings are material and their seeds for the soul as well. The scheme becomes more powerful still 
if one would posit a material soul in the first place. Augustine would be abhorred by 
Gottschalk’s way of thinking. Augustine breaks this possible scheme with the idea that 
everybody has sinned in Adam, traducianism or not, no materialistic tendencies needed.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Gottschalk is thoroughly rooted in Augustine’s concepts. The problem of the origin of 
the soul, the universality of original sin, traducianism versus creationism (not to mention the 
parts on the nature of the soul, which are partly totally quoted from Augustine, or Augustine as 
described by Gregory) are ideas that he all treats with the understanding one has about those 
from Augustine’s texts. But he draws his very own contrary-to-Augustine implications. If the 
Carolingians displayed a ‘growing self-awareness’ and ‘intellectual confidence’, this text is a 
perfect example.338 Gottschalk is not afraid to draw his own conclusions, and knows where he 
departs from Augustine. But, at the same time, Gottschalk also poses himself as the dispenser of 
Augustine’s authority. I cannot help but feel that the whole history of the an. et or. in the 
introduction is meant as a show off of his own mastery of Augustine. In this respect the use of 
an. quant. 31 is telling. In the grey area of correct use of a text, Gottschalk chooses to highlight 
his intimate knowledge Augustine339, brushing over that this is the exact point where he uses 
Augustine himself to break through Augustine’s problems of the origin of the soul, with the 
result described in the previous paragraph. As much as Gottschalk is formed by Augustine, he 
appropriates him for his own purposes in a way that could not be noted in Cassiodorus or 
Eugippius. 
 
338 Otten (2001), 66. 
339 cf. the trivia of the history of the an. et or. in the beginning of the text and the circumstances of the experiment of 
the worm note 332. 
 Chapter 5. John Scott Eriugena and the 
will to sin. 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
5.1.1 Preliminary remarks. 
 
In 851 John Scott wrote his De divina praedestinatione liber (hence div. praed.) in order to 
refute Gottschalk’s idea of a double predestination.340 As the title suggests, the main focus of 
Scott’s work is not the soul, but predestination. The work in which Scott explicitly and 
systematically deals with the soul is the Periphyseon. Yet for a number of reasons the De divina 
praedestinatione liber fits better in the focus of my present enquiry. The Periphyseon provides material 
enough to merit a full study, and indeed, such a study has been written.341 Moreover, the focus of 
this enterprise is a review of the reception of Augustine’s ideas on the soul. The emerging line is 
that the ontology of the soul became tied up with the propagation of original sin via 
traducianism or creationism. It therefore stands to reason to review Eriugena’s De praedestinatione 
in order to see how he acquitted himself of this task. In this work Eriugena was thus developing 
his thoughts in a polemical way against Gottschalk, much as Augustine would develop his 
thoughts in de multiple intellectual battles he fought during his life. Even if Eriugena was 
building a model of the human being in his head, as I will argue in this chapter, Eriugena did not 
mean this work as a definitive summa of his outlook on the world. Moreover, Eriugena's ideas 
would change to a great extent in the Periphyseon, due to the incorporation of Greek texts in his 
thought. This would introduce changes into Eriugena's ideas on nous and it would have its effects 
on Eriugena's anthropology. This chapter therefore needs to read in the historical context in 
 
340 To reiterate, this work was not written specifically against Gottschalk’s Questiones de anima from the previous 
chapter. In fact, according to Madec’s index auctorum the Questiones de anima were not used at all by Eriugena for the 
composition of this text. 
341 Otten (1991). 
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which the div. praed. was written, wich is as a polemic, commissioned by Hincmar, against 
Gottschalk's ideas on predestination. 
In a birdseye view, Eriugena’s overall strategy is to change the discussion on 
predestination from an anthropocentric to a theocentric perspective.342 His main point is that 
God is simple.343 From this position the other consequences follow: 1) God did not deliver an 
opus bipertitum of double predestination. Even if God permits the non-elect to pursue their road 
to damnation, his will and direction towards salvation are one and simple. 2) There is no 
difference between divine will and divine omniscience, or in this case, divine prescience. God’s 
foreknowledge was causing trouble, since even if God as an eminently good being cannot wish 
people a bad fate, his foreknowledge of their end would still necessitate it. John Scott’s argument 
is that ‘prescient’ is an inaccurate predicate if substantially applied to a being outside of time. Yet 
one might say that God’s omniscience still necessitates the fate of the non-elect. Eriugena’s 
answer to this is that sin turns the human soul from God and makes it tend toward nothingness, 
it ‘unforms’ the soul. Knowledge can only be of beings, all of which eventually have their origin 
in God. God can therefore not have knowledge as such of the damnation of human beings. The 
‘origin’ of the fate of the damned lies in the free will of the human being, when it operates 
without or contrary to God’s intention. It is the human will which drives the human soul away 
towards nothingness, which God by his very nature cannot necessitate and therefore cannot be 
held responsible for not know.  
 
When it comes to the human soul, it is therefore the will which holds a main interest for 
Eriugena. Let us see how this is reflected in the way that he uses Augustine when talking about 
the soul. Given that the use of Augustine is one of the issues at stake in the whole predestination 
debate of the ninth century, it is not surprising that Augustine is very present throughout the 
whole of the work. Scott uses many and varied works of Augustine, which date mainly from the 
early and middle periods of his career, the civ. (412-27) and corrept. (426-7) being the notable 
exceptions. Yet, when we look at the instances where Scott uses a citation of Augustine in which 
the soul is explicitly mentioned, there are but three sources: the vera rel. (391), the lib. arb. (387-
 
342 cf. Otten (2001), 78-80, apart from the numerous more specialised articles which have appeared on John Scot’s 
use of Augustine in the De divisione naturae. 
343 Gottschalk in his Confessio prolixior (Lambot, 59) had used the axiom that God is simple to deny Hrabanus’ and 
Hincmars’ differentiation between God’s predestination (only for the elect) and God’s prescience (also of the 
damned). Gottschalk drew the implication that prescience equals predestination so that predestination has to be 
double. Eriugena used the same axiom against Gottschalk to deny the possibility of a doubleness of predestination, 
as will be shortly shown. Both used the axiom dialectically for their own purposes, but one might say that Eriugena’s 
logics are the most ‘pure’. cf. Stanciu (2005), 40; Madec (1977), 189. 
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395), and the c. ep. Man. (397?). These are all anti-Manichean works and therefore congenial with 
Eriugena’s aim in his De praedestinatione. After all the main point of difference between the 
Manichees and Augustine (after his rejection of Manicheism) is their interpretation of evil. 
Augustine, in line with Neo-Platonism, rejected the evil God of the Manichees in favour of an 
undivided benign God and an origin of evil in the free will. In the vera rel. Augustine was 
concerned to show how God as ‘the one’ (unum) is the source of all being and that the human 
being should return to that source.344 And in the lib. arb. Augustine offers a theodicy by showing 
how human beings possess a free will and how this free will is responsible for sin.345 
Furthermore, it is striking that books 7 and 10 of the Gn. litt. are not used in the de div. praed.346, 
just as ep. 66 (and the other ones). All these texts of Augustine are relevant for the propagation 
of the soul, and we are bound to conclude that Eriugena’s considerations of the soul will be very 
different from what we have observed in Eugippius and Gottschalk. In order to investigate 
Eriguena’s ideas on the soul the div. praed. one might take to Madec’s index and look at all the 
instances of Eriugena’s use of anima (‘soul’ as life giving principle) and animus (‘rational soul’ or 
‘mind’) and see how they figure. Are they are used by Eriugena himself and if so with what 
meaning, or are they quoted from Augustine, and if so from which text?347 But Eriugena also 
 
344 cf. Lössl (2007), 20-5.  
345 cf. retr. 1.9.1.  
346 Scott uses the majority of the Gn. litt. in the div. praed. Together with chapters 7 and 10, chapers 5, 9 and 12 are 
‘missing’. 
347 animus might not be the first term to look for when one investigates the ontological discourse of the soul, since it 
refers more to the activities of the soul (memory, will, understanding and such) than the ontological arguments 
about the mode of existence of the soul per se, for which the term anima would be used. However, in Eriugena’s 
case, the term animus would be as valid, since, as will be seen in this chapter, he assigns an ontological role to will 
(voluntas) in the div. praed. Should one use Madec’s index for such an approach, one would find the following for 
direct quotations: 
 The instances where the term anima is used in direct quotation are nearly all from the vera rel. (except one 
from the c. ep. Man.), while the quotations with the term animus are nearly all taken from the lib. arb. (except one 
from the c. ep. Man.). These are the following citations: 
 
Augustine  Eriugena  
c. ep. Man. 27.29 10.62-71 animus 
 35.39 10.71-88  anima 
    
lib. arb. 1.11.21-2 6.34-64 all animus 
 1.16.34-5 6.69-81  
 2.18.48 7.40-67  
 2.19.50 7.68-80  
    
vera. rel. 11.21-12.23 16.176-210 all anima 
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included in his div. praed. an explicit anthropology over the course of chapters 4-8. I have chosen 
to focus on these chapters (and chapter 16 on sin) since it seems more relevant to understand 
Eriugena’s arguments about the human being and how they serve in the context of the whole of 
the text, than to focus on only the use of the term and how it figures in quotations.  
 
5.1.2. Structure of De praedestinatione 
 
At the basis of Gottschalk’s and Eriugena’s different views on predestination lay a 
fundamentally different conception of the human being. Their disagreement was over what 
drives the human being to action. According to Schrimpf, Gottschalk saw the human action 
after the Fall as being completely caused by urges (being affected by concupiscentia), which can 
only lead to sin.348 The function of grace is to block an urge from causing a sin. In this view 
human beings were heterogeneous beings, who are not able to control their own actions. Against 
this Eriugena was to defend the human being as an autonomous and being with free will.349 The 
will therefore had pride of place in his treatment of the human being as done in his De 
praedestinatione.  
Eriugena used two approaches350 with which he denounced Gottschalk’s ideas on 
predestination and the human being, namely philosophy and ‘faith’ (fides). Eriugena believed that 
true faith equals true philosophy, explicitly invoking Augustine’s authority on this point with a 
quotation from vera rel. 5.8, yet these two approaches lead to two different parts in the div. 
praed.351 Philosophy deals with logical reasoning352, and through an analysis of the term 
 
 14.27 5.216-35  
 20.38-9 16.137-75  
 23.44 17.104-16  
 41.77 17.116-120  
 
348 Schrimpf (1982), 823-4. This might come as a shock, since this has not at all been established in the previous 
chapter. However, this assessment is not made on the basis of Gottschalk’s Questiones de anima. Unfortunately 
Schrimpf does not seem to deem it necessary to provide annotation for his findings, other than for the one 
paraphrase of Gottschalk he gives from the De praedestinatione. For the rest he rests assured by mentioning Lambot’s 
edition of Gottschalk’s theological opuscles, but he also mentions his Schrimpf (1980), 164-74. 
349 Schrimpf (1982), 825, 840 argues that the benefit of Gottschalk’s view is that he could explain how one human 
being was saved, while another was not. For this he had to trade off the autonomy of the human being. Hraban, 
Hincmar and Eriugena were not prepared to accept the moral lethargy which they perceived this tradeoff to have, 
but therefore also lost the ability to show why one particular human being was saved, but not the other. 
Predestination is however not the first focus of this chapter.  
350 cf. Schrimpf (1982), 834, 853-57.   
351 1.1.4-16 for philosohpy and 4.3.55-8 for faith. cf. Madec (1977), 184.  
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‘predestination’ Eriugena reasons on logical grounds against Gottschalk in chapters 2 and 3 that 
predestination cannot be double. From chapter 4 onwards Eriugena uses faith. The method used 
here is ‘that kind of reasoning which is called apodeictic’ (illa rationis specie quae dicitur 
ΑΠΟΔΙΚΤΙΚΗ). It would be interesting to know where Eriugena derives the term ‘apodeixis’ 
(‘showing’, ‘proof’, ‘demonstration’) from since the word illa suggests a specific source (it is 
itself apodeictic so to say), but Madec does not enlighten on this point.353 Eriugena himself does 
not further specify himself what he means by this. But it is clear that with the ‘apodeictic 
method’ Eriugena shows what the proper views are on the basis of religious authority, be it 
Scripture or patres, primarily Augustine. Moreover the (re)interpretation of modes of speech of 
Scripture and the patres as metaphors or figures of speech play a major part in Eriugena’s 
argument (chapter 9 explicitly deals with figures of speech and the necessity for using them for 
the divine).354 A significant example of such a reinterpretation can be found in Augustine’s 
formulation ad eorum damnationem quos iuste praedestinavit (‘for the damnation of those whom he 
justly predestined [to punishment]’) in Ench. 26.100. In chapter 12.2.22-43 Eriugena explained 
that it was a figure of speech and had to be understood e contrario.355 A telling difference between 
the two approaches of reason (logic) and faith (apodeictic) can be seen in Eriugena’s rejection of 
Augustine’s idea that God prepares before the start of time what he would do later.356 In chapter 
2.2.31-37 Eriugena draws the inference (colligitur) that if God alone existed before creation and 
prepared, his predestination existed before creation too, so that no difference can be made 
between God himself and God’s action of predestination.357 In chapter 9.6 he rejects the same 
 
352 1.1.18-27 through the quadrivium of philosohpy of divisoria (dividing one into many, i.e. logical anaysis), diffinitiva 
(determining one among many, i.e. deffinition), demonstrativa (to the hidden through the manifest, i.e. deduction) and 
resolutiva (from compound to simples, i.e. induction). On this fourfold division cf. madec (1977), 6; Schrimpf (1982), 
854-6, and Stock (1980), 88 on the idea of a ‘fourfold plan as interpretative activity’.  
353 Ganz (1981), 292, points to Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae 17.5.5. (rev. ed. G. Goold 1952) Argumenta autem censebat 
aut probabilia esse debere aut perspicua et minime controversa, idque ‘apodixin’ vocari dicebat, cum ea quae dubia aut obscura sunt, per 
ea quae ambigue non sunt inlustrantur. ‘Furthermore, he thought that arguments ought to be either convincing, or clear 
and not open to controversy, and he said that the term ‘apodixis’ or ‘demonstration’, was properly used only when 
things that are doubtful or obscure are made plain through things about which there is no doubt.’ transl. John 
Rolfe.) The term ‘apodeixis’ is indeed defined in this quotation, however, for the purposes of understanding 
Eriugena, it does not elucidate how this makes an argument based on logic differ from a demonstration based on 
authority. What is for example the difference between apodeixis and the logical ‘species’ demonstrativa? However, the 
difference between Eriugena’s two approaches also has to be sought in the negative character of the logical one 
(rejecting Gottschalk through ‘pure‘ reasoning) and the positive character of the ‘authoritative‘ one (showing what in 
fact is the case on the basis of proper authority). This negative approach hardly merits the name ‘demonstration’.  
354 cf. Madec (1977), 184: ‘...le De praedestinatione est, à ma connaissance, l’un des rares essais de critique du langage ou 
du discours théologique.’; Stock, ‘In search of Eriugena’s Augustine’, esp. 89-90. Since we are dealing with the 
anthropology in this chapter, the methapors and figures of speech Eriugena uses, deal with interpreting Augustine’s 
texts in a favourable manner. They are not used to approach the content matter (the will) as such, since it is not 
divine but part of creation. 
355 cf. 15.7.142-55 for Eriugena’s explanation of the figure antiphrasis. cf. Stanciu (2005), 56-7. 
356 e.g. persev. 17.41, cited by Eriugena in 11.7.174-181 and persev. 18.47. 
357 2.2.31-7. 
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notion by explaining that the terms ‘predestination’ and ‘preparation’ can only be used of God as 
a metaphor (...verba significativa...translative proferri sunt).358  
However, the differences between chapters 1-3 and 4-19 are not set in stone. For it is not 
to say that Eriugena does not employ authority or reinterpretation on the basis of figures of 
speech in the first three chapters, nor uses logical devises in the later chapters. But authority is 
not the basis from which Eriugena argues in these first chapters, rather a supporting argument. 
Authority has a different function in these later chapters, namely as the basis from which 
Eriugena proceeds, and this is reflected in the higher frequency of the authority, the increased 
length and specificity. Eriugena is wont to use more direct and longer quotations. Vice versa 
Eriugena uses logical devises (such as the ‘method of conversion’ (conversione) in chapter 12.1, i.e. 
the establishment of the bi-implication in a definition by switching the terms) in later chapters. 
But Eriugena uses these logical devices to interpret authority. It would therefore be too much to 
claim that Eriugena used altogether different methods. Rather he used two different approaches. 
When it comes to the content of these later chapters Eriugena presents Gottschalk’s 
theory of double predestination as a combination of the worst of both worlds of extreme 
Predestinationism and Pelagianism. The Predestinarians denied free will to the human being, the 
Pelagians denied the efficacy of grace. Yet both are present in this world. Free will is necessary 
for the just judgement of the human being, and to deny grace would be denying the salvation of 
the world (salus mundi).359 This may not be a fair rendering of Gottschalk’s views360, but it does set 
Eriugena up for the way he will use his apodeictic method. He will show first that free will exists 
and is responsible for sin in chapters 4-7 and then what grace is in chapter 8. Thereafter he 
shows how predestination is properly understood, chapters 9-15. Eriugena argued in these 
chapters that evil is a privation and cannot come from God as the source of being. But evil and 
punishment are understood to affect this world. So in chapters 16-19 Eriugena has to give an 
account of the way that punishment for sins is actually effected which is compatible with his 
argument from chapters 9-15. 
It is thus in chapters 4-8 that Eriugena develops his anthropology, added with chapter 16 
in which the structure of sin and punishment is described in anthropological terms.  
 
 
 
358 9.6.137-9. cf. Stanciu (2005), 57. 
359 i.e. Christ, given that this refers to Titus 2:11.  
360 Schrimpf (1982), 833 argues this interpretation of gemina praedestinatio, which was also taken by Hraban and 
Hinkmar, is faulty. 
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5.2 Philosophical Content 
 
5.2.1 Free rational will 
 
Right at the start of Eriugena’s apodeictic approach, in chapter 4, Eriugena’s task is to 
establish that the human being has a free will in order to ensure his liability for just judgement. 
In chapter 8 he distinguishes free will from grace. It is in these two chapters that Eriugena 
establishes the ‘substance’ of the human being as the will.361 When Eriugena speaks of 
‘substance’ he means the soul, which, apart from his overall usage in the text, also becomes clear 
from the definition that he gives of the human being (8.4.73-4): ‘The human being is a rational 
substance receptive of wisdom’.362 This substance has a Trinitarian structure: being, willing and 
knowing (4.6.166-9; 8.1.9-12). For Eriugena’s purposes, this means that ‘the whole nature of the 
soul is will’ (8.2.1-2). The rationality of this substance is guaranteed by the fact that the human 
being is created in the image and likeness of God (4.5.160-4).  
So far so good, but it is essential for Eriugena to maintain that the will is free. Just as the 
human will was created rational in God’s likeness, it was also created free (4.5.160-4). A rational 
will also implies a free will (4.5.157-60; 8.5.107-8), so that the freedom is substantially part of the 
will (4.6.173-5). The freedom of the will is also recognised in the universal desire for happiness 
(4.6.180-3; 5.4.98-101; 5.7.142-5). Freedom of the will means that there is no external cause 
which compels the will (5.4.88-98). 
 
Augustine figures heavily in Eriugena’s account of free will. First of all Eriugena’s 
language in his account of rational free will mirrors Augustine. Madec has drawn attention how 
these reverberations aid the philosophical understanding, and on the basis of Madec’s edition, 
these instances are easily compiled.363 Eriugena’s use of rationalis vita in 4.4.105 is reminiscent of 
 
361 Aut quomodo eam divina voluntas, summa videlicet universitatis ratio, quae nulla necessitate stringitur, quoniam sua liberrima 
potentia potitur, imaginem sui similem faceret, si non eius substantiam crearet voluntatem liberam rationalem?’ ‘Otherwise how would 
the divine will, that is to say the highest reason of the universe, being unrestricted by any necessity as in the greatest freedom it possesses its 
own power, how could he make it to his own image and likeness if he did not created its substance a free rational will?’ All translations 
of the praed. are Mary Brennan’s. For the ontological meaning of substance see paragraph 5.2.5, p. 129 
362 Madec, 50 notes that he does not know this definition from elsewhere. To me it seems that this is an original 
wording of the more traditional ‘the human being is a rational animal’, with the ‘soulish’ part already translated into 
‘substance’ and wisdom added to tie the human being closer to God. Eriugena seems to have a tendency to rephrase 
things into his own words, as we shall see later with the trinity of 8.1.12 further in this paragraph. 
363Madec (1977), esp. 187-9. cf. Madec’s classification of Eriugena’s use of Augustine’s texts for his own 
composition in the same article, 186-7: 1) longer direct quotations which are signalled 2) varied anonymous 
‘emprunts textuels’ which are normally easily identifiable to the educated reader, except for some in the preface and 
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vera rel. 30.54. Another instance is the word egestas (‘poverty’, ‘want’), which Eriugena uses in 
4.5.146 for the idea that a base will impoverishes the person. Augustine uses the same word in 
vera rel. 12.23 (a will that desires inferior, i.e. mutable, things in ‘a state of want’ in egestate goes to 
hell), 20.38 (the Fall was the product of a will against truth so that the human being fell from 
eternity into time and from riches into poverty a copiosis ad egena -egenus is the adjective of the verb 
egeo from which egestas is the noun-), and 21.41 (for the fallen human being the temporal forms 
are ‘riches of poverty‘ copiosa egestas). Moreover, vera rel. 12.23 is cited verbatim by Eriugena in 
chapter 16.5.195-210. In these three cases, the word egestas has temporal overtones, and it is in 
this way that Eriugena’s impoverishment, from eternity to temporality, has to be read as well.  
Then there are certain paraphrases. In 8.1.1 iam nunc pulsanda est divina misericordia is a 
paraphrase of lib. arb. 3.2.5. This specific paraphrase merits a little more than just a listing. In the 
lib. arb. Augustine (or rather Evodius) ‘evokes’ God’s grace to open its doors wide at a very 
crucial point: how can God have foreknowledge of an evil will, but not be responsible for it? The 
overwhelming importance of this question for Eriugena’s text (and Augustine’s for that matter) 
does not have to be pointed out further. And Eriugena places it at a similarly important point in 
his text: where do we find the difference between human nature and grace? (we will go into this 
in paragraph 4). This is not a ‘random’ paraphrase, but consciously chosen at a similar point in 
Eriugena’s text, evoking Augustine; shortly after 8.2.24-5 cum enim omne bonum aut deus ipse est aut 
quicquid ab eo est is a paraphrase from lib. arb. 3.13.36 and vera rel. 18.35. In 4.5.147-8 Ars igitur ipsa 
per quam facta sunt omnia is a paraphrase of lib. arb. 3.15.42. The distinction between uti and frui is 
made, albeit not extensively, in 4.5.138-40 (God gave the will to the human being in order to use 
uti it well to enjoy frui him). This distinction cannot only be found in doctr. chr. 1.3-4; 1.37), but 
also in div. qu. 30.364 This last work at least was used more often for the composition of the divina 
praed.365   
Apart from these resoundings of Augustine’s language in Eriugena’s writing, Eriugena 
also takes some themes from Augustine for his account of free will. The Trinitarian structure in 
4.6 esse, velle, scire can be taken from Conf. 13.11.12. Madec states that he cannot find the 
 
first chapter 3) locutions loosely inspired on Augustine’s formulae and theses. Especially these last come into play 
here.  
364 cf. Chadwick ‘Frui’, AL vol. 3, 70-5. Madec does not note this as having its source in Augustine, but to me this 
seems to be the case. Madec probably thought it was so well known that it was commonplace. 
365 Madec in his index auctorum does not list the doctr. chr. but lists the div. qu. with 28 in chapter 2.1.10-4, and 2, 4, 
and 51 in chapter 3.6.175-6. Of these only the first one is ‘certifiably’ used. The last three are more ‘thematic 
intersections’. Eriugena shows how the commandment of ‘double love’ does not divide love as ‘double’ 
predestination does not divide predestination itself. div. qu. 2 deals with the justice of the gift of free will, 4 with the 
cause of human perversity, and 51 with the creation of the human being in the image and likeness of God.  
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Trinitarian structure from 8.1, essentia, voluntas, scientia, in Augustine.366 The problem is that 
Eriugena here explicitly evokes Augustine’s authority (sancto Augustino credimus). However, this 
problem is solved if we recognise the substantive forms in the second Trinitarian structure taken 
from the infinitives of the first. It is true, however, that the substantive form cannot be found in 
Augustine, and this may serve as a first sign that Eriugena internalised Augustine’s abstract 
structures and treated them creatively. 
Another theme is the universal search for happiness. This comes back in 4.6.180-3 (every 
unhappy sinner desires happiness), 5.4.98-101 (desire for happiness after the Fall is a sign of free 
will in human nature), and 5.7.142-5 (no one wants to live unhappy, which would be impossible 
if the will is subject to compulsion). The universality of the desire for happiness is a common 
theme in Augustine. Again the lib. arb. springs to mind. Madec lists lib. arb. 1.14.30 (everyone 
wants to live happy, but not everyone wants to live rightly, so that some are unhappy) and 2.9.26 
(everyone pursues happiness, but some stray from the path of wisdom, which is happiness). This 
universal desire in lib. arb. may only be implicitly connected with natural freedom (but present 
since without free will we could not set out on our own paths towards happiness). But this step 
is set by Augustine, however in c. Iul. imp. 6.11 and 6.12, where Augustine explicitly interprets the 
liberty of the will in having a right or a wrong will and identifies the will with what we use to live 
happily (6.11 nam si, ut dicis, boni malique voluntarii possibilitas sola libertas est, non habet libertatem deus, 
in quo peccandi possibiitas non est. 6.12 Immutabilis autem cum qua home creatus est et creatur, illa libertas est 
voluntatis, qua beati esse omnes volumus, et nolle non possumus. 
 
It shows that the lib. arb. and vera rel. figure heavily in Eriugena, not only in his direct 
citations (cf. note 347) but also in the themes Eriugena chooses and resoundings in his language. 
A more abstract analysis of Eriugena’s use of the lib. arb. and vera rel. for his anthropology is 
therefore necessary.  
 
 
5.2.2 Forcing Augustine to free will  
 
But what has to be focussed on first is the way in which Eriugena speaks about this will. 
His arguments for the freedom of the will even after the Fall, which were treated above, amount 
 
366 note 9/19, 48. Madec’s edition, however, is of course of great quality, and without it this chapter would not have 
been written. This does remind one, however, of Madec’s own ‘D’autres développements si’inspirent, en revanche, 
de manière plus libre de formules et de thèses augustiniennes.’ from (1977), 187. 
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to the idea that free will is part of the substance, the nature of the human being, and is therefore 
inalienable. ‘For, although by sinning, he cast away the life of happiness, he did not lose his 
substance which is to be, to will, to know’. And ‘If we say it was free will he had [lost], then he 
lost his nature. But if reason points out that no nature can perish, we are forbidden to say that he 
lost free will, which without doubt is a substance.’ 367 What the human being lost after the Fall is 
not the freedom of the will, but the ‘strength and the power of free choice’ (vigor et potestas liberi 
arbitrii) which was not in the nature of the human being, but from the grace of God.368  
Eriugena backs this up in 4.7.190-208 with Augustine’s authority, with a quotation taken 
from persev. 7.13-4.369 And indeed Augustine says there that after the Fall the human being needs 
grace in order to come to God and stay with him, since it is no longer in the ‘power of free 
choice’ (in viribus liberi arbitrii). But these two paragraphs of the persev. treat grace, and are not at 
all suited to Eriugena’s task of showing how free will is anchored substantially in the human 
being. Worse, Eriugena is aware that Augustine might actually not be on his side on this one. He 
therefore offers the potentially most explosive quote from Augustine for him to defuse. He picks 
the following sentence from ench. 9.30: ‘Misusing his free choice, the human being lost both himself and 
it’370 and comments that Augustine here meant to say that Adam did not lose his substance, his 
nature, but ‘changed it into an inferior thing’ (sed eam [naturam] in inferius mutavit).  
This reinterpretation boils down to an outright aggravated violation of the ench.371 
Augustine exactly wants to say that with the Fall the human being lost his free will. The ench. 
continues with -and it is not strange that Eriugena chose his quote from it rather selectively- : 
‘For as a man who kills himself is still alive when he kills himself, but having killed himself is 
then no longer alive and cannot resuscitate himself after he has destroyed his own life--so also 
sin which arises from the action of the free will turns out to be victor over the will and the free 
will is destroyed. “By whom a man is overcome, to this one he then is bound as slave." (2 Petr. 
 
367 4.6.166-8 Quamvis enim beatam vitam peccando perdidit, substantiam suam non amisit quae est esse, velle, scire. 172-5. Si 
dixerimus liberam voluntatem [quam perdidit post peccatum], perdidit igitur suam naturam. Si autem ratio edocet nullam naturam 
posse perire, prohibemur dicere liberam voluntatem perdidisse, quae sine dubio substantialis est. 
368 4.6.185-6, vs. Stanciu (2005), 64. 
369 Schrimpf would probably call this ‘divine authority’, in concordance with Eriugena’s method of first giving 
Scriptural evidence before the patres and seeing how Augustine in this quotation speaks about the Lord’s Prayer. 
However, Schrimpf can also not deny that this piece of divine authority is molded in the words of Augustine. Cf. 
Madec 32 for an omission of ‘et’ from Augustine in Eriugena’s text.  
370 Nam libero arbitrio male utens home et se perdidit et ipsum. 
371 O’Meara (1977), 193 might say that this would not be undeserved: ‘If Augustine had such marked fondness for 
so benignly interpreting doctrine of an opponent inconvenient to him [in e.g. the civ. and acad.], one is perhaps 
justified in raising the question if Augustine himself gives grounds on occasion for equally benign interpretation of 
himself?’ Stock (1980), 97 goes somewhat further: ‘Perhaps the highest compliment Eriugena pays to the bishop of 
Hippo [in the Periphyseon] is the attribution to him of tenets nowhere found in his works.’ 
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2:19) This is clearly the judgment of the apostle Peter. And since it is true, I ask you what kind of 
liberty can one have who is bound as a slave except the liberty that loves to sin?’372  
The liberty left to the human being in this further text of the ench. 9.30 is the liberty of a 
slave. It is therefore questionable whether Augustine would agree with Eriugena’s conception of 
the substantial freedom of the will. But Eriugena tries to convince his readers by lumping the 
two, substance and free will, together. No one, including Augustine would say that Adam after 
the Fall is no longer the same substance, i.e. a human being. But this does not mean that the 
freedom of the will is therefore guaranteed; that is what Eriugena wants us to believe. In other 
words, does the ‘inferior thing’ that we have become after the Fall retain the freedom of the will 
or not for Augustine? Is Eriugena on this point in contradiction with Augustine, or could there 
be grounds for Eriugena to think that Augustine is on his side and that he is only interpreting or 
systematizing him?  
What thus does Augustine mean when he says that the human being lost both himself 
and free will through bad use of the latter? On the face of it, this is one of the more intricate 
questions in Augustine, and it would take Rist the better part of his Augustine to answer.373 This is 
not the time nor place to embark on another full scale investigation of Augustine’s oeuvre, so 
under Rist’s lead I will try to make a shortcut and give the bare essentials in this paragraph. The 
statement in the ench. is made by the very mature Augustine, around 421, so it is the views of the 
mature Augustine which come to bear here. They are that Adam had an unfailing moral compass 
which allowed him not to sin (posse non peccare; civ. 22.30, corrept. 12.33). However, he did, and the 
human being through that first sin lost access to the unfailing moral compass.374 In other words, 
the human being loosened his direct tie to the truth in which image he was created, so that after 
the Fall we are prone to take sensory images of things as the things themselves and produce 
fictions about them, misguiding our actions (mor. 1.21.38; ‘we now see through a glass darkly’ 
trin. 14.5.23). However it is far from the case that whenever we do see the truth, we act upon it. 
We may see the truth and decide and want the right course of action, but when push comes to 
shove not do it (conf. 8.10.22). And worse, we have come to want things or goals we ourselves 
know to be bad, so that we even have conflicting wills (conf. 8.9.21). The will in other words is no 
longer in our power (civ. 14.15). Therefore we have not only lost knowledge of the external 
world, but also have become partly incomprehensible to ourselves. Who (apart from God) 
 
372 transl. Albert Outler. Sicut enim qui se occidit, utique vivendo se occidit, sed se occidendo non vivit, nec se ipsum poterit ressuscitare 
cum occiderit, ita cum libero peccaretur arbitrio, victore peccato amissum est liberum arbitrium; A quo enim quis devictus est huis 
et servus addictus est (2 Petr. 2:19). Petri certe apostoli est ista sententia, quae cum vera sit, qualis, quaeso, potest servi addicti esse 
libertas, nisi quando eum peccare delectat? 
373 Rist (1994), 29-202.  
374 idem, 130-1. 
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knows what we will do in the future? Our memory thereby lost coherence even further. Not only 
do we not know who we are by having conflicting wills in the present, but our memory can also 
no longer connect (‘distend itself to’) our past, present and future as it was supposed to.375 Our 
humanity as once created and our personal identity have thus been shattered, we do not 
understand ourselves anymore.376 We lost both ourselves and our will through the first sin. The 
wages of sin is death (Rom. 6.23), but before our death we have already been weakened 
considerably. The result of our ignorance of truth and our weak will is that we are ever liable to 
sin. We are in a state of concupiscence (concupiscentia in civ. 14).377 A sign of this is that the 
instrument that we were supposed to have full control over now takes on movements of its own. 
Our bodies have become partly autonomous from our souls, as can be seen in the involuntary 
male erection (conf. 10.28.39; Gn. litt. 9.10.18). As a result, in this life even for the saints it is 
impossible not to sin in at least some small measure (non posse non peccare). All our misery thus 
started out with our loss of access to the truth and willingness to act upon it. Real freedom thus 
is not to do what we please, but to be subject to truth, as Augustine already said in the lib. arb. 
2.13.37.378 We are therefore more free in the measure in which we manage to overcome our 
inhibitions and limitations towards that truth (civ. 14.11), which we can only fully reach after our 
demise, so that we will not only be re-created into Adam, but into something better, for we will 
no longer be able to sin (non posse peccare).  
Eriugena thus was certainly right when he claimed that Adam changed into something 
inferior, but certainly wrong with his implication that Augustine thereby meant that the human 
being kept his free will. Shattered and inhibited, the will limps along and is unfree to actually find 
truth and right action unless supported by grace.  
 
 
5.2.3 Reading the lib. arb. through Eriugena’s lens  
 
Yet is it not possible to make a case for Eriugena’s ideas on the basis of the lib. arb.? We 
have seen after all how much inspiration he takes from this text. It would not only prove to be 
 
375 cf. idem, 139. 
376 I know no better literary expression of this than Augustine’s own conf. 10.16.25: ‘ Assuredly, Lord, I labour here 
and I labour within myself; I have become to myself a land of trouble and inordinate sweat.’ Ego certe, domine, laboro 
hic et laboro in me ipso: factus sum mihi terra difficultatis et sudoris nimii. This quotation has been made ‘famous’ through 
Heideggers’ use of it in Sein und Zeit 1.1.9.43-4. 
377 cf. Rist (1994), 135-8, Bonner, ‘concupiscentia’, AL, 1116. 
378 cf. Rist (1994), 132. 
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an indication yet again of the importance of the lib. arb., but also show that Eriugena actually 
read other texts of Augustine through the lens (or rather his lens) of the lib. arb. I believe that a 
case for Eriugena can be constructed from especially the beginning of book three. The beginning 
of this book has special relevance for Eriugena since it discusses how the prescience of God 
does not necessitate the individual human will, what sinning and its effects are and how sinning 
souls fit in the order of the universe.  
 
 
5.2.3.1 Does freedom mean control of the will? 
 
One of the main points of the lib. arb. in this discussion, and in fact of the lib. arb. overall, 
is the idea that what we have most control over in our lives is our will itself, an opinion that 
Augustine would later abandon.379 Does this control imply a freedom of the will? That rather 
depends on the concept of freedom one adheres to. We have seen that Augustine’s conception 
of freedom is ‘free from limitations’. Augustine would thus answer negatively, since even in our 
greatest power the human being encounters limitations (Eriugena does not disagree with this). 
But Eriugena adheres to a different conception of freedom. Eriugena thinks of freedom as ‘free 
from compulsion through an external cause’.380 Freedom for Eriugena means not being forced or 
motivated externally, being self-moved instead of ‘bumped along’ like a billiard ball colliding with 
other balls. And this kind of freedom disregards however broken or faulty we may be inside. 
Eriugena chose this different conception of freedom through his commitment to individual 
responsibility. That calls for this staunch defence of the freedom of the will that is being 
scrutinised here. It implies for Eriguena that God cannot drive the human being to thought or 
action. Neither to the bad through his foreknowledge, but then in equal measure also not to the 
good through grace.381 If grace can sometimes seem a sufficient cause for good action or thought 
in the late Augustine, it has a much diminished causal efficacy in Eriugena, where it can only 
serve as a necessary but not sufficient cause. In other words, God can provide the individual 
 
379 In similar, almost formulaic wording in: 1.12.26 Quid enim tam in voluntate quam ipsa voluntas est? and 3.3.7 Quapropter 
nihil tam in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas est. 
380 5.4.86-98, specifically 88-93: Ubi intendendum est nullius voluntatis esse veram libertatem, si aliqua causa eam coegerit. Igitur si 
humanam voluntatem aliqua causa praecedit, qua eam invitam extorqueat ad bona malave vel cogitanda vel agenda, sequitur non solum 
non esse eam vere liberam, sed penitus eam non esse. ‘In this matter it must be understood that there is no true freedom of 
any will if some cause has imposed compulsion. Therefore if some cause precedes a human will which by force 
compels it, though unwilling, towards good or evil thoughts or actions, it follows not only that it is not truly free but 
that it is not free at all.’  
381 cf. Stanciu (2005), 60. 
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with all the grace he wants, if the wicked individual lacks his personal good will, the good is not 
going to happen. This makes for at least a weak explanation of the Fall, for it explains partly how 
Adam could have all the grace he could wish for but still sin (but not why he actually sinned).  
If we return to the question whether internal inhibitions cause a loss of freedom of the 
will, Eriugena would answer that the individual human will can have all the inhibitions possible, 
but as long as it is not necessitated externally it remains free.382 Since the freedom of the will 
translates itself into the freedom of movement of the individual will, as we will see in the next 
paragraph, this conception of freedom as ‘free from external causation’ really is a natural 
philosophical interpretation. In lib. arb. 3.17.48-9 Augustine makes clear that the human will is 
the starting point for his investigation into the cause of sin, and that asking for the causes of the 
will itself will lead to an endless regression, which for Eriugena can only mean a confirmation of 
his thinking the will as free, since in this natural philosophical conception of freedom the will is 
its own starting point of the movement of the soul. For Eriugena eventually this is but a more 
formal way of stating that what we have most control over is our will.   
 
 
5.2.3.2 Concupiscence does not preempt free will 
 
What then are the effects of the Fall in lib. arb. and what is the place of concupiscence, 
since the later Augustine attributes the shattering and loss of freedom of the will to this? 
Augustine does not employ concupiscentia as a technical term yet and only mentions it once as 
‘carnal lust’ (carnalis concupiscentia 3.19.53, equivalent to the carnalis consuetudo in 3.18.52), although 
this is not yet to be seen as exclusively, or even predominantly sexual383, but here in the lib. arb. as 
the temptations of the delights of any of the senses. As the effects of the Fall it identifies 
ignorantia and difficultas, and concupiscentia is identified with the latter.384 This is how Augustine 
explains it:  
 
 
382 Moreover, paragraph 5.2.6, p. 132-3 will clarify that Eriugena means these inhibitions to take place on the level of 
the individual will (the individual movements of the will), not in the nature of the human will itself (the will as the 
cause of the individual movements of the will). 
383 Bonner, ‘concupiscentia’, 1113 in AL vol. I, 113-1122. 
384 lib. arb. 3.19.53 “Si Adam et Eva peccaverunt, quid nos miseri fecimus, ut cum ignorantiae caecitate et difficultatis cruciatibus 
nasceremur et primo erraremus nescientes quid nobis esset faciendum, deinde ubi nobis inciperent aperiri praecepta iustitiae, vellemus ea 
facere et retinente carnalis concupiscentiae nescio 
qua necessitate non valeremus?”’cf. Rist (1994), 135-6. 
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‘This penalty for sin is completely just: Someone loses what he was 
unwilling to use well, although he could have used it well without trouble had he 
been willing. That is, anyone who knowingly does not act rightly thereby loses the 
knowledge of what is right; and anyone who was unwilling to act rightly when he 
could thereby loses the ability when he is willing.’385  
 
According to Augustine, ignorance and the weakness of the ‘flesh’ to act upon what is 
understood as being right (difficultas) bar one from knowing what is right or acting upon that 
knowledge. Other than the later concupiscence, which is a permanent state of liability, difficultas 
here means, in Rist’s words, ‘trying and failing’ in actual cases of employment of the will.386 But 
does that impinge on -as Eriugena would say- the substantiality of free will? Augustine is 
unequivocal: ‘But to approve falsehoods as truths so that one errs against one’s will, and to not 
be able to hold oneself back from lustful actions due to the relentless and tortuous affliction of 
carnal bondage, is not human nature as originally established, but the penalty after being 
damned. When we speak of fee will to act rightly, obviously we are speaking of it as human 
beings were originally made.’387 Augustine’s implication is, even in the work in which he is 
supposed to be the most optimistic concerning free will, that after the Fall the human being no 
longer enjoys free will. But Eriugena would say that these limitations do not provide external 
constraints on the will and therefore do not restrict the will in its movement. Moreover these 
limitations concern individual human beings, but not the nature of the human being, as created 
by God, whether before or after the Fall. From Eriugena’s standpoint we always enjoy our free 
will. It is just that after the Fall we need grace as an external factor as well in order to do good. 
When we act badly it is exclusively owed to our own free will. Yet however we act, our free will 
is the starting point of the action. And, more relevantly, Augustine himself is keen to point out 
that we can still employ our will to lift us from our state of sin -wherein he does show his 
optimism-: ‘No human being has been deprived of knowing how to investigate advantageously 
matters of which it is disadvantageous to be ignorant, or the need to confess humbly his 
weakness, so that He Whose support is unerring and effortless support the person who 
 
385 lib. arb. 3.18.52. Illa est enim peccati poena iustissima, ut amittat quisque quod bene uti noluit cum sine ulla posset difficultate si 
vellet; id est autem ut qui sciens recte non facit amittat scire quid rectum sit, et qui recte facere cum posset noluit amittat posse cum velit. 
nam sunt revera omni peccanti animae duo ista poenalia, ignorantia et difficultas. All translations from the lib. arb. are Peter 
King’s. The whole of this paragraph is key for Augustine’s description of the effects of the Fall in the lib. arb.  
386 Rist (1994), 137. 
387 lib. arb. 3.18.52 Sed adprobare falsa pro veris ut erret invitus, et resistente atque torquente dolore carnalis vinculi non posse a 
libidinosis operibus temperare, non est natura instituti hominis sed poena damnati. Cum autem de libera voluntate recte faciendi 
loquimur de illa scilicet in qua homo factus est loquimur. 
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investigates and confesses.’388 And so the will may not be able to bootstrap itself out of the 
swamp of sin unaided à la von Munchhausen or as the Pelagians would have it, but an effort of 
the will is still required on the part of the human being according to Augustine. Does that not 
require the will itself to have some measure of freedom even after the Fall in at least the choice 
to accept help or not? In Eriugena’s framing of affairs: the human soul still needs to move itself, 
even if it receives help in moving in the right direction. Augustine starts 3.18.52 out saying that it 
should not be a surprise that we do not (after the Fall) have ‘free choice of the will’ (arbitrium 
liberum voluntatis). Eriugena agrees: we are hampered in our free choice (arbitrium) after the Fall 
through ignorance and difficulty. But even after the Fall the will (voluntas) itself, that one is free. 
 
 
5.2.3.3 Persistence of the sinning soul 
 
We have now seen two readings of the beginning of book three of the lib. arb. with which 
Eriugena can support his views on the substantiality of free will: the will as that over which 
human beings have most control and the effects of the Fall as external limits to the choice of 
free will, but not to free will itself. But there is a third reading that Eriugena could list as support. 
Lib. arb. 3.11.32-13.37 deals with the place of the sinning soul in the world and how it still has a 
place in the order and beauty of the universe. In this context Augustine discusses ‘corruption‘ 
(corruptio) of natures in the most general of terms in 3.13.36 in order to show detractors that 
every nature (substance) as created being is good, even if corrupted. With a reductio ad 
absurdum Augustine shows that a complete corruption of the good created being is impossible. 
For a completely corrupted good loses all its goodness and thereby becomes incorruptible. This 
would mean that a nature would be rendered incorruptible by corruption. Augustine employs 
this argument in order to show that even the sinning soul is a good. But Eriugena would take 
from this, apart from the remaining goodness of a nature, especially a confirmation of the 
persistence of being of a nature throughout corruption, in this case the human soul. The human 
being loses something in the process of corruption, but needs to retain its substance. The 
example of the slave a few paragraphs earlier 3.11.34 takes on a new meaning: ‘The rags of a 
condemned slave are vastly inferior to the clothing of a well-deserving slave held in high esteem 
by his master, yet the slave himself is better than any expensive clothes, since he is a human 
 
388 lib. arb. 3.19.53 Nulli enim homini ablatum est scire utiliter quaeri quod inutiliter ignoratur, et humiliter confitendam esse 
imbicilitatem, ut quaerenti et confitenti subveniat ille, qui nec errat dum subvenit nec laborat. 
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being.’389 Augustine uses this example to show that the soul retains a value, whether in a celestial 
or corporeal body, Eriugena can take from this that however much changed for the human being 
throughout the Fall, the soul as such remained, which in Eriugena’s terms means that the human 
being’s substance remained so that will itself is unchanged.  
These three readings of the beginning of book three may be conjectural, but they show in 
which way Eriugena on his premises well felt supported by the lib. arb. and used it with gusto. 
Once one accepts that Eriugena and Augustine employ different concepts of freedom, i.e. 
‘unconstrained by necessity/self-moving‘ versus ‘uninhibited’, one can see how Eriugena is able 
to blatantly disregard Augustine’s assertions of the loss of free will after the Fall, while still 
enlisting Augustine’s support for his overall view of the human anthropology. Moreover 
concupiscence in the lib. arb. is not so much an inner failing or shattering of the will itself, but an 
external impediment, barring rightful function of the will, but leaving the will as being intact. 
This again is in accordance with Eriugena’s conception of free will after the Fall. After reading 
the lib. arb. through this particular lens, Eriugena can consequently use the lib. arb. to interpret 
the rest of Augustine’s oeuvre.  
 
 
5.2.4 Motion of the will  
 
There are several reasons why the soul for Augustine and Eriugena can be said to have 
motion, which will turn out to be tied together in order to make a neat theodicy. A first reason is 
that the soul is mutable (thus not divine), as was the young Augustine’s argument against the 
Manicheans. This implies motion of the soul in itself. With this motion it can turn towards or 
from God. A second reason is that the prime function of the soul is to animate the body, thus 
provide it with automotion (in the traditional Aristotelian distinction between externally moved 
bodies and automotive bodies). This in itself does not provide the soul with motion. After all, if 
the soul may be compared to a hinge around which a door (the body) pivots, the hinge itself 
stays motionless.390 Yet the soul does not only serve the function of ‘motivator’ to the body. For 
the workings of the soul are self-reflexive. This can be seen in the other functions: the 
understanding can understand itself (or at least try, we are less optimistic now than Augustine, 
 
389 Pannosi quippe vestis damnati servi multo est inferior vesti bene meriti et in honore magno apud dominum constituti, sed ipse servus 
melior est qualibet veste pretiosa, quia homo est. 
390 div. qu. 8. 
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Descartes and Kant were) and memory can realise its internal space.391 The soul thus also moves 
itself or, in other words, the will can will itself. Concomitant to this is the idea in (neo)Platonism 
that thinking itself is movement of the mind (motio animi, motio mentis). In a theodicy (as the lib. 
arb. and the div. praed. essentially are) these two grounds for motion of the soul can be powerfully 
combined: if the soul moves itself, God cannot be held responsible of the bad movements (evil 
will). Then God can only be held responsible for the bare fact of creating in the first place. And 
most people rather exist and live, even if unhappy, than not at all.392 
Let us see how the motion of the will figures in Eriugena’s text. But before we come to 
the human will I would like to take a short detour via divine will. As the human being is created 
in the image and likeness of God, so that we are in a way ‘small gods’, God is supposed to 
portray on a grander scale what goes on in the human soul. Eriugena’s view of God thereby 
elucidates his argumentation for the human being. As goes for the human soul, God’s being too 
is identical to willing.393 Reminiscent of div. qu. 28 and Gen. adv. Man. 1.2.4 Eriugena makes the 
argument that since there is no thing greater than God’s will, there cannot be a cause to God’s 
will (a cause being greater than the effect). In fact God’s will is the cause of all that exists. Since 
God’s will is such a special case in nature, its powers of creation themselves not being under any 
compulsion or necessity, Eriugena gives it a special aetiological name.394 He is not a ‘necessary 
cause’ (causa necessaria)395, or a compelling396 cause (causa coactiva), but the ‘voluntary cause’ (causa 
voluntaria 4.5.134-6; 5.5.108-12).  
The human being also exhibits this voluntary cause.397 In this way the freedom of the will 
(both God’s and the human being’s) has to be understood as a special cause which stands 
outside of the normal natural order. But even if the wills of the human being and of God are 
similar, they are not equal. The freedom of the human will implies a mutability, since choices are 
made in the temporal universe, whereas God’s will is not subject to change.398 This mutability of 
the human will means movement, so that the human ‘voluntary cause’ implies a motion of the 
 
391 conf. 13.11.12; trin. 10.10.13; ibid. 10.11.18; civ. 11.26,11.28. 
392 And if you say you don’t Augustine will call you a liar. lib. arb. 3.6.18. To disagree and commit suicide is either the 
highest blasphemy Augustine could think of, or an act committed out of error.  
393 2.1.17-20. 
394 Given that we are here not in a natural philosophical world, but in an ‘ethical’, the term ‘prime mover unmoved’ 
would not do, albeit that it certainly conveys the same meaning.  
395 i.e. he is not himself necessitated. He is of course the necessary cause for something else to exist. This naming is 
a matter of perspective. 
396 Coactiva is placed opposite to libertas, e.g. in 5.7.144-5, so that the word ‘compulsion’ carries the right 
connotations.  
397 5.5.112-7. 
398 8.6.113-21. 
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human will.399 The freedom of the human will, i.e. not being compelled or necessitated 
externally, takes on the meaning: being self-moved.400  
Eriugena’s treatment of the motion of the will in 8.7-9, which falls in the context of the 
difference between nature and grace which will be treated in the next paragraph, is in its totality 
both an exposition of and a conversation with Augustine. First Eriugena has to argue more 
tightly that the human will is indeed self-moving. Could there be causes for external movement 
of the human will? If the cause is greater than the effect, the mover has to be greater than the 
moved. So yes, a greater being, i.e. God, could move the human soul, but an equal (human or 
angelic/demonic) or lesser (presumably an animal, or a lesser -i.e. less virtuous- human soul) 
could not. As far as God is concerned, Eriugena already established that if God did not create 
the will totally free, thus self-moving, there is no basis for God’s judgment of the human 
being.401 Madec here only reluctantly refers to lib. arb. 1.11.21.402 But given both the similarity of 
the argument to the lib. arb. and the other instances of Eriugena’s leanings on that text, there is 
no reason to hesitate. In Augustine the argument, of which 1.11.21 is but the conclusion and 
summary, is rather more extensive. Lib. arb. 1.7.16-1.8.18 Makes the human rational minds stand 
hierarchically above animal souls because of the human knowledge of being alive, 1.8.18-1.10.20 
places virtuous minds which govern impulses above those governed by desire, and states that in 
a virtuous mind the desire to subjugate a peer would instantly make the mind less virtuous and 
thus lesser and incapable. 1.10.21-1.11.21 establishes that God is just and therefore does not 
enslave. Of this longer argument, Eriugena takes the conclusion, not the path towards it, but to 
me there is no question of his involvement in Augustine. Eriugena’s ‘tweak‘, so to say, consists 
of underpinning the argumentation with another principle. Augustine uses the principle that 
beings of greater power have more moral value (with the consequence that the human mind 
cannot be subjugated by lesser minds or will not be subjugated by better ones). But Eriugena 
applies the principle that the cause is greater than the effect to Augustine’s argument (the will 
cannot be moved by lesser wills and will not be compelled to move by greater ones).In the 
Neoplatonic scheme of things, these principles are an expression of the same hierarchical 
universe. But this principle rather suits Eriugena better since is more suited to the natural 
philosophical context of the motion of the soul. 
 
399 5.5.112-3; 8.7.122-3. 
400 5.8.153-7; 8.7.122-3. 
401 5.8.153-7; 4.3. 
402 Madec, 52. ‘Ce raisonnement s’inspire peut-être d’Augustin’. 
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Thus Eriugena has now established that the motion of the human mind is an effect of 
the voluntary cause implanted in it by God.403 The motion the mind went through was first a 
turning towards God, then towards itself. The turning towards God and towards oneself is a 
familiar theme in Augustine, and can be found in, again, the lib. arb. (3.1.2). However, this latter 
passage seems significant for Eriugena and not only because it just is inches away from the 
‘knocking on heaven’s door‘ of 3.2.5 (which Eriugena paraphrases in this same chapter at 8.1.1 as 
we have seen). For here in the lib. arb. the turning of the soul towards or from God is explicitly 
connected with the voluntary motion of the soul. In 3.1.1-2 the discussion between Augustine 
and Evodius is about the difference between natural and voluntary motion. The downwards 
motion of a stone is natural and therefore not reprehensible, whereas the motion of the soul 
towards its own goods (by implication also downwards) is voluntary and thus to be judged. The 
interesting thing is that Eriugena also speaks of the ‘natural motion’ (motus naturalis) but then 
ascribes it to the human soul, so that its natural motion is the voluntary motion that is to be 
judged. This may be confusing, but Eriugena has to do this, since his chapter here is on the 
difference between natural free will and free will under grace. He cannot abide by Augustine’s 
distinction between amoral natural motion (of a stone) and voluntary motion which can be 
valued. But the conclusion is that he uses the same language as Augustine, and with the same 
meaning, but with a slightly different expression.404  
As is Eriugena’s normal procedure from chapter 4 onwards when he started the 
apodeictic method, he includes Augustine’s authority to back his argumentation up. When 
treating the motion of the will Eriugena chooses to cite lib. arb. 2.1.3 for this.405 Right at the start 
of book 2 of lib. arb. Evodius asks Augustine why God gave free will, with which many sin, to 
the human being. Augustine gives three reasons, which provide Eriugena’s authority: 1) a person 
needs to have free will to act rightly 2) the purpose of free will is to act rightly, not to sin 3) 
 
403 More exactly, in 8.7.144-6 Eriugena says that the motion of the human mind is due to two causes ‘one of which 
is a superior cause which all natures have in common, the other inferior, which is created in the human being itself’ 
(...humanae substantiae motus naturalis...duplici causa effici persuasum est, quarum una superior quae naturarum communis est 
omnium, altera vero interior quae in ipsa humana substantia est constituta...). The first, more general cause is the bare fact of 
existence.  
404 While writing about the motion of the mind, it seems that Eriugena is trying to incorporate as much of his 
erudition of Augustine as possible. Right after analysing the cause of the motion in the human mind, he goes on to 
make the distinction between God’s motion, which is outside of time and space, the motion of the mind, which is 
inside of time but outside of space and the motion of the body, which is in time and place, which is strongly 
reminiscent of Gn. litt. 8.20.39.65 It does not serve any purpose in Eriugena’s argument, already having established 
that the human mind is in motion and that it is automotive and therefore solely responsible. Moreover it could raise 
questions, for Eriugena seemed to have linked the motion of the human mind with the mutability of the human 
soul, concluding in div. praed. 8.6 that the liberty of the human soul means mutability, and directly treating the 
motion of the mind after. But it seems Eriugena had the knowledge (in his head or compiled), and felt it would be a 
shame not to use it. 
405 verbatim, except for two small changes: ‘Si enim homo esset’ into ‘est’ and ‘iniuste’ into ‘non iuste’. cf. Madec, 54.  
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without free will there would not be ‘the good in accordance with which justice itself is praised in 
condemning sins and honouring right deeds.’406 Thus the point for Augustine is clear: no justice 
without free will. In this passage Augustine speaks about ‘to will‘ (velle) and ‘free will‘ (libera 
voluntas) and ‘free choice of the will’ (libero voluntatis arbitrio), but the motion of the will is not at all 
at stake. Augustine’s main point is very congenial to Eriugena’s overall reasoning, but Eriugena is 
therefore presented with a problem: how to read the motion of the will into this. Eriugena’s task 
at hand here is to make in Augustine’s text a distinction between his substance of the human 
being (soul, capacity of the will) and his motion of the will (in order to differentiate between 
nature and grace. The next paragraph will go into detail why he would want that) If anything, 
Augustine’s authority therefore rather muddies the water than clears it. After all, Augustine 
himself is only speaking about the reasons why the will has been given. Eriugena thus has to 
anachronistically force the distinction between motion of the will and substance of the will on 
Augustine. Augustine would probably not agree with Eriugena’s narrowing the substance of the 
soul down throughout his text to a substance of the will, even if Eriugena might be forgiven for 
this in the context of his polemic against Gottschalk. But Eriugena’s distinction between 
substance of the soul (will) and motion of the soul (will) serves to systematically separate the 
existence of the will from separate desires. Such an almost scholastic distinction cannot be 
discerned in Augustine. And in any case, if Augustine’s quotation is subjected to such a 
distinction, it is clear that Augustine here is speaking about the bare fact of the free will itself, 
thus the existence of it in the human being, not of separate desires. In Eriugena’s words, 
Augustine is speaking here ‘substantially’, about voluntas. Thus Eriugena has to interpret the 
quotation for the reader in order manipulate him into Eriugena’s understanding in order to have 
Augustine buttress Eriugena: ‘In relation to those words we must see to it that no one confuses 
substance and motion when they hear the words “free will”, which is undoubtedly substantial. 
Our holy father Augustine, then did use such a mode of expression in saying free will for that 
which is the movement or choice of the free will, and we are in the habit of using it when by 
means of substantial causes we express their effects.’407 Other examples Eriugena gives are ‘foot’ 
for ‘walking’ and ‘reason’ for ‘reasoning’.  
 
406 transl. Peter King. ‘illud bonum, quo commendatur ipsa iustitia in damnandis peccatis, recteque factis honorandis’ . 
407 ‘In quibus verbis debemus intendere ne quis substantiam confundat et motum, audiens liberam voluntatem quae procul dubio 
substantialis est. Eo itaque locutionis modo sanctus pater Augustinus usus est, dicendo liberam voluntatem pro eo quod est liberae 
voluntatis motum sive arbritrium, quo solemus uti dum per causas substantiales earum significamus effectus.’ 
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This interpretation408does not change the spirit of Augustine’s thinking, since Augustine 
would concur that it is the way in which the will is used which incurs the judgment, whereas the 
free will itself is a bonum. But Eriugena does change the text, for what is at stake for Augustine is 
exactly the bare fact of the free will itself, not the use of it. But Augustine uses the right words to 
express the idea that free will precedes justice, an opportunity not to be passed on. Eriugena’s 
explanation therefore is a blatant reinterpretation of the text with the same spirit but to another 
meaning of the text for his own purposes.  
When looking at Eriugena’s treatment of the motion of the will overall it shows that 
Eriugena had some systematising tendencies, trying to make a coherent distinction between a 
substance of the soul and a motion of the soul. To clarify such a distinction was never an issue 
for Augustine, who spent his energy arguing what kind of being the soul was, how it had free will 
and how the sinning soul fitted justifiably in a just universe. For Augustine the motion of the 
soul was a given, in its (neo-Platonic) mutability in turning to or from God and in its 
(Aristotelian) movement in time. And he could use it as a metaphor, as we have seen with the 
comparison of the stone. But he never explicitly and systematically identified what was the 
substance of the soul and what the motion. This is rather a ‘substans-accidens’ mode of thinking, 
which became popular in the 9th century through the study of the categoriae decem and which 
Eriugena applied very successfully in the div. praes.409 How Eriugena applied this thinking, and 
why he had to systematise the motion of the will versus a substance of the soul is the topic of 
the next paragraph on the difference between nature and grace.  
 
 
5.2.5 The difference between nature and grace as exemplified by the Fall 
 
In his overall argument against Gottschalk’s view of double predestination Eriugena sees 
free will and a correct understanding of grace as the pillars of his apodeictic approach, since free 
will is the appropriate category to refute Gottschalk's Predestinationist side, and grace the 
Pelagian side. Eriugena’s views on anthropology in the div. praed. are brought together in the 
relationship between these two. With his chapter on the difference between them, chapter 8, he 
 
408 Reinterpretations of Scripture or Augustine play a major part in the whole of Eriugena’s treatise. Another 
significant example of a reinterpretation is of Augustine’s wordings ad eorum damnationem quos iuste praedestinavit (‘for 
the damnation of those whom he justly predestined to punishment’) in Ench. 26.100. In chapter 12.2.22-43 Eriugena 
explained that this had to be understood e contrario. Cf. 15.7.142-55 for Eriugena’s explanation of the figure 
antiphrasis. 
409 E.g. 8.2.; 16.5. 
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concludes the anthropological part of his treatise before setting of to describe how to understand 
God and predestination on his terms. His views on sin and punishment, albeit anthropological, 
are part of his description of evil. They will be the topic of the next paragraph. Here it will turn 
out that the difference between nature and grace lies in the difference between the substantial 
freedom of created will in being self-moving (nature) and the ability to control the movements of 
the soul (grace), which amounts to a difference between the substance of the soul and the quality 
of the soul. In order to explain this difference, and to explain how Eriugena used Augustine in 
making this difference, we will paradoxically have to go over much of the same ground as the 
previous two paragraphs (2 and 3). But we are going to do this from a slightly different 
perspective, since the focus will eventually be on the relation between substance and motion. 
 
Before chapter 8, Eriugena already gives us a taste of his ideas in chapter 4 (4.6-8). This 
chapter, as we have seen, deals with the freedom of the rational will. As a last argument for his 
position that the freedom of will is part of the soul, the substance of the human being, and thus 
what it means to be human, Eriugena states that the Fall did not involve a loss of freedom of the 
will (as we have seen in paragraph 5.2.2, p. 124). What we lost instead is the ‘strength and the 
power of free choice’ (vigor et potestas liberi arbitrii). This power of free choice was not part of our 
nature, but was a ‘great gift’ (magnum munus) which we received through the ‘grace’ (gratia) of 
God. One might invoke again the idea of akrasia: the addicted person has the freedom of will to 
want to stop his addiction, but just not the strength to see his will through in an actual choice. 
But I do not think that this is the model that drives Eriugena to his statement. An analysis of 
chapter 8 will provide more insight.  
The difference touched upon in paragraph 5.2.3.2, p. 130 between freedom of the will 
and freedom of choice is the cornerstone of Eriugena’s attempt to square his idea of our 
freedom of the will even after the Fall with the idea that we all sin in that life after the Fall. After 
all, sinning makes us unhappy, but our freedom of the will ensures that we all wish to be happy, 
so why sin? In short, the reason why we sin after the Fall is because we lost our freedom of 
choice even if we retained our inalienable freedom of will. Here the movement of the will 
becomes relevant, for Eriugena explains, sometimes with difficulties, that the choice of the will 
consists of movements of the will.410 The freedom of the will is in our nature as human being, 
but what one actually wants, in other words, the movement of the will, is its choice. It is perhaps 
 
410 8.6.113-6 Quid enim aliud sentimus audientes liberum voluntatis arbitrium, nisi liberae voluntatis motum, quae omnia naturam 
humanae voluntatis exprimunt.’ ‘What else do we understand when we hear of the free choice of the will except the motion of the will, all 
of which express the nature of the human will. Brennan’s translation with alteration. 
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not unreasonable to apply the Aristotelian distinction of potency and actuality, with the freedom 
of the will providing us with potential wills, but our choices representing the set of our actual 
wills. This is how Eriugena puts it: ‘Into our nature too [our creator] introduced a cause by 
which we could ourselves move freely, reasonably, voluntarily, towards the pursuit of those ends 
to which it had been inteded that we should attain. That motion is rightly called the free choice 
of our will because it is subject to our control. For we would be able, according to our 
judgement, to direct it on the right course; we would also be able to restrain it.’ 411 The cause that 
Eriugena mentions at the beginning of this quote is the voluntary cause that was spoken of in the 
previous paragraph, which we can equate here with the will. The actual will itself consists of the 
movement of the will, and is subject to our control. At least, so it was, until the Fall.412 As 
Eriugena has Augustine explain in chapter 4.7.202-5 through a citation of persev. 7.13 (and the 
first sentence of 14), after the Fall God wanted that man could only come to him and stay with 
him by grace. So that in Eriugena’s terms, after the Fall our ability to control the movements of 
the will, our freedom of choice, is only to be had through grace. This is why it is not helpful to 
imagine Eriugena’s model of will and choice with the idea of akrasia. Akrasia presumes an actual 
will, thus, in Eriugena’s words, a movement of the will which is a choice. But subsequently the 
agent is not able to see its choice through because of an intervening carnal desire which conflicts 
with his will. But the will itself is already there. However, in Eriugena’s model after the Fall we 
lost the freedom of choice already, so that our will could never independently arrive at a position 
where it wants to abstain from sin in the first place. This signals a further difference with 
Augustine’s ideas of the effects of the Fall. For as we have seen on p. 126 and p. 129, Augustine 
did use the model of akrasia for his concept of difficultas, which he later ‘radicalized’ to the 
permanent state of concupiscentia. But in Eriugena’s model there is less place for an internal moral 
struggle between good and evil wills, before the will inevitably gives in to the bad choice if not 
aided by grace. In Eriugena’s world we are either uncomplicated sinners or uncomplicated saints.  
At the basis of this crucial distinction between the freedom of the will and the freedom 
of choice lies Eriugena’s use of the Aristotelian categories, as they were transmitted through the 
Categoriae decem and which formed an important analytical tool for the ninth century intellectual.413 
 
411 8.7.150-6. Nostrae quoque naturae inseruit [nostrum conditor] causam, qua nosmet ipsos possemus movere libere, rationabiliter, 
voluntarie, ad ea quae nobis sequenda fuerant assequenda. Qui motus merito vocatur liberum arbitrium nostrae voluntatis, quoniam 
potestati nostrae subiectus est. Possemus quippe pro nostro iudicio recto cursu eum dirigere, possemus cohibere. 
412 8.7.136-7 states that Eriugena is describing the situation before the Fall, in which the human will was able to turn 
itself to God and not sin or turn away an sin, thus in short, to exert control with the freedom of choice.  
413 8.2.28-33. For the Categoriae decem, ed. Minio-Paluello in Aristoteles Latinus vol. 1, 1-5 (Paris 1961). For their use in 
the Carolingian Renaissance’s new attempt at philosophy cf. the seminal Marenbon (1981), esp. 12-30, for 
Eriugena’s use of them in the De divisione naturae cf. Stock (1980), 85-104, esp. 93-6 and Marenbon (1980), 118-34.  
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The categories belong to the sphere of ontology and philosophy and language (they describe at 
once what exists and in what ways we can refer to beings). The first category of substance 
consists of all the beings, whereas the other nine categories (from quality and quantity up to 
action and passion) describe the accidents, that is, the way in which the beings manifest 
themselves. These categories therefore describe everything that exists, albeit that some of the 
beings are hard to ascribe accidents to, even though their substance is certain (this most notably 
counts for God). But this is not the case for the human being, however, to which all the 
accidents can be ascribed (Aristotle devised his categories for the human being and never meant 
for them to be applied to a God outside of reality, such as the Christian God). Eriugena’s move 
in order to protect the freedom of the will (and thus the responsibility of the human being and 
the theodicy of God) is to grade the free will not as an accident, but as a substance.414 In 
Eriugena’s analysis the freedom of the will is therefore part of what it means to be a human 
being. Without it, we would not be the same substance, the same species anymore, but another 
thing, and it therefore cannot be what we lost after the Fall, on pain of Adam’s descendants not 
being human anymore. Augustine does not operate on the basis of this Aristotelian idea of 
substance. He operates on a neo-Platonical understanding of substance, in which the substance 
of a humang being (or other thing) can be lessened by corruption or increased by turning to god, 
while remaining the same individual. However, if forced in Eriugena’s way of thinking in fixed 
substances, Augustine would without a doubt keep the will (but translate it back to ‘soul’) as 
belonging to the substance of the human being, but downgrade its freedom to the status as 
accident, which can therefore be gained or lost. the point is that eriugena reads augustine with a 
different model of substance and can therefore force augustine to take a position on the 
persistence of the human being and free will that Augustine never meant to convey. 
Eriugena firmly roots the freedom of the will through the categories in the sphere of 
ontology. But Eriugena’s conception of the freedom of the will takes into account the sphere of 
natural philosophy as well. There are two sides to the will. After all, the will not only is a 
substance, but also a ‘voluntary cause’ which causes its own movements. Its freedom means that 
there are no external necessities operating on the will, that is, that the will moves out of its own 
accord. Thus, for Eriugena, we are indeed ‘little Gods’ able to start a causal chain. Eriugena’s 
freedom of the will in this way serves for his anthropology as a bridge between ontology and 
natural philosophy. That is interesting because it is in terms of natural philosophy that Eriugena 
 
414 8.2 for Eriugena’s introduction of the categories; 8.3.51-3 for the assertion that the will is according to its nature 
substantial; 8.4.74-6 for the assertion that the will is naturally free since it is rational. Keep in mind that free will does 
not necessarily imply free choice of the will, since grace is the other necessary condition.  
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describes grace. For if these movements of the will are under ‘our own control’ we have freedom 
of choice and can act with a purpose, whereas when these movements are not subject to our 
judgment we lack freedom of choice and act as unguided missiles. This is the difference between 
nature and grace: nature ensures the automotion of the will but not the direction of the 
movement. Grace determines whether we can steer these movements or not. If we receive it, we 
are able to take control of our life, without it we are ships without a rudder, waiting to see where 
the current takes us. Grace is therefore not something which exists per se, but it is an addition to 
beings, making better what already exists.415 To emphasize the difference between nature and 
grace, Eriugena is therefore careful to locate their origin in two different sources in 8.2: nature 
comes from God’s ‘goodness’ (bonitas), but grace from God’s ‘generosity’ (largitas).416 
The difference between nature and grace is therefore a difference between the existence 
of the will and the functioning of it. For Eriugena this merits the use of two different sets of 
conceptual tools to analyse the two different aspects of the will, namely its substance as opposed 
to its functioning (i.e. its movement). Eriugena describes the nature of the human being with the 
categories (i.e. substance and accidents), but grace in terms of causes and movement (movement 
is not an accident, and in fact, movement always had a tenuous place in the ontology of the 
Aristotelian universe). When the will is part of what defines the human being, it is a substance. 
When it is aided by grace, it is the cause which gives the motion to the soul and the human 
being. In this way Eriugena tries to benefit from the stability of being inherent in the Aristotelian 
category of substance for the freedom of the will, but at the same time from the mutability that 
motion and agency imply for the fickleness of grace.  
Grace for Eriugena thus is the ability to take control of one’s life. As Eriugena says in 
4.6.186-9 Adam had the gift of grace so that he could keep the commandment, but lost it so that 
we can only keep the commandment by the aid of grace. In other words, Adam had full control 
over his choice, but we after the Fall need the help of grace to have that control he had. But the 
difference between Adam and us is not as fundamental as it may seem, since apparently everyone 
 
415 8.4.79-82.  
416 Augustine does not make this differentiation between the largitas and bonitas dei, with the largitas as the source of 
grace, in his works. In fact, the word largitas is only used approximately 190 times in the opera omnia 
(approximately, since it may have been used in the recently discovered sermons) according to the CAG database. 
However, one of these occurrances is of importance, since largitas and bonitas dei are mentioned side by side. In persev. 
17.41 Augustine says Sed mirabilior et fidelibus evidentior largitas bonitatis dei est, quod etiam parvulis, quibus obedientia non est 
illius aetatis ut detur, datur haec gratia. ‘But the generosity of God’s goodness is even more admirable and manifest, in 
that this grace is given even to the little ones, who are not yet obedient because of their young age.’ Moreover, this 
sentence directly precedes the quote Eriugena gives of the persev. 17.41 in 11.7.173-81. This quote is very significant, 
since it contains the definition of predestination that Eriugena will use in chapter 12. It therefore likely that Eriugena 
took this sentence and turned Augustine’s casual locution into part of the model he is building throughout the div. 
praed. If this is correct, it shows the systematizing tendencies Eriugena’s logical thinking bring to the quarry of 
Augustine’s texts.  
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including the first human being needs grace in order to exercise control.417 The difference rather 
seems to be a gradual for Eriugena. Adam always had control, where we only sometimes have 
control. For Augustine the difference between Adam and the human beings after the Fall are 
larger. For him Adam was the archetype of the human race, created as a better human being, 
thus in his nature. He was not a human of general stock who simply enjoyed a privileged status 
while the rest of us are more equal than he was. This difference between Eriugena and Augustine 
is a direct result of Eriugena’s effort to promote the responsibility of the human being by placing 
the freedom of the human will in the nature of the human being. The result is that the 
differences between Adam and us can no longer manifest themselves on the level of ‘nature’.  
Underlying these differences between Augustine and Eriugena regarding the human 
condition after the Fall (shattered will vs loss of freedom of choice) and the relationship between 
Adam and us may well be a difference in ontology. Augustine after all wrote in a Plotinian 
universe in which being is dynamic: the human being can gain more being or lose it according to 
the measure in which it turns itself towards its source. But the ontology that underlies the 
Categoriae decem is Aristotelian. Being is more a phenomenological category in this paradigm, and a 
being cannot change its (measure of) being as it can in the Plotinian paradigm on pain of 
becoming something fundamentally different. Eriugena’s remark in 8.2 regarding the categories 
may well signal that he is operating on the basis of that latter ontology. This would support 
Eriugena in his claims that the nature (substance) of the human being has not been changed by 
the Fall. Although here is not the place, deeper research into the div. praed. needs to be 
undertaken, however, in order to be able to state this with certainty, since these six chapters (4-8 
and 16) may not give enough material for this purpose. 
Similarly this research may reveal something about Eriugena’s use of the word natura in 
the div. praed., relevant in the context of the overriding importance of this word in the De divisione 
naturae. There are two preliminary observations to be made here which may underline the 
potency of future research in this direction. In the div. praed. Eriugena uses this word generously 
throughout, as Madec’s index shows.418 In chapters 4-8 and 16 Eriugena uses natura in a few 
different guises. Examples are the nature of the world (4.5.155), there is human nature, set as we 
have seen in this chapter against grace, and rational nature (6.1.16-7) and a law of nature 
(5.8.191). What most of these variants share is the idea of the order and constitution of a being. 
The context seems to be the Creation as the nature of the human being is set against the special 
 
417 Ac per hoc vigor et potestas liberi arbitrii non erat in primo homine ex substantia sed ex creatoris gratia. vs. Marenbon (1980), 
309 and Stanciu (2005), 63 but with Schrimpf (1982), 837. 
418 Madec 226-7. 
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gifts of God of grace. In combination with Eriugena’s possible leanings to a more Aristotelian 
conception of being such a research may yield interesting results. The second observation is that 
the likelihood is very high that Eriugena took this usage of the word from Augustine’s lib. arb., 
whichever sources may be deemed relevant for Eriugena’s conception of nature in the De 
divisione naturae. Augustine used the word with the meaning constitution, as in the ‘nature of the 
body’ and ‘nature of the mind’ (lib. arb. 2.18.48), or simply ‘being’, as in ‘there is no nature which 
does not come from God’ (lib. arb. 2.20.54). Moreover, these two last examples are cited by 
Eriugena in 7.2.40-1 and 7.5.112.  
 
 
5.2.6 Sin and Punishment 
 
In the previous paragraph we have seen the apotheosis of Eriugena’s anthropology in the 
div. praed. The difference between free will as nature or substance of the human being, and the 
free will as the set of movements of the will, yielded Eriugena with his line of defence for the 
inalienability and goodness of free will. The Fall did not affect the substance or the nature of the 
human being, but merely the control we have over the movements of the will. This model of the 
human being provides different but intertwined questions. One question is what it is that 
changed and deteriorated after the Fall if the nature of the human being remained the same. 
Another is what it is that is punished and wherein our personal responsibility lies. In other 
words, what was the point of application of God’s justice? When ‘we’ lost control over the 
movements of our will after the Fall, what is that ‘we’ if we supposedly are not to imagine some 
homunculus pulling the strings? These questions lead to the question what the human being as 
an individual is, as opposed to a generic member of his or her species. Chapter 16 deals with sin 
and punishment, so if Eriugena will give us any answer, this may be the place to look for it.  
For Eriugena this chapter falls in the context of how God cannot predestine sins, given 
that the nature of evil is not a substance but only a privation, so that God cannot be held 
accountable for knowing sins in advance and thereby ‘causing’ them in some way or other. We 
have to keep in mind that Eriugena’s objective with the div. praed. was to defend the persistence 
of free will after the Fall and personal responsibility, and the crucial difference arrived at in the 
previous paragraph between free will as nature and as movement will be instrumental in 
Eriugena’s description of sin and punishment as well. As evil is only a privation, Eriugena is of 
the opinion that (created) substance is (created) good and therefore does not sin. God does not 
punish the human will as the substance or nature of the human being. Undoubtedly he was 
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driven to this position in no small measure to oppose Gottschalk’s assertion, in line with 
Augustine, that human nature did deteriorate in the Fall.419 In Eriugena’s words ‘no nature 
punishes nature’ (nulla natura naturam punit) and ‘But by what kind of justice creative nature will 
punish the natures it has itself created I cannot discover. Hence no nature will be punished; if 
not punished it will not be unhappy.’ 420 Unfortunately sin, punishment and unhappiness are 
around, so if it is not the will as substance which sins, is punished and subsequently unhappy, 
what is? It is indeed will in its other form as the actual motions of the soul.421 Eriugena has 
Augustine explain in 16.5 in an extensive quotation from the vera rel. 20.38-9 that the sin of the 
will consists of wanting after temporal, carnal, sensible and lower goods instead of their higher 
spiritual opposites. And the punishment, as explained in the following quotation by Eriugena of 
Augustine’s vera rel. 11.21-2, consists of finding a place among the lower, bodily and mortal 
goods. The pain of the deprivation of those lower goods that the soul (remember this is 
Augustine speaking, not Eriugena, who would undoubtedly have said ‘will’ instead of ‘soul’) 
wants after directly is the punishment. Moreover, this punishment is inescapable since these 
lower goods are mutable, and therefore will be absent at some point in the future even if enjoyed 
in the present. This idea of an ‘automatic’ punishment which does not involve a direct action of 
God is underscored by another quotation of Augustine, this time from en. Ps. 7.16. However, 
Eriugena could not be content with the idea of a universe that only balances its books in the due 
course of time. Whether out of the idea that a causal process cannot afford an inert temporal 
interval or out of a desire for maximum justice, he at length asserted that even if the punishment 
may find its completion in the next life it arises simultaneously with the sin, presumably 
therefore also in earthly life.422  
This description of sin and punishment has two effects. By asserting an impersonal 
mechanism behind the punishment for sin, God cannot be held responsible for meeting it out, 
however justly. God is not one to dole out retribution himself, but as a benevolent architect 
constituted this mechanism behind sin and punishment, and by implication behind virtue and 
happiness as well (virtue instantly leads to happiness, even if only in ‘secret’ (occulte) since it is 
 
419 Lambot, 185-6. Cf. Stanciu (2005), 26. 
420 16.1.28-31. Creatrix autem natura quali iustitia punit sit naturas quas ipsa creavit, non invenio. Nulla dehinc natura punietur; 
non punita non erit misera. With a nice anticipation of the Periphysion with the distinction of God as creative nature and 
universe as created nature.  
421 16.3.92-6: ‘Accordingly, in no one is nature punished, because it is from God and does not sin. But the mootion 
of the will wantonly misusing that good of nature is deservedly punished, because it transgresses the law of nature, 
which beyond doubt it would not transgress if it were substantially created by God.’ Proinde in nullo natura punitur, 
quia ex deo est et non peccat. Motus autem voluntarius, libidinose utens naturae bono, merito punitur. quia naturae legem transgreditur, 
quam procul dubio non transgrederetur, si substantialiter a deo crearetur.’ 
422 16.6.236-9 and the whole of 16.7, containing a description of the same process -but e contrario- for the reward of 
happiness for virtue.  
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disguised as ‘suffering’ (labor) in the temporal world. The sinners in fact punish themselves, God 
is removed from the process.423  
Secondly, we now have as full an answer as we will get from Eriugena in the div. praed. 
what it is that sins and is punished, and by implication where our individuality lies. It is an actual 
or activated will, a movement of the will that seeks after the temporal and therefore sins.424 The 
(moral) core of the human being, that which makes it an individual and therefore justifiably 
punishable, is the set of all actual movements of the will. Yet the definition of the human being 
as encountered in 5.2.1, p. 121 ‘The human being is a rational substance receptive of wisdom’ 
(8.4.73-4), uses the will as nature or substance of the human being, thus the potential will. This 
definition may therefore tell us which nature we have and to which species we belong, but it 
does not account for what we are as a person. This brings a nice touch to the question of our 
identity: our ‘I’ is not something stable, but something in movement and developing425, and we 
will only be able to totally say what we are at the end of our life, when our choices have all been 
made. This is however a clear departure from Augustine. Except for his very early works, he 
considers the body as a fundamental part of the individual human being. Eventually, with the use 
of the word persona in ep. 137.3.11 (411) he stressed the union between the material substance of 
the body and the substance of the soul.426 And as we have seen, the body therefore is part of 
what has deteriorated, since it after the Fall ‘lusts against the spirit’ and takes on autonomous 
movements of its own. Augustine himself therefore had no qualms to speak of faults in or 
 
423 cf. Marenbon (1980), 310. He also sports a nice classification of punishments for the sinner: 1) knowing that the 
sinner himself is unhappy 2) deprivation of knowledge itself 3) prevention of fulfilling perverse desires. 
424 cf. Marenbon (1980), 313-4 and 319-22 for the changes he tried to apply to the theory of punishment in the 
Periphyseon. 
425 Ontologically speaking our individuation principle is the motion of our will, thus our actual choices. Both our 
body and our free will are part of our nature, which is common to our species. What makes us individual human 
beings is thus something very fleeting, vs Schrimpf (1982), 842-3, 845, who rather credits Eriugena with the 
distinction between our ontological identity (as member of the species) and our ethical identity. Marenbon (1980), 
312-4 however agrees more with Florus’ and Prudentius’ critique that one cannot separate the will from the 
individual.  
 This conclusion which is made in this chapter on the basis of the anthropology is in accordance with an 
observation Marenbon ‘John Scottus and the “Categoriae Decem”’, 128 makes in the context of Eriugena’s use of 
the term ousia in the Periphyseon: ‘There is no difference, he [Eriugena] argues, between what is said of a subject [e.g. 
‘man’] and the subject itself. Thus Cicero, the individual subject, and Man, which is said of Cicero, are one and the 
same. The species is “whole and one in its numerous members, and these members are one individual in the 
species” (DDN 470D-471A; I, 102.11-21). The only way I can see of making sense of this position is to suppose 
that Eriugena meant by the individual of such and such a class simply the such-ness, by which he belongs to that 
class. He would distinguish implicitly between the particular man, as he might be perceived, differentiated from 
every other man by an innumerable variety of accidents, and the individual member of the species, Man, who is 
simply that man-ness, on account of which he is a man. Such individuals would, in a sense, be indistinguishable 
from their species.’ Ousia is not yet used in the div. praed., where Eriugena rather chooses the word substantia. 
Marenbon (1980), 323 himself argues for the following in the context of the theory of punishment: ‘...and 
Eriugena’s own later work is closer in important respects to the concerns and arguments of the De Praedestinatione 
than its parade of citations and terms from the Greek Fathers would suggest.’  
426 cf. Rist (1994), 98-101.  
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deterioration of natures (not meaning just bodies) in civ. 14.11. But Eriugena trims this 
anthropology down to one dynamical aspect of the soul, in line with his polemical needs against 
Gottschalk. 
 However, it also leads to some awkward answers. When we lost control over our will in 
the Fall, there was apparently no separate faculty or institution responsible for our will. We are 
what our will is, so that our will was self-controlled, but it lost that capacity. Yet how can a set of 
movements exert control over itself? And, conversely, if a sin automatically leads to its 
punishment, how can a movement of the will be punished?427 By reducing our personality, our 
individual identity to a set of movements of the will, Eriugena succeeds in quarantaining off 
God’s creation from our sins and the punishments and deterioration which accompany these 
sins. God indeed does not punish what he himself made and can furthermore not be held 
responsible for the way in which individuals bring themselves down without God’s further 
interference. It is just the way the universe works, no more and no less. However, the cost is 
rather large. Our existence, not as members of the created human species, but as human 
individuals confronting God through the moral choices we make in life, has a tenuous existence. 
Being no more than a set of movements of the will, our personalities have no stable base to rest 
on, as they had in Augustine’s immaterial substance of the soul. 
 
Apart from these general analytical remarks about Eriugena’s views on sin and 
punishment, there are three remarks to be made on his use of Augustine in this chapter of the 
div. praed. A first concerns the term concupiscentia, or rather its absence. In discoursing on sin and 
punishment in a text so influenced by Augustine one might expect to encounter this word.428 
However, neither in this chapter under consideration, chapter 16 on sin and punishment, nor 
indeed in the whole of the div. praed. is the term to be encountered, if Madec’s indices are to be 
trusted. We do, however, encounter the word libido in the following passage which contains a 
definition of libido in 16.4.97-102: ‘Hence the clear conclusion is that in the wicked it is not what 
God has made that undergoes punishments, but what pride has corruptly devised. Indeed the 
lust (libido) of a perverse will is tortured when it is not allowed to have those things which it evilly 
or unworthily strives after; for by this name, that is ‘lust’ (libido), the generality of all the vices is 
 
427 Marenbon (1980), 320. Marenbon argued that this was also Florus’ and Prudentius’ critique. 
428 And should one read the translation, one would not be dissatisfied. Brennan, 104 translates Eriugena’s 2 
occurences of libido in 16.4.98 and 101 first as ‘passion’, then as ‘concupiscence’, while Eriugena in my view 
deliberate used libido instead of concupiscentia. I will argue in this paragraph that Eriugena planned to stay away from 
this term.  
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understood’.’429 The choice of libido here instead of concupiscentia, which would have fitted just as 
well in its place, seems a deliberate choice to ignore an elephant in the room. In Augustine’s 
writings the term concupiscentia did go through a development.430 Whereas the young Augustine 
would think of concupiscence as a (usually) perverse will, as in the triple concupiscence for 
bodily pleasure, power and curiosity, the later Augustine (as we have seen in paragraph 5.2.2, p.  
126-7 sees concupiscence rather as a disposition, a liability to sin. Both meanings of the term 
would have fitted well in Eriugena’s thought. Concupiscence as ‘lust’ could have been used for 
the passage above, and generally speaking, what better term than ‘concupiscence’ would there be 
for Eriugena to describe the loss of self-determining ability and power of the free will after the 
Fall (the loss of free choice)? This question can only be firmly answered if one investigated the 
usage of the terms concupiscentia and libido at the time of Eriugena. There is no place for this in 
this context, but I wish at least to suggest here that Eriugena’s silence on this account is caused 
by the bodily overtones of the term ‘concupiscence’. Concupiscence was not exclusively sexual 
for Augustine, but Eriugena may have wanted to stay away from these connotations which 
would place the desire not only in the will, but in the body as well, as readers would have Paul 
readily in mind (partly thanks to Augustine): ‘The flesh lusts (concupiscit) against the spirit and the 
spirit against the flesh’ (Gal. 5.17).431 We should remember that in the work most relevant for 
Eriugena’s anthropology in the div. praed., the lib. arb., concupiscence was the concupiscentia carnalis 
(3.19.53). Libido as alternative would have been readily suggested by civ. 14.432 This term may have 
been equally sexually loaded433 but would place the burden of guilt more on the will and less on 
the body. The body, as part of God’s good creation fell under Eriugena’s protection and could 
not be indicted with error.  
 
The second remark deals with the transmission of original sin. The whole of Eriugena’s 
intricate anthropology could make us forget that the reason why the ontological treatment of the 
soul became relevant for the predestination question is the transmission of original sin, with 
Gottschalk in his Quaestiones de anima clearly taking the side of the traducianists against the 
creationists, with all its materialistic implications. Eriugena has to account for this transmission 
 
429 Brennan’s translation with changes. ‘Hinc aperte colligitur in impiis supplicia non perpeti quod deus fecit, sed quod superbia 
vitiose invenit. Libido siquidem perversae voluntatis cruciatur, dum ea quae male aut indigne appetit habere non sinitur; hoc enim 
nomine, videlicet libidinis, generalitas omnium vitiorum conprehenditur.’  
430 As documented by Bonner's lemma 'Concupiscentia' in the AL, 1113-20, cf. Rist (1994), 102. 
431 even if the body cannot have a desire without the soul, e.g. Gn. litt. 10.12.20. 
432 not quoted or paraphrased in the div. praed., but given the use of many of the other books of the civ. probably well 
read by Eriugena. 
433 civ. 14.16: Cum igitur sint multaturm libidines rerum, tamen, cum libido dicitur neque cuius rei libido sit additur, non fere adsolet 
animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscenae partes coporis excitantur. 
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as well, seeing how the Fall plays an important role in his explanation of a distinction between 
nature and grace. As to be expected, he did not side with Gottschalk on this question, but he did 
not choose creationism either. Seeing how Eriugena is overall little engaged with Augustine’s 
ontological discourse of the soul, he chooses an option which altogether sidesteps this traditional 
problem. From 408 onwards, and increasingly so during the Pelagian controversy where the 
transmission of original sin was important, Augustine came to a theory of a ‘double life’ of the 
soul, i.e. that the human soul has an individual life, but also partakes in a communal part.434 This 
communal part of our souls lives in Adam. Adam therefore not only is our ‘archetype’, but he 
continues to live in us, or, more accurately, we in him. Yet there is not only a Neoplatonic 
element in Augustine’s thinking, but also an historical. We lived communal life of the soul in the 
historical Adam, whereas our individual life begins at or sometime after our conception.435 And 
during our communal life in Adam we sinned and died, so that the original sin still affects and 
weakens each individual human being.436 In civ. 13.14 Augustine would say: ‘For God, the author 
of natures, not of vices, created man upright; but man, being of his own will corrupted, and 
justly condemned, begot corrupted and condemned children. For we all were in that one man, 
since we all were that one man, who fell into sin by the woman who was made from him before 
the sin.’ 437  
This solution for the transmission of original sin, i.e. our sin in Adam, was the option 
that Eriugena chose. In 16.3. he used a partly paraphrased civ. 13.14 in his assertion that in Adam 
the universal nature of the human being was made in which we all sinned and consequently are 
justly punished.438 Through this choice Eriugena was not forced to choose between creationism 
or traducianism, with all the dangers involved. In this chapter on sin and punishment, however, 
Eriugena’s mission is not merely to show that God’s punishment for original sin is just. It is 
rather to underscore his differentiation between will as human nature and the movement of the 
human will (the choice of the will) as the core of responsibility in the individual. That after all fits 
in his overall scheme to vouchsafe the freedom of the human will as nature of the human being 
 
434 cf. Rist (1994), 123-9. 
435 ep. 98.1. 
436 as Paul says in Rom 5:12 ‘Wherefore as by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death 
passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.’, which was avidly quoted by Augustine in later life.  
437 Deus enim creavit hominem rectum, naturarum auctor, non uitique vitiorum; sed sponte depravatus iusteque damnatus depravatos 
damnatosque generavit. Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum, quae 
de illo facta est ante peccatum.Another place for the formulaic omnes in illo fuimus can be found in en. Ps. 84.7. 
438 16.3.68-72: Cum itaque omnium hominum universam naturam in primo homine deus condiderit, adhuc enim, ut ait 
Aug<ustinus>, ille unus omnes fuit, quod in ipso naturaliter creatum est nullo modo potuit naturalem legem creatoris transire. my 
italics. ‘Since, therefore, God created in the first man the universal nature of all men, for as yet, as Augustine says, 
that one man was everyone, that which in him was naturally created could be no means transgress the natural law of 
the creator.’  
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against the punishment of original sin, so that it can still be operative in the human being after 
the Fall, enabling the responsibility for one’s own sins. How did Eriugena then use this theory of 
a ‘double life‘ of the soul to underscore this difference? How could we all be in Adam and how 
did we sin in him? For Eriugena, as we have seen, our individuality rests with the movements of 
our will, and everything else is part of our God-created nature. Since God does not punish his 
creation, this communal life we had in Adam, everything we share with him and each other, is 
out of bounds for God’s punishment. Adam’s universal nature therefore cannot have been that 
which sinned. The implication Eriugena teases out is that we not only partake in (or: have) a 
communal life in Adam, but must have an individual life with individual wills in Adam as well, 
which consequently sin and are justly punished.439 This is the only form in which the theory of a 
‘double life’ of the soul is consistent with Eriugena’s anthropology, but it is a departure from 
Augustine’s theory. Augustine after all believed individual human life to begin with our 
individual presence on earth, not before that, since that would violate Rm 9.11 (‘For when the 
children were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil’) which served as his safeguard against 
his early ideas of a Fall of the soul into the body.440 Augustine’s premise, that God created nature 
perfect, to which Eriugena strictly adhered, in the case of the ‘double life’ of the soul thus led to 
opposite consequences. For Augustine it made an individual life before embodiment impossible 
(after all, the body is created good so that it cannot serve as a prison for punishment), for 
Eriugena it necessitated an individual will in Adam (since our perfect communal nature cannot 
have been that which sinned). Eriugena had created this room for himself by ignoring 
Augustine’s discourse on the origin of the soul. His choice to use Augustine’s dynamic discourse 
on the soul instead of his ontological discourse, kept him safe from harm. Eriugena had removed 
the historical element out of the theory of the ‘double life’ of the soul by making our communal 
life and our individual life co-temporal. In effect he ‘re-corrected’ Augustine’s theory back to a 
more Plotinian stance on the relationship between the individual soul and the hypostasis of the 
Soul. 
 
The final remark is on the use of authority overall in this chapter on sin and punishment. 
Almost half of this chapter consists of direct quotations. So far all direct quotations were taken 
from Augustine (disregarding Scripture that is), but in this chapter we encounter two other 
authors. The first is Prosper of Aquitaine, whose Responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Vincentianarum 
 
439 16.3.74-96. 
440 Gn. litt. 7.25.36; 10.7.12. 
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(here obiect. 3) is misattributed to Augustine.441 The quotation contains the differentiation 
between vice and (human) nature in line with Augustine (e.g. lib. arb. 3.14.38-15.42)442 and serves 
as a point of departure to keep our communal nature in Adam free from indictment. The second 
is Gregory the Great who has the honour to close the chapter with a lengthy quotation taken 
from his Moralia in Iob (11.9).443 The function of the quotation is to drive the point home that 
punishment is instantaneous, so that the sinners suffer here on earth, in their own conscience 
and consciousness.  
The quotations which take their provenance in Augustine are very well chosen. They 
come from Gn. litt. 11.21.28-22.29, en. Ps. 7.16 and vera rel. 11.21-12.23; 20.38-9 and 54.104-5. 
They show how evil is not a substance but an evil will, starting with the devil and tempting 
human beings, who love lower goods and therefore take their place among those lower goods so 
that the sinful delights become the instruments of punishment. The lib. arb., however, is absent 
in this chapter. This may be explained by the fact that the part of it which treats original sin 
(3.20.56-22.63) does so in the context of the problem of the origin of the soul from which 
Eriugena wanted to stay away. Other parts would have been useful, but he evidently found 
enough in the vera rel. It is not strange that this work should take a prime position, since it has an 
anti-Manichean agenda and thus denies the substance of evil, attributing sin instead to our own 
will.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
With Eriugena’s stress on the inviolable ‘nature’ (natura) of the will and the application of 
the natural philosophical concept of freedom as freedom from externally caused motion, he 
makes a distinction between the being of the will and its functioning. For Augustine this 
distinction would be faulty, as the will is no separate thing from its function, so that a conflicting 
will is a shattered will. What Augustine argues for is the existence of the soul in his ontological 
discourse on the soul, and the workings of, among others, the will in a rather separate dynamical 
discourse. Eriugena of course can claim that he is totally following the master. After all, Eriugena 
 
441 16.2.60-7. There are not many misattributions (to Augustine) in the div. praed. Another one is Bede’s De natura 
rerum 1.1 in div. praed. 3.7.222-4. About this misattribution cf. the learned Stock’s ‘In search of Eriugena’s Augustine’, 
esp. 86-8. Another sizeable one is Hypomnesticon 6.2.2; 6.5.7; 6.6.8 in 14.4.134-55. The Hypomnesticon was also taken as 
originating from Augustine by Hincmar and possibly supplied by Hincmar to Eriugena. 
442 Madec, 95. 
443 to spite Gottschalk, who had used Gregory’s Moralia in Iob for his Confessio brevior? Lambot, 54 line 7-8, cf. Stanciu 
(2005), 31. 
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too states that the soul consists of the Trinitarian structure of memory, will and understanding, 
which is the soul. But for Eriugena this only serves as the first step to set himself up in the 
argument which we have been following in this chapter. For all intents and purposes the soul in 
the div. praed. is narrowed down solely to the will, so that Augustine’s difference between the soul 
as an immaterial being and the will as its agency is changed into Eriugena’s difference between 
the nature of the will as substance and the function of the will as voluntary cause and automotor. 
Augustine talks about the being of the soul as an immaterial and eternal being in some texts (e.g. 
sol.) and about its Trinitarian structures and workings in others (e.g. trin.), but these two 
discourses never really come together even in the works in which he treats both (e.g. conf. and 
civ.). Yet Eriugena makes both the being of the soul (as nature of the will) and the working of the 
soul (as motion of the will) two equal building blocks to drive the same point home: that the will 
of the human being is free. Through Eriugena’s argument the will acquires a pivotal function: the 
same will explains both what the human being is, using one set of concepts, and what it does, 
using another set. One might almost make this sound scholastic when put as Eriugena’s will qua 
being of the human being and will qua automotive cause.444 Through this focus on only one 
element of Augustine’s traditional psychology of memory, will and understanding, Eriugena 
achieves a unification of the human being which has been shown neither in Augustine’s texts nor 
in the texts using and adapting Augustine as researched in this thesis. The cost of course involves 
neglecting the other two psychological elements of memory and understanding, but given that 
Eriugena wrote his div. praed. in the context of his polemic against Gottschalk and did not 
purport to write a summum this can be forgiven. It only serves to underscore the apologetic 
nature of the text. Moreover, in some way this cost is small considering the pay-off.445 By 
promoting the will to the substance of the soul, in one swift stroke Eriugena cuts his vision of 
predestination loose from the traditional question concerning the ontology of the soul relevant 
for the predestination debate. Thus, he declares the question of the origin of the soul 
(traducianism vs. creationism) and the possible issues with the materialism it involves, as seen in 
Gottschalk, as being irrelevant through his utter silence on these topics.   
 
The use Eriugena made of Augustine in his anthropology of the div. praed. has many 
faces. Eriugena stayed true to Augustine’s fundamental tenets, such as that creation is good. The 
ample quotations he offers from Augustine, which are normally identified, reinforce the image of 
mastership of (even ownership over) Augustine. Sometimes Eriugena’s own text amounts to 
 
444 Schrimpf (1982), 864. 
445 For the consequences regarding the notion of the individual see above p. 136. 
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little more than a few sentences connecting and interpreting the various quotations of Augustine 
(this does not count for the first three chapters). The unaware or unschooled reader might be 
tempted to think that they must then also be in line with Augustine. But as we have seen, this is 
not the case. Eriugena is ready to quote selectively, deliberately misinterpret and on points flat-
out contradict Augustine in line with his own agenda.446 Brian Stock has shown how Eriugena’s 
Augustine is multi-layered, consisting of an interplay between Augustine, texts from Bede’s De 
rerum natura, and the Categoriae decem which Eriugena all attributed to Augustine.447 From the 
analysis in this chapter something of this can be gleaned through Eriugena’s use of the 
categories. Eriugena’s use of pseudo-Augustine’s Hypomnesticon (a mid-fifth century work against 
the Pelagians following a ‘moderate’ Augustine)448 does not seem to have had a major impact on 
Eriugena’s anthropology in the div. praed., although a further search in this direction might prove 
interesting. On the foundations of Augustine a new program for the soul arises. Due to the 
polemical necessities it is sleeker then Augustine’s, not caring about the ontological questions of 
the soul (deliberately ignoring the origin of the soul) but purely looking at one aspect of the 
dynamical discourse, i.e. the will. Yet, due to the application of pseudo-Augustine’s Categoriae 
decem and an almost scholastic mode of thinking that differentiates the notion of ‘will’ into its 
aspect of nature/substance and into its aspect of movement, it is able to connect the ontology of 
the soul with the working of the soul, something that Augustine never did. It does lead, however, 
to some awkward questions concerning our individuality. What becomes clear through this 
analysis of the anthropology in the div. praed. is that Eriugena conceptualizes reality through 
model building. He is carefully analyzing his ideological needs, creates differentiations which 
support those needs and thinks the implications through systematically, much more so than 
Augustine is wont to do. He is careful not to transgress the boundaries of orthodoxy, but 
through this modus operandi comes to highly original positions. His relationship with Augustine in 
his thinking is varied. Augustine serves as anchor for Eriugena’s orthodoxy and as authority for 
its confirmation. But he also serves as inspiration for Eriugena, from which he can start off his 
model building to arrive at positions which run against Augustine’s original thought. Yet 
 
446 cf. Stock (1980), 97-8, on the Periphyseon: ‘He [Augustine] is rarey quoted in isolation. His views are accepted, 
modified, or opposed as the situation requires. Nor is his presence always most clearly perceived through direct 
citation’ and ‘Yet, as important as Augustine is as an interpreter of previous authorities, at critical moments in the 
Periphyseon he too must be interpreted.’ In the div. praed. Augustine’s quotations have to speak for themselves 
somewhat more often.  
447 Providing Eriugena with his interpretative scheme of the quadriformis ratio. Perhaps Eugippius is partly responsible 
for this with the attention he gave to the four rationes of the Gn. litt. Stock (1980), 86-96.  
448 CSEL 10. 
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Eriugena does not hesitate in these instances to fortify his position with Augustine too as much 
as possible through deliberate (mis)interpretation.  
 
 
 
 
figure 1. Eriugena’s model of the human being as developed in div. praed.
  Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
1. Use of Augustine 
 
In the previous chapters, a survey has been made into varied authors  across varied 
genres of the sixth and the ninth century concerning their ideas on the ontology of the soul. All 
these authors owe a considerable debt to Augustine for the formation of their ideas in this area, 
and some too for their formulation. The most extreme case is Eugippius, whose personality as a 
scholar, and whose relationship with Augustine’s ontological discourse on the soul has to be 
reconstructed through careful consideration of his copy-pasting of Augustine’s texts for his 
florilegy. All of the authors in this thesis were widely read in Augustine, but they also exhibit 
personal choices which  works of Augustine to use for their own. Augustine develops the 
foundations of his ideas on the ontology of the soul in the early dialogues but these are not the 
primary texts these later authors went for. An exception to this rule is the an. quant. which was 
employed by Cassiodorus to good effect and by Gottschalk for his all-important separation of 
the centipede to ‘prove’ traducianism.  
The Gn. litt., especially book 7, provides an interesting case. This book is a crucial text in 
regard to Augustine’s ontological discourse of the soul as it delves deeply into the technicalities 
of the creation of Adam’s soul. Especially since it is part of Augustine’s exegesis of Genesis one 
would expect reverberations of it throughout all the authors treated. But this is far from what 
has come to light. In fact, the only author to use Gn. litt. 7 was Cassiodorus. For the other 
authors there were different reasons not to use this text. Eugippius did use a lot of the Gn. litt. 
(we have looked at his use of especially books 6 and 10 in his chapter) but he avoided book 7 
since he did not want to show an analytical and speculative Augustine on the origin of the soul, 
but an agnostic one. Eriugena had special polemical reasons to stay away from the Gn. litt. 7 (and 
10), since he wanted to ignore  any traditional treatment of the origin of the soul or material of 
the soul (but he did use much of the rest of the work). Instead he stressed the will as an 
altogether different substance of the soul. Gottschalk is the only one who might have included 
Gn. litt. 7 in his deliberations about the soul, had he taken or been granted the opportunity to 
expand on his letter and produce a fully-fledged de anima out of it. As it stood, it is not a 
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congenial text to prove traducianism and since the historical circumstances of the letter are 
uncertain, Gottschalk may not have had the Gn. litt. ready at hand when composing his letter. 
The lack of use of Gn. litt. 7 did mean that questions such as the existence of a precursor to the 
soul, or how the interplay between body and soul works, did not figure on the radar of the 
authors. Moreover the style of writing of Gn. litt. 7, or indeed the whole of the Gn. litt. was not 
used by the authors in this thesis. Augustine had the intellectual power, dare, and stature in the 
Gn. litt. to go forth by asking  probing questions, hypothesizing and analyzing, and not always 
reaching an answer to his own questions. The constraints of the genres, polemical needs and 
perhaps intellectual capacities prevented the authors from doing so. Eugippius did not write 
himself (this florilegium at least) and Gottschalk and Eriugena needed to confirm positive 
statements. Cassiodorus might have adopted such an attitude towards his material should his 
intellectual powers have given him the option.  
Overall, there is no single text or corpus of texts that all these four authors employed. 
They used texts from several genres in which Augustine wrote and from all the time periods of 
his career, such as his early philosophical dialogues, his exegesis, his letters and works such as the 
Conf. and the civ. What the authors sought in these texts was the truth as Augustine had seen it, 
or at least the confirmation and authority of Augustine for their own position. Results and 
conclusions mattered more than Augustine’s sometimes long-winded argumentations that 
buttressed those conclusions. Whenever an author engaged with Augustine’s texts, he did not 
perform a close reading in order to reconstruct the context of an insight and thereby establish 
the scope or value of a statement, but rather lifted the statement as truth from Augustine’s text 
and combined it with other statements of Augustine in order to provide more forceful buttress 
for their position. Cassiodorus’ quotation of Augustine springs to mind, in which he combines 
half a sentence from the ord. and half a sentence from the an. quant. Many examples can be 
gained from Eriugena’s chapter, in which it is shown how in the div. praed. Eriugena  sometimes 
used an explicit quotation of Augustine which flat-out contradicts what Augustine actually 
wanted to say. This leads to two considerations. First this makes clear that Augustine’s texts do 
not present these late antique and early medieval authors with a historical figure who went 
through a deep intellectual development during his long career. Augustine’s texts present a 
quarry which can be mined for diamonds, which are too hard for the (potential) opposition to 
break. A sign of the different attitudes between modern scholars and the authors in this thesis 
can be their treatment of the retr. Modern scholars love to read and cite the retr. in order to gain 
information on Augustine’s later views of his earlier works. Together with the Conf., there is no 
other work in Augustine’s oeuvre more suitable than this ‘meta-text’ for realizing that Augustine 
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went through a long development. The only author to use the retr. was Eugippius, in his 
important excerpt 372 De animae quaestione. But tellingly Eugippius does not use it to see how 
there may be a distance between the old Augustine and the ‘earlier’ ones, but to reinforce 
Augustine’s agnosticism on the origin of the soul almost into the ahistorical position that it is not 
for the human being to gain knowledge on this point.  
Secondly the abuse of quotations of Augustine by the authors in this thesis cannot be 
taken for a lack of understanding of Augustine on their part, but rather shows a conscious and 
considerate use of Augustine. Their intellectual commitments, whether it be solving the problem 
of the origin of the soul (Eugippius, Gottschalk), safeguarding the responsibility of the individual 
(Eriugena) or combining Stoicism with Augustine’s ideas (Cassiodorus), guided these authors 
into what to take from Augustine and how to use it.  Sometimes that led to the distortion of the 
meaning of the quotation, i.e. of what an audience had to take from it, to a high degree. Indeed it 
rather seems, especially in Eriugena’s case, that the quotation of Augustine which is used to force 
Augustine to a position or even contradict himself is the more deliberated. This last point in no 
way wants to suggest that the authors in this thesis had their own preconceived notions and only 
went to Augustine’s texts to bolster their point with his authority. Every author in this thesis was 
fundamentally formed through the reading of the texts of Augustine that he thought he needed 
for his own text, even if prior intellectual development or commitment meant that he 
(deliberately) changed some of Augustine’s points. This even goes for Gottschalk and Eriugena, 
who diverge much more from Augustine than Cassiodorus and of course Eugippius are wont to 
do. Gottschalk comes to his insight of traducianism and thereby makes a much stronger claim 
than Augustine would be willing to allow. But his starting point, the premises from which he 
draws his implication and from there on went his own way, are all Augustine’s. Eriugena 
sometimes uses Augustine to contradict Augustine, and has a different conception of freedom, 
substance, and the Fall, all aiding him to state that the soul actually only consists of free will. But 
he stays true to Augustine’s intentions in stating that the human being has lost the freedom of 
choice, and without grace will not be able to self-direct himself in the only right direction, i.e. 
towards God. And in identifying the substance of the soul with the will, Eriugena, other than 
Cassiodorus or Gottschalk, keeps the soul a hundred percent immaterial.    
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2. Genres 
 
The research in this thesis has purposefully taken place with texts from different genres: 
Eugippius’ massive florilegium, Cassiodorus’ traditional De anima, Gottschalk’s letter, and 
Eriugena’s long apologetic tractate. One of the questions was whether the constraints of the 
genre would lead to different kinds of reception of Augustine’s texts. Form most definitely 
dictates content in a general way in the case of Eugippius (a work built up exclusively from 
quotations), Cassiodorus (having to write about the traditional topics of a De anima such as the 
quality and quantity of the soul), and Eriugena (having to write against Gottschalk). Yet studying 
the source texts through close reading shows that the intellectual commitments of the author are 
a far more important factor for his use of Augustine. This can most clearly be seen in 
Cassiodorus’ case. Cassiodorus is perhaps the author who was most guided in his use of 
Augustine by his genre. A De anima after all asks of its author to explain what the soul is, what its 
quality is (‘how it is’), what it does, where it comes from and where it is going. Cassiodorus 
therefore ‘naturally’ turned to some of the texts of Augustine, most notably the an. quant. and the 
Gn. litt. 7. But the task of synthesizing Stoicism and Augustine that Cassiodorus set himself, led 
him to taking advantage of the Neo-Platonic young Augustine, stressing the reasonable part of 
soul and judgement over the will, only reserving the will to account for the negative mutability of 
the soul. This fundamental choice of Cassiodorus, which guided his use of Augustine in for 
example ignoring Augustine’s whole trinitarian discourse, was not dictated by the genre he was 
writing in.  
 
 
3. Origin of the Soul 
 
A red line in this thesis has been the way in which the interest of the authors in the 
ontology of the soul has been formed by their involvement in the predestination debate. 
Cassiodorus is the exception. Even though his De anima has a section on the origin of the soul, 
he does not engage in the predestination debate at all. It is fitting with the idea of a conservative 
and rather backward looking scholar to want to display his knowledge on the soul in a traditional 
way without getting involved in contemporary debates. At the same time also his temperament 
as politician, and the point in his intellectual career in which he wrote his De anima, i.e. as a fairly 
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recent convert, may have precluded him from going headlong into the debate. But the other 
three authors connect the ontology of the soul with the predestination debate. This may not 
come as a surprise with Eriugena, since the text under scrutiny is the div. praed. But in 
Gottschalk’s case it is even likely that he came to his insights in the ontology of the soul because 
of his engagement in double predestination. The reason why the ontology of the soul is relevant 
for the predestination debates is that the question of the origin of the soul has a bearing on the 
universality of original sin. The universality of original sin, which is the pivotal point in both a 
theodicy and an explanation why the human being should turn himself to God, became 
orthodoxy in the fifth century, but its consequences remained contested during the 
predestination debates which heated up from time to time without ever reaching a satisfactory 
conclusion. The ontological question of the origin of the soul became burdened with the task to 
technically explain how original sin was universalized. Out of Augustine’s options of creationism, 
traducianism and pre-existence of the soul, the first option would be preferred by the hard core 
Pelagians, who state that every soul is created free and unmarred by original sin. Already during 
the time-frame of the authors of the sixth century in this thesis, this position was no longer taken 
up. The option of traducianism is most congenial to intellectuals who want to have an easy way 
to grasp how original sin is universalized, in order to strengthen their defense of the necessity of 
grace.  
Gottschalk, who drew his implication of a ‘negative’ predestination to hell if there is a 
positive predestination to heaven, chose this as his answer to the question of the origin of the 
soul. But Augustine was right to mistrust this option, since he could not imagine one soul being 
borne by two parents. In his text the technical troubles that Gottschalk encounters once he has 
chosen that option become clear, and I hope some of it has been explained in the chapter on 
Gottschalk. It led Gottschalk to an almost materialistic conception of the soul, and for 
Augustine the immateriality of the soul was much more fundamental than any answer to the 
question of the origin of the soul. In other words, for Augustine the question of the substance of 
the soul (‘what’ the soul is) has priority over the question of the origin of the soul (after all 
answering this question was a fundamental step in Augustine’s own conversion). Perhaps 
Gottschalk would have agreed if he had approached the question from the side of the ontology 
of the soul instead of the predestination debates. 
Eugippius and Eriugena both have very original answers to this question, although from 
very opposite motivations. Eugippius did not want to inflame the debate further, and tried to 
find a ‘third’ way between creationism and traducianism (it seems the pre-existence of the soul 
had become an irrelevant option in terms of the predestination debate). He tried to relieve the 
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soul of the burden of spreading original sin and instead assign it to the rationes seminales of the 
human being. The modern (and I daresay correct) understanding of Augustine sees the rationes 
only operating in the coming into being of the human body, seeing how Augustine had argued 
against any precursor to the soul in Gn. litt. 7. But Eugippius does not seem to have shared that 
understanding, so that his rationes seminales apply to the whole composite of the human being, 
body and soul. However, due to the implicit nature of Eugippius’ way of arguing for this option 
through the copy-pasting of a florilegium, it is unclear how many readers may have recognized 
this option in the first place (perhaps his personal instruction of his most advanced pupils would 
have made such points much more obvious). What is clear is that Eugippius left a lasting 
impression with his forceful statement of Augustine’s agnosticism on the origin of the soul. For 
Cassiodorus the question of the origin of the soul was moot, since Augustine did not know the 
answer himself. The likelihood is very high that this is directly coming from Eugippius’ framing 
of affairs, cutting out all the analysis of the question in order not to provide potential 
ammunition in a predestination debate. Gottschalk in his turn had read Cassiodorus’ De anima 
for his letter and it is tempting to state that his positioning of the agnostic Augustine would be of 
Cassiodorus’ provenance. It may be the case that Cassiodorus and perhaps Eugippius guided him 
in this recognition, but Gottschalk was an avid reader of Augustine himself too, and this is 
shown by the fact that he laudably shores up Augustine’s agnosticism with original quotations 
and a description of the history of the an. et or. 
In opposition to Eugippius, Eriugena did not want to keep the peace, but took the 
commission to detract Gottschalk. He tried to break through the problem of the origin of the 
soul and how this technically ensures the universality of original sin (a dogma he shared with 
Gottschalk) by making the question totally irrelevant. Eriugena, as only author in this thesis, 
approaches the question from the totally different perspective of Augustine’s dynamical 
discourse on the soul (the activities of the soul of remembering, knowing, and willing). By 
explaining how the human being may not have lost his free will, but was universally affected by 
losing free choice, he deftly sidestepped Augustine’s -and everybody else’s for that matter- 
conundrum. Eriugena simplified the whole matter. Where everyone else wanted to explain the 
loss of free will technically through the more fundamental layer of the ontology of the soul, 
Eriugena stated that this ontological layer consisted of the will. In a way Eriugena stated that the 
symptom was the disease itself, so that no further complicated search was necessary. But the 
side-effect of his cure for the question of the origin of the soul is that the notion of individuality 
becomes hard to explain. 
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4. The sixth century and the ninth 
 
As far as a diachronic element is concerned, the authors in this thesis have been chosen 
from two distinct historical periods, the sixth century and the ninth. The intellectual climate 
between these two centuries is very different. Although even late antiquity was drawing to an end 
in the sixth century, Cassiodorus had had a classical education and curriculum and after his 
conversion could still entertain the dream of establishing a classical, albeit christian, university. 
Gottschalk and Eriugena were both members of a frankish culture, who as intellectuals were 
engaged in conserving and developing their roman christian heritage. Eugippius, as a sixth 
century monastic educated refugee from the fringes of the Roman empire, may form a bridge 
between these two positions. But they also had mutual intellectual concerns. Most broadly one 
may state that they were all concerned in their own way with saving humanity from doom, be it 
by converting to the true faith and establishing monasteries in order to save the soul in the 
afterlife (Cassiodorus), be it by trying to keep the moral community from shattering even if the 
political community had (Eugippius), or be it by saving humanity from future but also very much 
from contemporary turmoil through a proper insight into predestination (Gottschalk and 
Eriugena). More specifically predestination formed an intellectual topic with which the authors, 
Cassiodorus excluded, engaged. But in their approaches to predestination and the soul at large, 
there are also two interesting intellectual differences between the authors of the two periods.  
The first difference is that both Gottschalk and Eriugena have a systematizing tendency 
which is not exhibited in Eugippius or Cassiodorus. This is most visible in Eriugena. Through 
close reading his text, it becomes clear that Eriugena has a very clear abstract model of the 
human being which he uses to shape his arguments against Gottschalk. Assuming for the 
moment that the figure I have drawn of that model is correct, its simplicity is due to the 
conceptual clarity in Eriugena’s head and his way of thinking things through. Gottschalk has 
much less of such a conceptual clarity in the text under scrutiny in this thesis (and it may have 
been much quicker in the composing), but he shows an intellectual and systematic rigour in 
thinking through the implications of the option of origin of the soul he has chosen. In contrast 
with this Cassiodorus and Eugippius are not drawing implications and systematizing, but rather 
collecting and choosing, even if very skillful at times at that. 
The second difference is that both Gottschalk and Eriugena have a stronger engagement 
with the individual. Gottschalk shows this strongest, by positing a special divine volition for the 
coming into being of every individual human being. What differentiates humanity from the rest 
of creation in Gottschalk’s eyes is that every individual member of our species has been brought 
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about by God’s special attention. Eriugena also spends thought on what the individuation 
principle is for the human being. What separates our individual soul from any other soul is not 
some divine volition, or our potency to choose and act, but the actual choices we have made in 
our historical lives. Stated this way it may not seem so strange that Eriugena was made out as a 
Pelagian, if Eriugena also had not stressed the absolute need for grace for free choice of the will. 
 
The method of close reading which has been applied in this thesis (hopefully) leads to an 
assessment and appreciation of every individual author. But it also has its drawbacks. For one, it 
limits the amount of source text one can go through so that the number of authors in the 
investigation had to be limited. It also leads to a focus on differences, differences between 
Augustine and the author, and in this conclusion differences between the authors’ reception of 
Augustine. More texts will have to be studied and more similarities have to be noted if one wants 
to chart a tradition or culture. But at least with the engagement in the predestination debates in 
which three of the authors in this thesis had engaged, I hope to have shown some of the 
iterations and alterations on a topic that led to the formation of an intellectual tradition.  
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 Appendices 
 
1. Two models of change for the soul in 
the young Augustine 
 
 
 
 
1.1 mutability of the soul 
 
Not long after the Cassiciacum period –as Cary points out-, from the mor. and the an. 
quant. onwards (387-389), Augustine would reject the divinity of the soul.449 This fits in with the 
anti-Manichean polemic, since the Manicheans claim that God and the soul are of the same 
substance.450 Augustine rejects this, pointing out that, although the soul is not mutable in space, 
it is mutable over time.451 In the previous paragraph, the mutability of the soul had already been 
mentioned briefly. The soul is after all mutable since it is now stupid, then wise.452 Yet this 
mutability of the soul is not only intellectual, but at the same time moral.453 The change of the 
soul has a definite direction for Augustine: it improves or deteriorates, it turns itself towards the 
life of reason or towards the life of the senses. The soul thereby undergoes a change over time, 
with which it takes a middle position between the divine, which is immutable per se, and 
corporeal nature, which is mutable in place and time.454 
In explaining how the soul is mutable, Augustine needed to steer clear from positing a 
change that affected the soul too much, since the soul has a definite position in the order of 
creation from which it cannot verge. But at the same time Augustine was of the opinion that the 
change that the soul undergoes is of crucial importance for the human being. In his early period, 
especially the imm. an., Augustine tried to clarify the mutability of the soul using two models, one 
of Aristotelian and one of Plotinian origin. However, these models do not go together well 
 
449 Cary (2000), 111. 
450 e.g. c. Fort., 11; cf. O’ Daly (1978), 32. 
451 div. qu. 19. 
452 e.g. div. qu. 54. 
453 cf. O’Daly (1978), 32. 
454 ep. 18.2; cf div. qu. 19. 
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because of their different metaphysical backgrounds. It is therefore not surprising that in the 
later Augustine one mode of explanation suppressed the other. 
 
 
1.2 two models of change: the model of Aristotelian origin 
 
As an introduction Augustine speaks in the imm. an. 5.7 of two kinds of change in the 
soul: first by the fact that the body affects the soul (secundum corporis passiones) for example 
through age and sickness, and secondly by its own affections (secundum suas passiones) such as 
desire and fear.455 He does not go further into the relationships between the two kinds of change, 
since what is important for Augustine in that paragraph and the next is to show that there is no 
change of the soul whatsoever that entails a change in the nature of the rational soul. Just as he 
would later argue in the Gn. litt. 7.10.14 that the human rational soul can never deteriorate so 
much as to become an animal soul.456 The first explanation of this occurs in imm. an. 8 and 9. In 
these paragraphs Augustine distinguishes a ‘minor’ change (aliqua mutatio) from a ‘radical’ change 
(tanta mutatio). In the minor change some of the properties ‘in’ the subject (in subiecto) may 
change, without the whole subject changing. Yet if the change is so great that the subject itself 
changes, then none of the properties of the subject remain unaltered. The subject itself changes 
when we are compelled to give the product of the change a different ‘name’ (nomen), so that the 
definition of the subject is changed. In order to clarify this explanation he chooses wax as an 
example: wax may change its physical appearance such as shape or colour, but remains wax. Yet 
when the wax is consumed by the flame, e.g. of a candle, so that it melts and disappears, it will 
no longer be wax.457 In that case none of the properties can remain in the wax.458 
 
455 cf. O’Daly (1978), 34. 
456 cf. Plato, Timaeus (trans. Donald Zeyl) 91d-92c. 
457 cf. sol. 2.12.22. 
458 It is a question where Augustine derived his wax example from. Numerous mentions of cera are given by for 
example the Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford 1982), p. 300, yet an –at least superficial- survey does not yield a 
relevant source, although all the examples together eventually list the accidental properties of the wax that Augustine 
mentions. Rolf Hurschmann in Der neue Pauly (Stuttgart 1997) vol. 2, 1069 mainly refers to Pliny’s Natural History 
books 11 and 22. In their own lemma on wax, Büll’s and Moser’s supplement to Pauly’s Realencyclopädie vol. 13 
(Stuttgart 1975), 1347-1416 speaks, apart from the uses of wax and similar topics, about the development of the 
symbolism of light and its use in liturgical candle burning such as the Easter candle in the Christian church, a 
development contemporary with Augustine. Yet, although it might be tempting to read Christian symbolism into 
this passage, there really is no lead to do so. Büll and Moser do not offer a reference for the use of wax as an 
example for change. The author admits that there is as yet –in 1980- no systematic treatment of the sources on wax. 
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This model of change can be traced back to Aristotle, whose Categories Augustine had 
read when young.459 In the Categories a difference is made between what pertains to the definition 
or the substance of a subject and what can be found ‘in’ the subject.460 Every property which 
determines a subject to be what it is, belongs to the definition, as ‘reason’ for example –along 
with other properties- determines the human being. Yet other properties, such as colour, merely 
qualify the subject, for example as a white specimen. These properties have come to be called 
respectively ‘substantial’ and ‘accidental’ properties. On this model of change a subject can thus 
change with respect to its accidental properties while remaining what it is, keeping its definition. 
Yet when the substantial properties are altered, then the substance changes. Augustine either 
through the translation in which he read the Categories, or through his own devices, alters the way 
in which he speaks about this model. He violates the Aristotelian use of ‘in’ by claiming that all 
properties, thus also the substantial, are found in the subject. However the wax-example makes it 
clear that the accidental-substantial distinction underlies the juxtaposition of ‘some change’ and 
‘great change’. All the examples which Augustine gives of ‘minor’ change, such as colour, shape 
and temperature are accidental properties of the wax, whereas the ‘great change’ during the 
burning affects the substance itself. The fact that Augustine has his wax burnt in the example is 
very interesting for two reasons. First of all it intends to clarify the principle that through 
substantial change no property can remain in the substance. Nothing of the wax is left after the 
burning for the properties to adhere to. Supposedly Aristotle would not concur on this principle, 
since at least two properties persist if one would construct a red wooden chair from a red 
wooden table. This also brings out the second reason why the burning is interesting. If Aristotle 
speaks of substantial change, he would have one thing changed into another thing, so that 
another definition applies. Yet with the burning of the wax Augustine implies that after the 
substantial change nothing is left. This is partly warranted, since after a substantial change at least 
nothing is left of the substance before the change. However, in my view, Augustine’s motivation 
for this ‘change-into-nothing’ is to have this model of Aristotelian origin converge with the 
model of Plotinian origin that will be treated in a moment.   
The principle that during substantial change no property persists is important for 
Augustine, since it entails that the soul cannot undergo substantial change if there is at least one 
property which remains throughout all possible change of the soul. For Augustine reason turns 
out to be this persisting property, thereby barring the soul from substantial change. The soul will 
 
459 conf. 2.48; cf. O’Daly (1978), 36. He rightly points to Aristotle, Categories 2 1a20 ff, and gives in n. 89 literature 
about the question in what form Augustine read this work; cf. Cary (2000), 102-103. 
460 e.g. Cat, 5.2a34-2b7. 
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thus never cease to exist, and is therefore immortal. For Augustine this explains why the soul, as 
the principle of life, cannot die. On Augustine’s understanding this model of change thus states 
that a change in the accidental properties of a subject are ‘minor’ (aliqua mutatio) and the subject 
persists. While a ‘radical’ change affects the substance (subesse) and definition (nomen) of the thing 
itself, destroying all the properties along with it. O’ Daly thus states: ‘Now it is precisely 
qualitative change that Augustine wishes to attribute to soul; what is ‘in soul’ as in a subject may 
(but need not necessarily) change: that is to say the soul’s affections, its will, or its moral and 
intellectual condition may alter. These changes do not, however, affect the substantial identity of 
the soul.’461 For the unity and continued existence of the soul is precisely what ensures these 
possibilities of accidental change. According to this explanation the moral state of the soul is 
therefore unconnected to the ontological status of the soul: however deep the human being (and 
thus its soul) may be morally deteriorated through involvement in the life of the senses, the soul 
gives form or species to the body and can never (totally) cease to engage in rational activity, since 
the rational soul remains to be what it is. The wretched man and the saint thus have essentially 
the same soul. According to this model of Aristotelian origin the moral state of the soul is 
therefore unconnected to the ontological state, since the moral change is only accidental. 
 
 
1.3 the model of Plotinian origin 
 
Yet this division between the moral and the ontological state of the soul seems strange if 
we look at the second way in which Augustine speaks about the mutability of the soul. The 
second model of change, which has its roots in Plotinus, is given by Augustine in 7.12 and 8.13 
of the imm. an. when he discusses the dangers for the immortality of the soul. If, as we have just 
seen, reason ensures the immortality of the soul, does this not mean that turning from reason 
towards the senses undermines this immortality? Augustine tells us that the soul which turns to 
reason and wisdom exists more fully, while the soul that turns from reason and truth to 
foolishness does so at its own cost of a lessened being (esse minus). Through the defect of turning 
from reason, the soul tends towards nothingness since all defect ‘tends towards nothingness’ 
(tendit ad nihilum). This lessening of the being has to be understood as becoming ‘more deformed’ 
(deformius), thus a lessening of the species of the being, and thereby the soul becomes ‘uglier’ 
(foedius). However this privation of form can never be said to be so great that the soul totally 
 
461 O’ Daly (1978), 37. He, however, does not note that Augustine talks of all the properties being ‘in the subject’. 
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ceases to exist. Augustine finds it hard to explain why, but compares this lessening with the 
cutting in half of a body. As a body can be cut into half infinitely, yet never reach nothing, so the 
soul will never cease to exist totally. This second model regards the being not as its form (species). 
It seems that this second model also admits of two types of change, but we will see that it does 
not really. In a ‘minor’ change, the form of a being can be more or less present, providing the 
being with more or less beauty and being. However, throughout this ‘minor’ change, the being 
remains the same being since the form is still there. A ‘radical’ change occurs when the form 
totally dissolves, thus when the being has a total privation of form (privatio). Then the being 
ceases to be that particular being. Although it thus seems as if there are two types of change, 
there is really only one kind of change. For in this model, every change has to be seen as shift on 
a continuous spectrum of presence of form, where the total absence of the form and the death 
of the being only constitutes one of the extremes of the spectrum. But, for Augustine, the 
extreme at the low end will never be reached by the soul. 
This model is derived from Plotinus, who explains how the soul deforms itself and tends 
towards nothingness through its involvement in the material world. It is therefore his views on 
matter and the generation of matter by soul which most probably are Augustine’s source for the 
second model of change. Plotinus explains his views on soul and matter mainly in Enneads I.8, 
II.4 and III.9. It will of course always be the question whether Augustine read these precise parts 
of the Enneads, yet there is no doubt that Augustine was in no small measure influenced by 
Plotinus and these parts specifically clarify Augustine’s second explanation. In my explanation of 
Plotinus I follow closely Dennis O’Brien’s interpretation in his succinct ‘Plotinus on matter and 
evil’.462 This will take some space, yet I believe it is useful for understanding Augustine. It is 
perhaps most clarifying to start with O’Brien’s conclusion that matter serves as the theodicy, 
since it explains the presence of evil in a reality which is dependant on the good principle of the 
One.463 Matter thus has to be evil and has to stand in some kind of opposition to the One. Yet at 
the same time it cannot be the absolute opposite to the One. In that case there would two 
principles governing reality, and the production of reality would not be guided by necessity, but 
by the chance in their relationship.464 Although matter is therefore evil and opposite to the One, 
in Plotinus’ hierarchy of reality, it is still the utter last stage of production coming from the One. 
Here the soul comes into play, for it is the universal Soul which is responsible for the production 
of matter, as agent of the One. This Soul produces the cosmos, whereas individual ‘partial’ souls 
 
462 Dennis O’Brien (1996).  
463 O’Brien (1996), 171, 189-190. 
464 Plotinus, II.4.2.9-10; cf. O’Brien (1996), 181, 187. Plotinus would not permit two principles governing reality, 
from which his polemic with the Gnostics stemmed. 
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produce the bodies in it through the power of growth of the vegetative soul.465 There are thus 
two closely interrelated questions. How do the individual souls produce and engage in this evil 
matter, and in what opposition does matter stand to the One?  
 
 
1.4 matter as form of non being; the participation of the soul in 
non-being  
 
Let us start with the second question. The One is the first principle and as such it is not 
only good, but also complete being and the source of being. If matter would be the absolute 
opposite of the One, it would represent absolute non-being. Yet Parmenides showed that it is 
impossible to speak or even conceive of non-being per se.466 Plotinus, however, did not oppose 
matter (ὕλη) to being (ὄν), but to substance (οὐσία). The difference is that matter is not opposite 
to existing, but to the forms (λόγοι/εἴδη) which are the substances.467 Plotinus explained this by 
taking the Aristotelian concept of privation. Privation is absence of form, and in Aristotle’s view 
when the form arrives, the privation of that form is negated and annihilated. Hereby Aristotle 
could explain the change, or coming into being, of one thing into another, while denying the idea 
of creation from nothing, which would have to be admitted if the form would come into the 
body without ‘preparation’. This privation was attributed to the underlying matter, which served 
as a continuous substrate throughout the whole process. One body thus comes into being from 
another through filling the privation for the form that the matter of the previous body has for 
the form of the new body. In effect the forms thus get replaced in the matter and the privation 
for the new form is removed. Plotinus adapted the concept of privation (στέρησις). On his 
version of the concept, matter is identical with privation, since the substance is already made up 
by the form.468 Moreover, when the form arrives in the matter, the privation is not removed. 
Throughout change, privation is thus persistent for Plotinus.469 Form is what defines the being 
(οὐσία), and it is in this way that matter as privation is the ‘form’ of non-being.470 The 
implication is thus that form cannot really be combined with matter, since the form as definition 
 
465 Plotinus, III.9.3;III.4.1; O’Brien (1996), 181. 
466 O’Brien (1996), 172. This is a second reason why matter cannot be taken as the absolute opposition to One, 
apart from the idea that it would otherwise constitute a second principle of reality. 
467 Plotinus, II.4.16.1-3; O’Brien (1996), 173. 
468 Plotinus, II.6.1.8-9. 
469 Plotinus, II.4.16. 
470 Plotinus, I.8.3; O’Brien (1996), 176-177. 
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of the being cannot be combined with the privation of the form. On this view there is just no 
underlying substrate which can really bind form and matter as opposite to form together.471 If 
matter thus is the form of non-being, then it is evil. For form gives definition and measure and is 
therefore good and beautiful. Matter as the contrary is ugly and bad.472 Matter thus stands not in 
absolute opposition to the one as non-being. But it is the form of non-being that every body 
needs in order to change into another body. Every body thus has a certain unmeasuredness, 
ugliness and evil to it, since it eventually changes into another. 
The first question was how the individual soul is engaged in evil matter. In Plotinus’ 
scheme of reality every stage is produced by the previous, and the individual soul thus produces 
the matter of the bodies. Yet, contrary to ‘ordinary’ production in Plotinus, the soul diminishes 
itself when it does produce a body. It is only directed to itself and wishes to be self-sufficient and 
to produce an image of itself, instead of directing itself to its own source. The soul is the 
definition of a being, and when the soul produces the image of itself (i.e. the body), it becomes 
less defined. It creates something ‘non-existent’.473 The soul thus participates in the non-being 
and loses form.474  
Returning to Augustine and his second way of explaining the mutability of the soul, it is 
now understandable how he comes to talk of the soul ‘tending towards nothingness’ and 
becoming more ‘ugly’ in imm. an. 7.12 and 8.13. For with the moral deterioration, the soul loses 
its form and is thus lessened in measure and order. Recapitulating, this model of change thus 
locates both the ‘minor’ and the ‘radical’ change in the form of the soul. In this model it makes 
sense to speak of proportional or gradual change, since the soul can be more or less present, or 
existent, depending on the question whether it is engaged in the spiritual life of reason or in the 
material life of the senses. Thus according to Augustine the soul can be infinitely lessened, 
although not cease to exist. A minor caveat has to be made here, since Augustine did not copy 
Plotinus’ ideas on matter. Where he may have been more negative about matter at the start of his 
Christian career than at its end, he never thought about matter, as part of the intrinsically good 
creation, as the absolute evil and absolute privation.475 
 
471 Plotinus, I.8.6.54-9.O’Brien (1996), 176. 
472 Plotinus, I.8.3; I.8.10. 
473 Plotinus, III.9.3; O’Brien (1996), 182. 
474 Plotinus, I.8.4. At least, there is discussion over this. Rist (1967), 122 will claim that the act of creation by the 
individual soul is cause of its diminishment, since they cannot resist their creation. O’Brien (1996), 186 claims that it 
is the soul who is ‘too eager’ to engage in the material world, after the creation will be evil. What combines the two 
interpretations is the attitude of the soul towards the matter: can it turn from it again, or does it get tied down? For 
present purposes it is not necessary to go into this debate. 
475 e.g. vera rel. 21. 
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On the surface Augustine combines the two models. The two models do converge in the 
idea that a thing can change without changing ‘radically’, thus without changing its nature or 
definition. And both models seem to involve a receding into nothingness, since Augustine has 
his wax sample burnt in the first model. Yet this convergence of models is only superficial. In 
the first model of Aristotelian origin a minor change is effected by a change in the accidental 
properties, in the second model of Plotinian origin it is effected by more or less presence of the 
form. Yet the models as Augustine used them differ in what is affected through such a ‘minor’ 
change. In the first model the locus of change is the accidental properties, which are in no way 
tied up with the being or definition of the thing. But it is exactly the being or definition which is 
the locus of change in the second model. The two models are contradictory in this point: in the 
Aristotelian model accidental change is a different change from substantial change, in the 
Plotinian model it is the same change, but the difference is in the degree of the change. This 
superficial convergence of the two models can be only superficial, since the metaphysical 
assumptions behind the two models are contradictory. The first model takes the being for 
granted and revolves around the question whether one can apply the name or the definition to 
the being or not. In other words, the assumption is that it is either this being, or it is not. Being 
can therefore be thought of as ‘binary’, it has a discrete value of 1 or 0, True or False. According 
to Aristotle in the Categories, it is nonsense to speak of ‘half a man’ since being does not admit 
gradation. 476 Yet the second model exactly does admit gradation of being. The form can be more 
or less present, there can be more or less being to the subject, since for Plotinus substance is 
attached to the form which can diminish or increase. The assumption is that being has a 
measure, and the actual subject is measured to the ideal in the case of the full presence of the 
form. Being can be thought of as ‘analogue’, it has a continuous value between 1 or 0, between 
total presence and total privation of the form. 
 
 
1.5 implications of the models for the moral state of the soul 
 
This deeper contradiction between the models of change can only come at a cost. 
Augustine pays by having very different implications of the models for the mutability of the soul. 
 
476 Aristotle (trans. Harold Cooke), Categories 5.3b34-4a9. This idea does not only count for the comparison of 
substances of the same species, e.g. two human beings, but also for the comparison of different substances, say a 
man and a horse. In Aristotle’s view a human being ‘is’ just as much as a horse. While in the ordering of the universe 
according to Augustine, a human being ‘is’ more, has more being than a horse. The form, measure and being are 
hierarchically placed in the divine ordering of the cosmos. 
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In connection with his search for the origin of evil, Augustine was most interested in the change 
that the soul undergoes in its moral state. In the first model of change, the change that the soul 
undergoes never affects the core of the soul. All change is accidental, thus that most important 
of changes, namely moral change, is accidental too. This first model thus entails a definite divide 
between the ontological status of the soul and moral change, since the moral sphere in no way 
affects the being of the human. Whatever happens, the most wretched human and the saint have 
in essence the same soul, since the definition ‘soul’ is applicable to both. Choices of the 
individual human therefore do not affect the being of the human soul. The soul has a very stable 
core and in the context of the imm. an. this very forcefully explains that despite the accidental 
moral mutability of the soul, the soul is essentially immortal. A danger lies therefore in 
diminishing the importance of moral change for the soul. No matter what happens and which 
choices you make, your soul is safe to live on. But Augustine was not inclined to diminish the 
relevance of the moral status for the soul, and introduced the second model of change (7.12-
8.13) a few paragraphs after the first model (5.7-9). 
In the second model, the consequences for the influence of the moral sphere on the 
being of the soul are remarkably different. The moral circumstances of the soul affect exactly 
that which is supposed to ensure the continuity throughout the change, since they affect the 
form of the soul. Better men have more form to their soul, and therefore more measure, beauty 
and being. Although the moral circumstances may be barred from delivering the ultimate capital 
punishment of death to the soul, it is clear that there is a strong tie between the ontological and 
the moral spheres. Being comes in degrees, and in the case of the soul the moral state can be 
seen as the setting for the actual degree. The individual choices thus have a great effect for the 
way in which the human being realizes itself. The form of the soul, that continuing element 
which ensures the identity of the soul, is very flexible and mutable, and is affected in many ways. 
In this more pessimistic view of the soul it seems more a miracle than a necessity that the soul 
does not pass away at all. Yet it does not, and this is what ensures its immortality. 
 
 
1.6 survival 
 
The question looms large why Augustine would be inclined to have these contradictory 
models of change. Right where it counts, in their explanation of how the soul experiences a 
‘minor’ change, thus where the soul is mutable but stays soul, these models are contradictory. 
Augustine may or may not have realized the contradiction, but it is clear that only one of the 
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models of change survived in Augustine’s mature thought. When we will have a look at which of 
the models survived, we will get an indication towards Augustine’s motif to use two models. The 
Aristotelian model is best characterised by the term in subiecto. This term is used not only in the 
imm. an., but also in the conf., where Augustine explicitly connects the term with Aristotle’s 
categories, when he explains how wrong it was to try to apply the categories to God.477 The 
observations then are that the phrase is certainly used by the mature Augustine, although not 
that much and that he uses the term more Aristotelian, by only having the term refer to the 
accidental properties.478 And in ep. 162.4, written 414 or 415 he used the term to explain Evodius 
and his brothers how dreams are dependant on our minds but do not subsist of themselves. The 
term is thus later used to distinguish that which can exists on its own from that which cannot, 
but is never more connected to the mutability of the soul.  
This is not the case for the Plotinian model of change. In the vera rel., written just before 
and at the time of the consecration of Augustine as priest in 391, Augustine describes in 11.21-
12.24 the evils of the soul and the return to God. In these paragraphs he clearly uses the second 
model of change. ‘The life that through a voluntary defect defects from him who made it, and 
whose substance it enjoys, yet wishing against God’s law to enjoy the bodies, at whose command 
God placed life, verges to nothing.’479 ‘For which reason the life, which delighted at the 
enjoyment of the bodies neglects God, inclines to nothingness, and that is perversion.’480 
Augustine can thus speak of the death of the soul as a metaphor when it turns from God as the 
source of being towards nothingness.481 ‘But death does not belong to life, if not as perversion 
(nequitia), which is said of what is not some thing; and that is why exceedingly perverted people 
are called “people of nothing”.’482 It is impossible to speak of a metaphorical death of the soul 
using the model of Aristotelian descent which compartmentalizes the change of the soul to the 
accidental properties. But in the Platonist tradition, the soul as form cannot die and at the death 
of the body will recede. This is exactly the idea that Augustine uses, although the moral death 
 
477 conf. 4.16.29. 
478 apart from the just mentioned conf. and soon to be mentioned ep. 162.4 are the trin. 7.10; 9.5; 10.15; c. Iul. 2.37; 
4.19; 5.51; 6.62 with a very clear definition of that which is reified (reatus) is a subiect or substance and that which is 
in subiecto is dependant. 
479 vera rel. 11.21: vita ergo voluntario defectu deficiens ab illo, qui eam fecit et cuius essentia fruebatur, et volens contra dei legem frui 
corporibus, quibus eam deus praefecit, vergit ad nihilum. 
480 vera rel. 11.22: quapropter vita, quae fructu corporis delectata neglegit deum, inclinatur ad nihilum, et ista est nequitia. 
481 Gn. litt. 7.28.43; O’Daly (1978), 35. 
482 vera rel. 11.21: mors autem vitae non est nisi nequitia, quae ab eo quod nequiquam sit dicta est, et ideo nequissimi homines nihili 
homines appellantur. 
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will never provoke the physical death. The model of change of Plotinian origin thus suppressed 
the other model for explaining the mutability of the soul.483 
It is therefore not enough to claim, as O’Daly does, that Augustine wanted to attribute 
‘qualitative change’ to the soul.484 I do not believe that Augustine after the imm. an. ever thought 
of the mutability of the soul in terms of accidental-essential. More precisely, it was for him 
exactly the essence of the soul which is mutable, although in measure and not in definition. But 
to come back to the question why Augustine would have used two incompatible models, how 
can the survival of only one of the models give us information about the motives of the younger 
Augustine to use the two? In order to answer this question we have to look at a change in 
Augustine’s theory of soul, with which the Plotinian model fits better than the Aristotelian.  
 
 
1.7 divinity of the soul? -encore 
  
An explanation why Augustine might have used the two models of change may be found 
in the confusion described earlier, about the divinity of the soul. The Aristotelian model of 
change is very suitable if one wants to stress the continuity of the human soul. In this model 
reason is an essential and thus inseparable property of the human soul.485 The stability of the 
truths found, or even constituted by reason in this model is the safeguard against the mortality of 
the soul and a possible starting point for arguing the divinity of the soul. Truth, for example in a 
mathematical reasoning is either there, or not. It is just not possible for the truth of the 
statement ‘1 + 1 = 2’ to be more or less present. The first model is therefore very suitable for 
claiming that the soul has a divine stability to its essence. The second model is much less suitable 
for such a line of thought. It is harder to claim the divinity of the soul when it is mutable exactly 
in the measure of its being. When Augustine reached certainty on this question, it is therefore 
not surprising that the Plotinian model became the only one to be used in his thinking. This 
model coheres with the idea that there is a dynamic to the dependency of the soul on God, a 
result from the creation from nothing.   
 
 
483 This point is in accordance with Cary’s general idea that Augustine, instead of losing Neoplatonist influence, 
actually became more Plotinian. Yet I am wary of stressing this idea too much, since I also believe that the biblical 
influence in Augustine gained a much larger place after c. 390, in accordance with Rist’s second ‘signpost’ of the 
ordination of Augustine to priesthood. 
484 O’Daly (1978), 37. 
485 imm. an. 6.11. 
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1.8 the change of motion (reason, will) 
 
With respect to the survival of these models of change it is interesting to see that there is 
also change in Augustine’s stress on what moves the soul.486 In the previous paragraph, it was 
shown that in the very early Augustine reason is a motion of the soul. Through the prominence 
of reason in Augustine’s early works, it was reason that received the stress as the inalienable 
motion of the mind. In my view the idea of reason as motion can be given a further context if 
we look at the following passage from the imm. an. 3.3: 
 
‘There is a certain power in what remains fixed, and all that remains fixed 
is unchanging, and every power can perform some action, and precisely when it 
performs the action it is a power. Now every action is either the result of 
movement or itself produces movement. So, then, either not everything which is 
the result of movement or certainly not everything which causes movement is 
changing. But everything which is moved by something and itself does not cause 
movement is something mortal, and nothing mortal is unchanging. Therefore we 
can conclude with certainty and without any exceptions that not everything which 
causes movement is changed.487 
(trans. Gerard Watson)  
 
What Augustine talks about here, is how the soul as a ‘fixed’ (thus immortal) being 
moves a body without itself being moved or changed and thus is the virtus of the body.488 He 
thus juxtaposes the soul and the body. However, I propose to take the first more general 
statement out of its immediate context and apply it to reason and soul. At this moment I see no 
better warrant for this but the fact that it is a general statement that serves as a kind of general 
introduction to the argument that the soul moves the body without being moved itself. 
Moreover, I believe this is warranted, since as the soul serves as a fixed and immutable point of 
reference for the mutable body, so reason serves as a fixed and immutable point of reference for 
 
486 I do not want to claim that reason is the only motion of the mind. As the imm. an. 5.7 says, the mind can change 
under the affections of the body and of itself. For example emotions are also motions of the mind. Especially these 
motions have to be governed by reason in gn. adv. man. 1.20.31.  
487 imm. an. 3.3: Quaedam constantiae virtus est et omnis constantia inmutabilis est et omnis virtus potest aliquid agere nec, cum agit 
aliquid, virtus non est. omnis porro action aut movetur aut movet. aut igitur non omne, quod movetur, aut certe non omne, quod movet, 
mutabile est. at omne, quod ab alio movetur nec movet ipsum, aliquid mortale est. neque mortale quicquam inmutabile. quare de certo 
iam et sine ulla disiunctione concluditur non omne, quod movet, mutari. 
488 cf. Gerard Watson’s commentary to the imm. an. in the Soliloquies and the Immortatlity of the Soul (Warminster 1990), 
200-201. 
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the mutable soul. It may be confusing how the soul is then both mutable and immutable, but in 
my view this can be reconciled. For the soul is immutable with respect to the kind of mutability 
of the body. The soul does not move in place as the body does. Moreover, the soul is immortal, 
thus cannot undergo the ‘radical’ change as the body can. Yet, if we compare the soul with 
reason, it becomes clear that the soul is mutable. For reason, being closely connected with truth, 
is eternal and stable, whereas the soul is mutable as we have seen earlier, albeit that this 
mutability is only ‘minor’. According to this principle the soul is thus the virtus of the body, as 
reason is the virtus of the soul. This reasoning gives further insight into the relation between 
reason and soul in the young Augustine and sheds light on the development of his thought. In 
the imm. an. it is the stability of reason, and the truths which are pertaining to it, which ensure the 
immortality of the soul. If reason is thus taken as ‘fixed’ (constans) then reason has a power to 
move something, without itself being moved. Reason as truth then moves the soul, bringing 
insight to the mind through a ‘motion’, without moving or changing itself. The soul itself, 
however, is very capable of change, being now foolish, then wise. Reason as truth thus moves 
the soul, which movement then can be taken as individual reasoning of the individual mind, 
‘looking’ at the truth that correct reasoning provides. On this interpretation, the soul is 
inseparably connected with the truths that reason as objective reason provides, as is certainly the 
gist of the argument of the imm. an. The individual human being, however, may have more or 
less movement in his mind, giving him more or less understanding. Yet the soul is in a way 
heteronomous, since it always has a connection with the truth. The suggestion is then that the 
soul is caused to move by reason. But it is at least clear that there is something more stable and 
eternal, on which the immortality of the soul is dependent. And in the young Augustine of the 
Cassiciacum period, this is stressed as the motion to the mind.  
But the stress on reason as the motion of the mind proved not to be durable in 
Augustine’s thinking. As Augustine turned more to solving the problem of the presence of evil, 
he stressed the will as the origin of evil. Around the time of the composition of the lib. arb. (388-
395), the primary location of action of the soul therefore changes from reason to the will. Div. 
qu. 2, 4 and 8 are clear examples of this intellectual movement: where div. qu. 2 asserts that the 
human being has received a will (voluntas), 4 takes the will to be the cause of moral deterioration. 
In 8 then the question is posed whether the soul moves by itself. The answer is positive: ‘He 
feels that the soul moves by its own, who feels that he has a will in himself.’489 In the context of 
the fall of the angels in the vera rel.: ‘But what touches as affects the soul, that influences the 
 
489 div. qu. 8: Moveri per se animam sentit, qui sentit in se esse voluntatem. 
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bodies as place: for it is moved by the will, the body by space.’490 The stress on will over reason 
as the motion of the mind is made clear in the lib. arb. 1.25.12. The will is taken as a necessary 
condition for knowledge: the desire for knowledge serves as the starting point for the 
investigation.491 If we recall the two models of explanation of change, then the survival of the 
Plotinian model of change fits well with the emphasis on the will as the movement of the soul. 
For the will in this model has the opportunity to affect the core being of the soul, while in the 
Aristotelian model the separate volitions are just accidental qualities of the soul that come and 
go. The result of the stress on will as the motion of the soul thereby results in loosening the ties 
the soul has with eternal truth. For the will has a starting point which is entirely in the soul itself, 
whereas reason in the individual soul has to rely on the even more stable reason or truths that 
pertain to it. In the young Augustine the immortality of the soul was more important than its 
mutability, but with the change of stress from reason to will as the action of the soul, its 
mutability was shown to be of greater importance. 
 
490 vera rel. 14.28: Quod autem affectibus contingit animae, hoc locis corpori, nam illa movetur voluntate, 
corpus autem spatio. 
491 Simon Harrison (1999), 201-202. 
 2. Cassiodorus’ use of Tertullian 
 
 
 
 
If Cassiodorus is working with different models of the soul, then he is working with 
different texts on the soul.492 This is the place for a short gaze towards another text that 
Cassiodorus might have used. Di Marco relates the origin of Cassiodorus’ Stoicism to a ‘koine 
stoicizzante’, which does not further direct us towards specific texts.493 However, he also remarks 
that Cassiodorus’ De anima is the first well structured and ‘organical’ De anima since the one 
Tertullian wrote in the 3rd c.494 Especially given the fact that Tertullian, also under influence of 
Stoicism, held to a materialistic conception of the soul it is important to take a short look at this 
De anima as well. Moreover, Tertullian included extensive doxographies in his De anima, so that it 
is very likely that Cassiodorus consulted him for more than Tertullian’s own opinions. 
Cassiodorus could have gained much information on the Stoics from these doxographies.495 
There are some strong oppositions (Tertullian believes the soul as material has some properties 
that other bodies have too, such as a three dimensional shape. De anima 9). But some similarities 
between the two De anima’s are so striking that the use of Tertullian by Cassiodorus seems likely. 
Here I will shortly indicate three similarities: Tertullian’s use of the word ‘spirit’, the main 
features of his conception of the human soul and the effects of the will.  
Tertullian has breath (spiritus) as the principle of life, since there is no life without 
breathing (this also goes for small animals without respiratory organs), which leads to the 
conclusion that spiritus and soul anima are one, the difference being that the first word relates to 
the function of life and the second to the substance (10). This spiritus thus thoroughly pervades 
all life on earth, and is invisible (at least for the human eye) (8).496 The substance of soul is simple 
and has a nature peculiar to itself.497 The soul of the human being thus also is made from this 
 
492 As is the topic of Di Marco (1985), who looks beyond Augustine as well.  
493 Di Marco (1985), 98. 
494 ibid. 96. 
495 as indeed modern scholars do as well. E. g. according to Annas (1992) 38 n. 4 Tertullian’s discussion of the Stoic 
materialistic conception of the soul (‘physicality of the soul’) one of the ‘most interesting and ancient discussions’. 
496 Tertullian does not, however, connect the words substantia and spiritus in a set term, such as substantia spiritalis as 
Cassiodorus does.  
497 De an. 9, Cum animae corpus adserimus propriae qualitatis et sui generis, iam haec condicio proprietatis de ceteris accidentibus 
corpulentiae praeiudicabit aut haec adesse, quam corpus ostendimus, sed et ipsa sui generis pro corporis proprietate, aut etsi non adsint, 
hoc esse proprietatis, non adesse corpori animae quae corporibus ceteris adsint. Et tamen non inconstanter profitebimur sollemniora 
quaeque et omnimodo debita corpulentiae adesse animae quoque, ut habitum, ut terminum, ut illud trifariam distantiuum, longitudinem 
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spiritus. But the soul of the human being is also special, since the Bible tells us it has been made 
by the breath (flatus) of God (3). But God’s breath (flatus) has to be distinguished from his Spirit 
–taken in a biblical sense-, even though ‘to blow’ (flare) is the same as ‘to breathe’ (respire). But 
God’s Spirit cannot be identified with the spiritus on earth (11). Thus we see here, although 
spread out over several chapters in Tertullian, nearly the same three species of the word ‘spirit’ as 
we came across in the definition of Cassiodorus: an invisible substance which pervades all souls 
(although I have not seen Tertullian report that it pervades all the cosmos), the soul of the 
human being and the Spirit of God. 
Tertullian’s conception of the soul of the human being shares many elements with 
Cassiodorus. The soul of the human being is totally rational (19). It is the soul that judges, thus 
there is no question of judging (‘forming opinions’, ‘opinari’) by the senses (17). The soul is 
undivided and has no different parts (14, 16) and serves as the ruling principle of the body (15). 
Even though animals and human beings share in spiritus, the human soul is really something else. 
Transmigration of the human soul into an animal in a following life is absurd, since they have a 
different substance (32). 
A last similarity between Cassiodorus and Tertullian is to the effect of the free will. 
Tertullian is arguing in 21 for the fact that the choices of the human being drive a human 
character towards good or evil. But in principle the nature of the human being is morally neutral 
(Tertullian is arguing against the Gnostics to the effect that Adam was born morally neutral, 
without an adverse material element in his nature). In Tertullian’s words: 
 
‘This will be the power of the grace of God, more potent indeed than nature, exercising 
its sway over the faculty that underlies itself within us-even the freedom of our will, which is 
described as ‘autecousion’ (of independent authority); and inasmuch as this faculty is itself also 
 
dico et latitudinem et sublimitatem, quibus metantur corpora philosophi. ‘When we aver that the soul has a body of a quality 
and kind peculiar to itself, in this special condition of it we shall be already supplied with a decision respecting all the 
other accidents of its corporeity; how that they belong to it, because we have shown it to be a body, but that even 
they have a quality peculiar to themselves, proportioned to the special nature of the body (to which they belong); or 
else, if any accidents (of a body) are remarkable in this instance for their absence, then this, too, results from the 
peculiarity of the condition of the soul's corporeity, from which are absent sundry qualities which are present to all 
other corporeal beings. And yet, notwithstanding all this, we shall not be at all inconsistent if we declare that the 
more usual characteristics of a body, such as invariably accrue to the corporeal condition, belong also to the soul-
such as form and limitation; and that triad of dimensions -I mean length, and breadth and height-by which 
philosophers gauge al bodies’; 10, Pertinet ad statum fidei simplicem animam determinare secundum Platonem, id est uniformem, 
dumtaxat substantiae nomine. ‘It is essential to a firm faith to declare with Plato that the soul is simple; in other words 
uniform and uncompounded; simply that is to say in respect of its substance’ (trans. Holmes). 
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natural and mutable, in whatsoever direction it turns, it inclines of its own nature.’498 (trans. 
Holmes) 
 
Cassiodorus could thus have read from this that the free will (liberam arbitriam potestas) 
provides for the human soul to be mutable (mutabilis) towards evil. It is specifically here that 
Tertullian speaks of ‘the power of free choice’, which later would be converted by Augustine into 
‘the free choice of the will’ in his lib. arb., substituting voluntas for potestas in his title. When 
reading Tertullian, Cassiodorus would have been thinking of voluntas, and not so much of 
reasonable judgment. As indicated, Tertullian uses ‘to opinionate’ (opninari) for ‘judging’. 
Cassiodorus therefore could have taken his differentiation between reasonable judgement and 
the will from Tertullian as well. It therefore seems likely, even if this judgement is derived from a 
rather superficial glance, that Cassidorus read and used Tertullian’s De anima as well.  
 
 
498 21, Haec erit uis diuinae gratiae, potentior utique natura, habens in nobis subiacentem sibi liberam arbitrii potestatem quod 
αὐτεξούσιον dicitur, quae cum sit et ipsa naturalis atque mutabilis, quoquo uertitur, natura conuertitur. 
 3. Eugippius 
 
 
3.1 Table 1. contents of the Excerpta 
 
In the following table on the basis of Knöll’s edition, the parts and chapters of the 
Excerpta are my abstractions, the only ‘real’ things are the paragraphs.499 In the capitula at the 
beginning of the Excerpta Eugippius shortly names, summarizes or introduces every excerpt, but 
certainly does not divide the whole of his Excerpta in larger partitions.  
 
Parts ‘Chapters’ Paragraphs 
(Knöll) 
 Topics 
A 1 1-24  Love; Human virtues and pitfalls; 
the true and the false mediator of 
sin 
(Salvation  
 History) 
2 25-44  The Fall and the origin of evil (The 
Origenist heresy); divine 
providence 
 3 45-203  Questions concerning Biblical 
history, chronologically ordered 
   45-130 Old Testament 
   131-174 Laws, transgressions, the end of time 
and the resurrection 
   175-203 New Testament  
     
B 4 204-241  Instruction of the laity and 
baptism, the state of darkness of 
 
499 In the CSEL-edition, the Excerpta has two systems of numbering excerpts, one using Roman numerals and one 
using Arabic numerals. The first system is given by Eugippius, and the way that he numbers his excerpts may 
indicate something about the coherence he perceives in the paragraphs. The second system is given by the editor 
Knöll. This system breaks many of Eugippius’ larger paragraphs up into smaller ones. In order to make his Excerpta 
as useful a possible, Eugippius is careful in indicating the source, both at the beginning of a paragraph and also in 
the middle when the source changes. Whenever Eugippius changed the source in the middle of an excerpt, Knöll 
was prompted to give a new number. Knöll therefore recognizes some 40 more paragraphs then Eugippius himself, 
on a total of 384 by Knöll’s counting. In this chapter Knöll’s numbering is used by default and Eugippius’ 
numbering only if it is relevant evidence for his perception of coherence of the excerpts. 
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the unbaptized 
(Contemporary 5 242-269  The Trinity 
Christianity) 6 270-304  Signs and rules of exegesis 
 7 305-323  The Pelagian heresy, 
predestination, grace and 
concupiscentia 
 8 324-276  Contemporary Christianity 
   323-327 Martyrs and treating the dead 
   328-341 God in ‘daily life’; praying; intentions; 
sinning; the body)  
   342-346 The Saints 
   347-349 The Septuagint 
   350-376 Body; soul; varia 
  9 377-384  Love  
 
 
3.2 Table 2. Excerpts relating to the soul, relevant topics and 
related interests.  
 
In this table, on the basis of Knöll’s edition, I have made an entry for every passage of 
Augustine, so that if an excerpt contains more passages of Augustine this excerpt will be 
mentioned more often. The passages have been selected as a first tool of analysis of Eugippius’ 
Excerpta. They have therefore been chosen with a broad focus: excerpts directly related to 
anthropology (soul, body, spirit) has been inserted. They have further been grouped to gain an 
understanding of the ‘weight’ of Eugippius’ interest in Augustine’s normal topics on the soul 
(such as ‘origin of the soul’ or ‘trinitarian structures in the soul’). In the group belonging to the 
origin of the soul excerpt 50-2 have been inserted, even though they do not bear a direct 
relationship to the origin of the soul. However, their insertion should make clear clear how 
Eugippius’ solution of the transmission of original sin through rationes seminales shapes up 
throughout the excerpts. This then leads up to Eugippius’ stress of Augustine’s agnosticism 
concerning the question of the origin of the soul in 372, a question largely devoid of polemical 
content if one followed the line of the excerpts. This table should also show the care with which 
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Eugippius composed excerpt 372. It is the only excerpt on the soul which consists of several 
source texts. 
 
 
Origin of the soul 
 
Excerpt 
nr. 
Eugippius 
(after 
Knöll) 
Title Work of 
Augustine 
Passage Topic 
31 Contra eos qui 
dicunt ob hoc 
factum esse 
mundum, ut 
animae quae 
prius peccaverant 
in eo 
includerentur; 
ubi et Origenem 
errasse probat 
contra libros 
ipsius, qui 
appelantur. 
civ. 11.23 About Origin’s error to 
state that the world was 
created for the punishment 
of fallen souls 
39 Contra eos qui 
dicunt, cur 
creaverit deus 
hominem, quem 
peccaturem esse 
praesciebat. 
Gn. Litt. 11.4.6-
15/20 
Why first sin? Good and 
evil in the world and how 
they work in the plan of 
God. 
40 De decimatione 
Levi in lumbis 
Abrahae. 
Gn. litt. 10.20.3
5-21.37 
Transmission of original sin 
through the rationes 
seminales.  
50 De locutione 
serptentis et 
Evam et de 
incantationibus 
Marsorum. 
Gn.litt. 11.27.4
3-30,38 
Story of evil pt 1: devil 
51 Qualiter 
intellegendum 
sit: Ecce Adam 
factus est tamquam 
unus ex nobis. 
Gn.litt. 11.39.5
3-41.56 
Story of evil pt 2: adam 
52 Quomodo Adam 
non sit seductus, 
ut dicit 
apostolus, cum 
idem dicat eum 
Gn.litt 11.42.5
8-42.60 
Story of evil pt 3: cast from 
paradise. 
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praevaricationem 
53 De creatione 
primi hominis et 
de causalibus 
rationibus vel 
quomodo 
dicantur additi 
anni XV 
Ezechiae regi ad 
vitam, quem 
praedixerat non 
victurum. 
Gn litt: 6.9.16-
18.29 
Causal reasons and the 
creation of Adam. 
 
82 Quid est: de manu 
fratris exquiram 
animam hominis. 
qu.  1.16 Gen. 9.5. understanding the 
human being through his 
kinship with Adam.  
103 Quomodo 
intellegendum sit 
tot animas exisse 
de femoribus 
Iacob. 
qu.  1.151 Souls from liam/thighs of 
Iacob. No argument for 
traducianism, since ‘soul’ is 
a pars pro toto for ‘human 
being’ 
372 De animae 
quaestione. 
ep. 190.16-
19 
Agnosticism concerning 
creationism and 
traducianism supported.  
372 De animae 
quaestione. 
ep.  202a.6.1
5; 
18.23-
25 
Agnosticism concerning 
creationism and 
traducianism supported. 
372 De animae 
quaestione. 
ep.  205.19 Agnosticism concerning 
creationism and 
traducianism supported. 
372 De animae 
quaestione. 
retr. 1.1.3 Agnosticism concerning 
creationism and 
traducianism supported. 
 
 
Trinity 
 
265 De 
interrogatione 
haeretici contra 
eos qui 
unigentum dei 
non paternae 
substantiae, sed 
voluntatis filium 
esse dixerunt. 
trin. 15.38-9 How the trinity in the soul 
of memory, will and 
understanding only 
imperfectly mirrors the 
Trinity of the persons of 
God.  
266 Tria quae sunt in 
imagine dei, id 
trin.  15.42 How the trinity in the soul 
of memory, will and 
Appendix 3: Eugippius 
 
188 
est memoria, 
intellectus et 
amor, unius esse 
persona, quia 
non hoc est ei 
esse quod haec 
habere. 
understanding only 
imperfectly mirrors the 
Trinity of the persons of 
God.  
267 Quam vera in dei 
trinitate unitas et 
quam vera in 
eiusdem unitate 
sit trinitas. 
trin.  15.43 How the trinity in the soul 
of memory, will and 
understanding only 
imperfectly mirrors the 
Trinity of the persons of 
God.  
 
 
Inner man 
 
12 De simplo 
salvatoris nostri, 
quod ad duplum 
nostrum 
concurrit et 
congruit.  
trin.  4.3.5-
4.7 
How the single death of 
Christ offsets the double 
death of the human being. 
Renewing of inner man. 
262 Quibus 
progressibus 
mens 
corporalium 
rerum sus et 
imagine delectata 
ab aeternorum 
contemplatione 
deficiat. 
trin. 12.8.13 Progression of the soul 
towards reason which is 
the inner man. This gets 
bogged down by the 
temptations of external 
world.  
 
 
Variae 
 
360 De hominem 
facto ad 
imaginem et 
similitudinem 
dei. 
div. qu.  51 Different ways of being 
able to say that the human 
being was made in the 
image and likeness of God 
(soul, spirit, body) 
203 Utrum aliud sit 
anima, aliud 
spiritus, an 
utroque nomine 
res una vocetur. 
an. et or. 4.22.36-
24.38 
With ‘spirit’ one refers 
either to the rational 
human soul (animus) or to 
the whole of the soul 
(anima). 
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171 
(up to 
173) 
Quomodo 
Porphyrii 
definitio, qua 
beatis animis 
putat corpus 
omne 
fugiendum, 
ipsius Platonis 
sententia 
destruatur, qui 
dicit summum 
deum dis 
promisisse ut 
numquam 
corporibus 
exverentur. 
  On the resurrection of the 
flesh. 
 
 
3.3 table 3. Comparison edition Eugippius’ Excerpta in PL and 
Knöll  
 
The PL reprinted the editio princeps of the Excerpta published in Basle by Iohannes Herold 
(1542) (Gorman, ‘The manuscript tradition of Eug. Excerpta I’, 9) 
 
checked per incipit and ending of each excerpt. 
 
with Knöll: ‘litterae p. in., m., s.f. quas addidi, post initium, medium, sub finem significant.' 
 
PL edition 
(‘prout 
auctor ipse 
digessit.’) 
text of 
Augustine 
Knöll 
edition in 
Eug.’s 
counting 
Knöll in 
Knöll’s 
counting 
text of 
Augustine 
topic 
xxvi conf. xii.25, 
34 et 35 
conf. xii. 
27,37- 32,43 
x 25 conf. XII.25, 
34 et 35 
 
  xi 26 conf. 
XII.27,37-
32, 43 m.  
 
xxvii idem xii 27 Gn. litt.  I 
1,1-9,15 
 
xxviii idem xiii 28 civ. .XI 4,1-
4,2m. 
 
xxix idem xiiii 29 civ. XI 5m-  
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8s.f. 
xxx idem xv 30 civ. XI 9 in.-
10 
 
xxxi idem xvi 31 civ. XI.23 
s.f. 
origin’s 
error 
xxxii idem xvii 32 resp. ad or. 
3,3 p. in. -, 7 
s.f. 
 
xxxiii idem xviii 33 resp. ad or. 
8,11-11,14 
s.f. 
 
xxxiv idem xviiii 34 de haeres. 42 
s.f. et 43 
origin’s 
error 
xxxv idem xx 35 civ. XII 12 
s.f.-15 
 
xxxvi idem xxi 36 civ. XII 
5x.f.-9 s.f. 
 
xxxvii idem xxii 37 Gn. litt. XI 
16,21 
 
xxxviii idem xxiii 38 Gn.litt. XI 
23,30-25.32 
s.f. 
 
xxxix idem xxiiii 39 Gn. litt. 
XI.4, 6-15, 
20 s.f. 
good and 
evil in the 
plan of God 
NOT  xxv 40 Gn. litt. X. 
20, 35-22, 
38 
Transmissio
n of original 
sin through 
the rationes 
seminales. 
xl idem xxvi 41 Gn.litt. VIII 
6,12 
 
xli idem  xxvii 42 Gn.litt. viii 
13,28 p. in. -
16,35 s.f. 
 
xlii idem xxviii 43 Gn.litt. viii 
9,17-10,19 
 
xliii idem xxviiii 44 Gn. litt. viii 
19.38 m. -
24.45 s.f. 
 
xliv idem xxx 45 Gn.litt. viii 
25.47 s.f.-
27.50 s.f. 
 
xlv idem  xxxi 46 qu. i 2  
xlvi idem xxxii 47 qu. i 3  
xlvii idem  xxxiii 48 qu. i 4  
xlviii idem  xxxiiii 49 civ. xv 24 s.f. 
-27 
 
NOT  xxxv  50 Gn. litt. XI 
27, 34-30, 
story of evil 
pt 1: devil 
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38 
xlix idem xxxvi 51 Gn.litt. XI 
39, 53-41, 
56 
story of evil 
pt 2: adam 
l idem xxxvii 52 Gn. litt. XI 
42, 58- 42, 
60 s.f.  
story of evil 
pt 3: cast 
from 
paradise 
li idem xxxviii 53 Gn.litt. VI 
9,16 s.f.- 
19,30 
causal 
reasons and 
the creation 
of Adam. 
lxxx idem  lxvii 82 qu. 1.16 Gen. 9.5 
understandi
ng the 
human 
being 
through 
kinship with 
adam 
ci idem lxxxviii 103 qu. 1.151 thighs of 
iacob, no 
argument 
for 
traducianis
m since 
‘soul’ is a 
pars pro 
toto for 
‘human 
being’ 
cccxli idem cccxxxi 365 div. qu. 45  
cccxlii idem  366 div. qu. 63  
NOT   367 div. qu. 43  
cccxlii b idem cccxxxii 368 nat. b. 24 
s.f.-30 
 
cccxliii idem cccxxxiii 369 ep. 205.2-4; 
9-9m. 
 
xcccxliv idem cccxxxiiii 370 ep. 
205.14m.-16 
 
cccxlv idem + 372 cccxxxv 371 ep. 205.17  
  cccxxxvi 372 ep. 205.19 
retr. 1.1.3 
s.f. (not 
seen by 
Knöll) 
de animae 
quaestione 
   372a ep 190. 
16 p. in.-19 
 
de animae 
quaestione 
   372b ep. 202a de animae 
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6.15; 18.23-
25 
quaestione 
cccxlvi idem cccxxxvii 373 pecc. mer. ii 
34.54m.-
36.59 s.f. 
 
cccxlvii idem cccxxxviii 374 qu. iiii 24  
NOT  cccxxxviiii 375 qu. iiii 25  
cccxlviii idem cccxl 376 qu. v 42  
NOT   376a c. iul. imp. iii 
84 s.f. 
 
cccxlix idem cccxli 377 ep. 140.9.24 
m. -10.26 
 
cccl idem cccxlii 378 div. qu. 35  
NOT  cccxliii 379 trin. viii 6.9 
s.f. - 8.12 
 
NOT  cccxlviiii 380 trin. viii 
8.12-12 s.f. 
 
NOT  cccxlv 381 trin. viii 8.12 
s.f.-10.14 
 
NOT  cccxlvi 382 trin. viii 
10,14-14 m. 
 
cccli idem cccxlvii 383 div. qu. 36  
ccclii idem cccxlviii 384 s. 150  
 
 
 
The excerpts chekced are from 25 to 53 (Knöll counting) since that is where the 
‘storyline’ of salvation history and the ‘story of evil’ takes place. Further excerpts 82 and 103 
have been checked (even though they do not figure in the main argument of chapter 2) for their 
ties between the soul and the human body. Finally from 365 up untill the end at 348, comprising 
of the crucial excerpt 372 (de animae quaestione) in order to show the many differences between 
the editions at the end of the Excerpta. A quick view, but not taken in in this table, confirms that 
the beginning of the editions manifest differences too. 
Overall the structure of Knöll is equal to that of the PL, with Knöll taking in more 
excerpts than the PL. This is especially clear at the end of the Excerpta where Knöll 379-82 adds 
excerpts from the trin. envelopped in excerpts from the n between div. qu. Excerpt 372 is not 
recognised as a proper excerpt in the PL but merged with excerpt 371 (= PL cccxlv), with the 
titles combined (Utrum singillatim a Deo creatore corporum lineamenta formentur, et de animae quaestione. 
Ex eadem epistola, vel ex duabus epistolis ad Optatum.’ ). Relevant for the argument of the chapter are 
two observations.   
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The argument is strengthened by the equal structure in early part of the history of 
salvation (1), but weakened by the absence of excerpt 40 (2), which is to set up the causal 
reasons as an alternate explanation for the transmission of original sin. The easy explanation of 
its absence in the PL is that it is an interpolation, in which case Eugippius himself cannot be held 
responsible for this excerpt.  
However the manuscript evidence, insofar as it can be surmised from secondary 
literature (see literature below and Knöll’s introduction to his edition), seems inconclusive as to 
excerpt 40 being an interpolation. According to Knöll’s apparatus criticus, for the reading of 
excerpt 40 he used mss. P, G, T, and M, so that excerpt 40 is included in at least those mss. With 
the help of Gorman, this can be refined to P1(δ), G(δ), T(β), and M(γ), with the greek letters 
indicating the mss. families the mss. are part of. The mss. are as follows: 
 
T  Codex Parisinus, numero 2109 signatus, olim Tellerianus Remensis 259. Reg. 
4015.2....hic liber saeculo VIIII...dimidiam partem Excerptorum, capita CLXV, usque ad caput 
CLVIII h. ed., neque umquam plura continebat.. (Knöll, XXI-XXII) 
 = Paris BN lat. 2109, incomplete, saec, ix in. (ante A.D. 828)...The last chpter is 
numbered 165 (= Knöll 173a). (Gorman, ‘The manuscript tradition I’, 23) 
 
P Codex Parisinus, 11,642, olim Sangermanensis, sicut in fronte libri adnotatum 
est...VIIII saeculo exaratus...Excerpta integra complectitur. (Knöll XXII-XXIII) 
 = Paris BN lat. 11642, saec. IX med., Saint-Germain-des-Prés...Derives from two 
exemplars. The first part (f. 1-218v; P1) from a manuscript of the δ family; the second )f. 219-
224; P2) from a manscript of the α family..(Gorman I, 24). P1’s last excerpt is 173a, so that 
excerpt 40 falls into P1 (Gorman II, 238). 
 
G Codex Sangallensis, numero 176 notatus VIIII saeculo...totum Eugippium 
continet Excerptorum capita 366. 
 = St. Gall Stiftsbibliothek 176, saec. IX med...Written under Grimand (A.D. 811-
82) and presented by him, this manuscript appeas in the ninth century catalogue of St. Gall...The 
exemplar of Vercelli XXX (94), saec. IX-X (H). Copied directly from Paris lat. 2110, saec. VIII 
in. (O). (Gorman I, 25). 
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M Codex Mediomontanus numero 12,263 signatus...saeculi VIII scriptus...integra 
Eugippii Excerpta continet, nisi quod Epistulae pars maxima (usque ad p. 3,25) desideratur 
(Knöll XVIIII) 
 = Rome Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Sesorianus 590, saec. VIII-IX...Although 
copied from Vat. lat. 3375 (V), the manuscript is of value for those passages missing or rewritten 
in Vat. lat. 3375 (V) [V which functioned as Knöll’s codex optimus -SH] (Gorman I, 24). 
 
The stemma codicum (Gorman II, 229) reveals there are four families. Excerpt 40 
appears in P1, G, T, and M, which are members of resp. δ, δ, β, and γ. The alpha family, 
containing C (= Monte Cassino 13, written during Abbot Desiderius 1058-1087), is considered 
by Gorman to be the best witness to the original structure of the Excerpta and its text (Gorman 
II, 235). The beta family provides the highest quality of text (Gorman II 237). The gamma family 
contains the oldest ms. V (= Vat. lat. 3375 saec VI ex.) and was ‘treated by Knöll as the 
archetype of the Excerpta.’ However ‘criticism of Knöll’s edition and editorial technique easily 
became an attack on his innocent codex optimus, unjustly maligned.’ (Gorman II, 241). In this 
family several interpolations have been identified, e.g. Knöll 8 and 9, and it lacks some excerpts 
contained in the other mss. families e.g. 10-24 (Gorman II, 241 n. 4). About the delta family, 
Gorman notes that ‘It is an unfortunate irony of the history of the transmission of Eugippius’ 
influential florilegium that the most numerous family of old manuscripts, designated here the δ 
family, is, from a textual point of view, by far the worst’ and his hypothesis is that they share an 
Insular hyparchetype (Gorman II, 244.) Gorman therefore concludes (II, 263): ‘Pius Knöll’s 
edition of the Excerpta, in many ways a remarkable achievement in 1885, reveals neither the 
original structure of Eugippius’ work nor the precise text of the archetype which is potentially so 
valuable for analyzing the manuscript traditions and establishing the texts of St Augustine’s 
works.’ 
For excerpt 40 this means that it is contained in at least three out of four mss. families. 
Knöll does not seem to have known or used mss. from the alpha family, so that from Knöll’s 
lack of use of a mss. of that family for excerpt 40 it cannot be concluded that excerpt 40 is not 
present in it. A hint in this direction is the lack of excerpt 40 in the editio princeps of Herold, but 
since it is unknown which mss. he used, this cannot be taken as a foregone conclusion. 
Gorman’s adhortation that a scholar editing Augustine or studying the manuscript tradition of 
one of his works should have a microfilm of Monte Cassino 13 (C) and Munich Clm 6247 (F), 
seems applicable to this case as well (Gorman II, 264). As it is at present unavailable, I would like 
to point to the fact that the excerpt is contained in three out of four families. This increases 
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likelihood of inclusion of excerpt 40 in Eugippius’ archetype considerably. Moreover, in either 
edition is Adam created in excerpt 53 as a complete human being through the causal reasons right 
after the ‘story of evil’ ends. The placement of this excerpt still seems to show how Adam could 
have been influenced by evil, and how he transmitted his evil to later generations. Excerpt 40 ties 
the causal reasons to the transmission of original sin in a far more explicit way, but the 
placement of excerpt 53 seems indicative of the same mode of thinking. However, the fact that 
excerpt 40 is not included in Migne still casts doubts.  
 
 
3.4 Chapter titles for excerpt 40 
 
XXIX  Quod anima hominis domino tolerabilius dicatur sine adfirmatione sententiae unde prima 
hominis quam de primo homine. 
 It should be more tolerable to say that the soul of a human being was given to the 
Lord, without asserting a judgement about the question whence the first soul of the human 
being came rather than from the first human being. 
XXX  Dicit sortis nomen huis singulari animae fuisse adiunctum ad auferendam suspicionem 
praecedentium meritorum. 
 He says that the name ‘lot’ was connected to this single soul in order to remove 
suspicions of preceding merits. 
XXXI   Argumentum pro secunda opinione. 
  Argument for the second opinion. 
XXXII  Hic medius prospectator utriusque partes suas agit. 
  Here the neutral analyst of both opinions explains his own perspective. 
XXXIII Argumentum pro prima opinione. 
  Argument for the first opinion. 
XXXIV  Quod anima Christi non sit ex traduce Adae adversum opinionem secundam. 
That the soul of Christ does not come from Adam as propagator, against the second 
opinion. 
XXXV  Huic respondet, qui medius inter utrosque disceptantes incedit. 
  He, who steps in the middle between the two disputing sides, answers 
him. 
It is remarkable that Eugippius correctly identifies two opinions (traducianism, 
creationism), but chooses to name the first one he sees – traducianism – ‘second opinion’ and 
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the second one – creationism – ‘first opinion’. The reason for this may be found in the 
following. From the chapter onwards in which Augustine identifies himself as a neutral observer 
of the discussion500, he presents the reader first with the argument for creationism containing the 
rationes seminales (which I have discussed earlier) and an argument against the idea of a 
propagation of the soul of Christ.501 The argument for traducianism thus becomes the second 
opinion by Eugippius’ counting. But he is forced to mention it first when Augustine shortly 
states the traducianist position before he even presents himself as neutral in these paragraphs. 
chapter titles for excerpt 53 
 
X Hic quattuor veluti gradus ponit cognitionis rerum vel agnitionis causalibus in verbo Dei in elementis 
mundi, in rebus secundum originem suis iam temporibus factis in seminibus. 
XI Docet perfectionem operis, quod Deus in origine mundi creavit omnia simul, inchoationem non 
alterius sed eiusdem operis esse, quo in eiusdem mundi administratione usque nunc operatur. 
XII Quaestio quomodo tunc inchoavit, quando consummavit. 
XIII Hic docet hominem in tempore suo formatum visibiliter et invisibiliter, id est animam et corpus, et 
ante hanc formationem praedestinatum dicit in praescientia Dei. 
XIV Hominem dicit non ideo ceteris in hoc mundo animalibus praelatum, quia ab ipso proprie dicitur 
factus, sed quia imago in eo et similitudo est Dei. 
XV Manus Dei est non visibile membrum, sed efficiendi potentia. 
XVI Instructio etiam non parva etiam statura corporis nostri ad caelestia requirenda. 
XVII Quod voluntas Dei sit summa causa, a qua rerum causae ordinatissime, ut ei placuit, extiterunt. 
XVIII Quaestio, utrum origo perfectas in se rerum formas gestarit an perper temporum temporum legales 
numeros et successus aetatum, et respondetur utrumque inditum primordialibus causis, quo creatura omnis ab 
origine conditionis suae serviat arbitrio creatoris.  
XIX Hic voluntatem Dei omnipotentis, bonitate et nulla necessitate hominem fecisse subtili disputatione 
monstratur. 
XX Et hic posse et necesse esse quam vim in verbis vel effectis obtineant subtilissime demonstratur. 
XXI Hic Ezechias inducitur ad documentum possibilitatis et necessitatis. 
XXII Quod Adam credibilius dicatur perfectae virilitatis factus a Deo. 
 
 
500 From ‘hoc ad me non multum adtinet’ (10.20.35). 
501 Which is chapter XXXIV, starting with ‘quapropter quod anima Christi non sit ex traduce animae illius primae 
praevaricatricis’ (10.21.37).  
